The Israeli Experience In Lebanon, 1982-1985
- ️John Pike
The Israeli Experience In Lebanon, 1982-1985
CSC 1987
SUBJECT AREA History
THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE IN LEBANON, 1982-1985
Major George C. Solley
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia
10 May 1987
ABSTRACT
Author: Solley, George C., Major, USMC
Title: Israel's Lebanon War, 1982-1985
Date: 16 February 1987
On 6 June 1982, the armed forces of Israel invaded Lebanon in
a campaign which, although initially perceived as limited in
purpose, scope, and duration, would become the longest and most
controversial military action in Israel's history. Operation
Peace for Galilee was launched to meet five national strategy
goals: (1) eliminate the PLO threat to Israel's northern border;
(2) destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon; (3) remove Syrian
military presence in the Bekaa Valley and reduce its influence in
Lebanon; (4) create a stable Lebanese government; and (5)
therefore strengthen Israel's position in the West Bank.
This study examines Israel's experience in Lebanon from the
growth of a significant PLO threat during the 1970's to the
present, concentrating on the events from the initial Israeli
invasion in June 1982 to the completion of the withdrawal in June
1985. In doing so, the study pays particular attention to three
aspects of the war: military operations, strategic goals, and
overall results.
The examination of the Lebanon War lends itself to division
into three parts. Part One recounts the background necessary for
an understanding of the war's context -- the growth of PLO power
in Lebanon, the internal power struggle in Lebanon during the long
and continuing civil war, and Israeli involvement in Lebanon prior
to 1982. The second part deals with the four distinct phases of
Israeli military operations in Lebanon: (1) the eight-day
offensive which shattered the PLO and seriously damaged Syrian
occupation forces; (2) the consolidation of gains and seige of
West Beirut; (3) the occupation of territory pending political
settlement; and (4) the phased withdrawal from Lebanon.
Part Three examines the results of the war in terms of military
lessons learned, degree of success of war goals, and overall
effects of the war on Israel, Lebanon, and the Palestinian
movement.
In brief, the Israeli Defense Force conducted a successful
combined arms offensive which achieved every military objective
assigned it, but which revealed certain weakness in force
structure and tactics. Strategic goals were initially met with
the evacuation of much of the PLO from Beirut and the defeat of
Syrian forces in the Bekaa; however,long term results have been a
renewed PLO presence in Lebanon, the rise of militant Shi'a
fundamentalist militias in the south, the almost total collapse of
any semblance of a Lebanese government, restored Syrian presence
and influence, deep domestic divisions in Israel concerning the
war, and increased political violence in the West Bank.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Chapter I. Introduction 1
Chapter II. Background 4
Chapter III. Plans and Preparations 40
Chapter IV. Invasion 58
Chapter V. Seige 97
Chapter VI. Occupation and Withdrawal 106
Chapter VII. IDF Lessons Learned 126
Chapter VIII. Conclusions 142
Bibliography 150
FIGURES
Figure 1. IDF Expansion, 1973-1982 16
Figure 2. IDF Organization 18
Figure 3. PLO Organization 23
Figure 4. Palestinian Factions 25
Figure 5. Lebanese Factions 29
Figure 6. IDF Order of Battle 48
Figure 7. PLO Order of Battle 50
Figure 8. Syrian Order of Battle 55
MAPS
Map 1. Religious Communities in Lebanon 27
Map 2. Areas of Control in Lebanon 35
Map 3. Topography of Lebanon 43
Map 4. PLO Dispositions 51
Map 5. Syrian Dispositions 53
(Vp6w6n?p 6. Israeli Advances -- 6 June 65
Map 7. Israeli Advances -- 7 June 68
Map 8. Israeli Advances -- 8 June 73
Map 9. Israeli Advances -- 9 June 78
Map 10. Israeli Advances -- 10 June 82
Map 11. Israeli Advances -- 11-12 June 85
Map 12. Beirut-Damascus Highway -- 22-25 June 91
Map 13. Beirut 96
Map 14. Beirut -- 1-4 August 102
Map 15. Israeli Dispositions -- Sept 82-Sept 83 113
Map 16. Israeli Dispositions -- Sept 83-Jan 85 115
Map 17. Israeli Dispositions -- Jan 85-June 85 123
CHAPTER I -- INTRODUCTION
Any attempt to examine one segment in the continuing Arab-
Israeli conflict runs into an immediate and unavoidable dilemma,
and this study of the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern
Lebanon from 1982 to 1985 is no exception. The dilemma is this:
the threads that must be woven together to produce a tapestry
which accurately and thoroughly depicts a particular conflict are
long and convoluted; the Lebanon conflict especially cannot be
understood without a knowledge of the greater Arab-Israeli
conflict, its roots and history -- both military and political.
Even that knowledge must be reinforced by further understanding
of both Arab and Jewish-Israeli history, culture, and society.
Obviously, a study which attempted such an encyclopedic approach
could not be confined to one volume -- much less to a research
paper. The approach of this study, therefore, is to rely on the
reader to bring with him an overall awareness of the greater
conflict and to provide only a brief account of the broader
struggle in order to concentrate on background events which
directly influenced the events and conduct of the Lebanon War.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the ensuing
three-year occupation are themselves multi-faceted. There is the
purely military struggle between Israel, on the one hand, and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Syria, and Lebanese
militias on the other. There is a political struggle on several
levels -- within the Israeli government, within Israeli society,
between Israel and both its friends and adversaries, between
Syria and Lebanon, and within Lebanon. There is the effect of
the war on the pre-existing confessional conflict in Lebanon.
And there is the effect on the Palestinian problem as a whole,
including not only the PLO but also the Palestinian communities
in Lebanon, Israel, and elsewhere. Again, a relatively brief
examination of the war cannot hope to deal adequately with its
many facets in any detail, so this study will focus on its
military aspects. But to concentrate solely on the military
aspects of this war in particular would be to remove it from its
context and to mislead the reader, so the attempt has been made
to include enough related information that the reader may gain an
understanding of military events in their political context.
An additional problem in writing of the Lebanon War concerns
the matter of sources. One might expect to find only
contemporary press accounts supplemented by a few journal
articles, but in fact a number of full-length works concerning
the war (or at least the invasion through the siege of Beirut)
have appeared in the last few years. In dealing with these
works, and in particular when dealing with press reports, care
must be exercised to maintain a balanced viewpoint. This
conflict, like the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, brings forth
an emotionally charged reaction from anyone who subscribes to the
views of one side or the other, and in this case the deep
division within Israel over the war has led to substantially
different accounts even among Israeli writers. The sources,
then, can be divided into four points of view, each represented
by writers whose approach varies from balanced, factual, and
reasoned to biased, unreliable, and emotional: anti-Israeli and
pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli and anti-Palestinian but pro-
Lebanese, pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian, and pro-Israeli and
reasonably balanced concerning the Palestinians. In dealing with
these sources the researcher must recognize any inherent biases
on the parts of the authors and accept as legitimate only that
information which can be verified. In addition, all Israel
Defense Force reports are kept secret for thirty years, and
American reports resulting from liaison with the Israelis also
remain classified. Nevertheless, one can build an accurate and
fairly complete picture of the war by comparing information from
a number of sources.
This study represents an attempt to build such a picture by
examining the events which led to the war, the characteristics of
its participants, the way in which it was fought, and its overall
results.
CHAPTER II -- BACKGROUND
It is difficult to define the amount of background
information the reader may need for an understanding of the
Lebanon War, but there is no doubt that some knowledge of the
roots of the war is necessary. In order to dig out those roots
without trying to cover the entire history of the Middle East, it
is possible to examine the influences on the conflict in four
areas: the military aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the
development of the Israel Defense Force; the history of the
Palestinians and the PLO in Lebanon; and the growing role of
Israel in Lebanese affairs.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
The historical roots of Arab-Israeli hostility can be traced
as far back as one wishes to go, and some Arabs and Israelis
argue the issue from a Biblical starting point, anchoring their
key points in events of 3,000 years ago. Be that as it may, the
modern conflict has its genesis in the Zionist movement of the
late 19th century, when the Jewish population in Palestine
increased from some 25,0002 in 1881 to more than 80,0002 in 1914.
Unlike the Palestinian Jews, the Zionist immigrants came to till
the soil and were determined to defend themselves in a land where
Bedouin and other Arab bandits regularly plundered villages and
robbed travelers; these Zionists established barricaded villages
guarded by the first Jewish defense organizations, Hashomer ("the
Watchman").4
World War I was a watershed for both Jews and Arabs.
Palestinian Jews served initially at Gallipoli in the Zion Mule
Corps; later, after the Balfour Declaration gave British approval
for "establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for the
Jewis people," the Jewish Legion participated in Allenby's
campaign to drive the Ottoman Turks from Palestine, Lebanon, and
Syria. Also serving under Allenby was the Arab Legion, commanded
by the Arabian Sheik Faisal--great-uncle of Jordan's King
Hussein--and advised by the T. E. Lawrence.5 At war's end, Britain
received the Palestinian mandate, but in order to conquer the
region, she had encouraged both Zionist aspirations and Arab
nationalism in Arabia, Trasnsjordan, and Palestine.
These conflicting aspirations resulted in bloody clashes
during the period of the British Mandate in Palestine. The
increasing number of authorized Jewish immigrants spurred Arab
anti-Jewish riots in the 1920's, which in turn led to the
creation of the country-wide militia that was father of the
Israel Defense Force--the Haganah.6 By the outbreak of World
War II, the Jewish population had reached 445,000; thousands of
Jews had received paramilitary training as part of the Jewish
Settlement Police; and the best of these underwent special
training under Orde Wingate in the counterguerilla Special Night
Squads. In addition, the Zionist radical right had formed its own
militia, the Irgun Zvai Leumi.On the Arab side, banditry and
riots had begun to be supplemented by trained guerillas under the
command of a former Ottoman army officer named Fawzi al-Kawukji.
World War II again brought military training to the
Palestinian Jews, as some 32,000 joined the British forces.
Meanwhile, the Haganah organized a full-time military force, the
Palmach, which participated as scouts and commandos in the
British operations against Vichy Lebanon and Syria. After the
war, the Haganah concentrated on building an army-in-waiting and
on facilitating illegal immigration from Europe, while the Irgun
and its offshoot Lohamei Herut Yisrael ("Fighters for Israel's
Freedom", LEHI to Israelis and the Stern Gang abroad), indulged
in a terrorist campaign against the British. Arab guerilla groups
-- many of whom had also received British training -- fought both
British and Jews.7
The first Arab-Israel war actually began in November 1947,
when the United Nations commenced its plan to partition Palestine
and the British agreed to withdraw within six months. The war
unfolded in several phases, the first two of which consisted of
an offensive by mostly Palestinian elements and a Jewish
counteroffensive. The Palestinians had formed a number of units
manned by armed Palestinians and Arab volunteers. One of these
units was commanded by the same Fawzi al-Kawukji; another by the
talented Abdul Kader Husseini -- a kinsman of Yasser Arafat.
During these phases, the Palestinians attacked Jewish villages
throughout Palestine, until the Jewish forces mustered the
strength to strike back. In April 1948, the Irgun seized the Arab
village of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem, and massacred some 250
men, women, and children in an action which more than any other
stimulated Palestinian flight into neighboring countries. By May,
the Palestinian offensive reached its apex when Arabs captured
the Jewish kibbutz of Kfar Etzion and committed their own,
retaliatory, massacre. However, soon after the Palestinians were
spent.
The final phases of the war began on 14 May 1948: the day the
British evacuation was completed, Israel declared her
independence, and forces from five Arab countries, including
Lebanon, invaded Palestine. On 26 May, the Israeli Army was
officially established by combining the various militias into the
Zva Haganah LeyIsrael (literally "Defense Army for Israel", and
officially Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, but known in Israel by
its popular acronym--Zahal). In a campaign which lasted until
June of 1949 (although the fighting was mostly over by December
1948), the Israeli Army defeated each invading force in detail.8
The signing of armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon in 1949 did not end the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Rather, the conflict became institutionalized. In the years
following the War for Independence, Israel continued to build her
army and to define a defense doctrine, while at the same time
strengthening her population base by the encouragement of
unlimited Jewish immigration. On the other side, the Arabs were
struggling to come to grips with the disaster of 1947-48, both in
Arab capitals and in the many Palestinian refugee camps scattered
throughout the Middle East. In the main, the early 1950's was a
time when both sides tested each other -- and themselves -- in
small raids, both by regular forces and armed Palestinian
Fedayeen (Arab for "self-sacrificers") guerillas from Gaza and
Jordan's West Bank. By October 1956, Egypt had regained
sufficient strength and confidence to close both the Suez Canal
and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, prompting Israel to
act in concert with Britain and France and launch an offensive
against Egyptian forces in the Sinai. That fast-moving operation
resulted in a swift Israeli victory: IDF mechanized and armored
columns reached the Suez Canal in less than four days, and in
another four days they seized the entire Sinai Peninsula,
destroying the equivalent of two Egyptian divisions in the
process.9
Again, a period of relative peace followed the Egyptian
defeat; but again, Egypt rebuilt its strength in preparation for
another clash with Israel. In May 1967, Egypt began to mass its
forces in the Sinai, concentrating some 95,000 men and nearly a
thousand tanks; President Nasser made increasingly bellicose
announcements and declared the closing of the Straits of Tiran to
Israeli shipping, while at the same time Jordan and Syria
mobilized their forces. To counter what it considered
increasingly dangerous preparations by the Arabs, Israel launched
a pre-emptive attack on 5 June. Begun with Israeli Air Force
(IAF) attacks on the airfields of all three countries, the
Israeli attack routed all three Arab forces in a mere six days,
with relatively low losses to the IDF.10
The Six Day War was an unparalleled success for Israel and
an unmitigated disaster for the Arabs. Egypt had suffered some
10,000 dead and lost the Sinai Peninsula for the second time in
11 years. Jordan had 1,000 killed and lost its remaining foothold
in Palestine on the West Bank, but more important to Arabs and
Israelis alike, it had lost the city of Jerusalem; Syria lost
over 2,000 killed and most of the Golan Heights, the strategic
hills overlooking northern Galilee. Moreover, the Israeli
success brought about an entirely new equation in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Although the territorial gains greatly enhanced
the security of Israel proper by distancing her from her enemies,
the gains also brought hundreds of thousands of Arabs under
Israeli control, caused a new wave of Palestinian refugees, and
stimulated the fortunes of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization as Palestinians lost faith in the ability of Arab
governments. As the Arabs despaired, Israelis rejoiced in the
belief that they had so thoroughly destroyed any threat to their
survival that lasting peace would now follow.
However, the war did not bring peace, but a three-year period
of non-stop conflict known in Israel as the War of Attrition.
This war was most intense along the Suez Canal, but was also
fought on the Syrian and Jordanian fronts; artillery exchanges,
ground raids, and air strikes exacted a steady toll on both
sides, and terrorist and guerilla attacks against Israeli
civilian targets became frequent. Although Israel fortified its
front lines, particularly along the Suez Canal and in the Golan
Heights, it also conducted long-range air strikes and armor
raids. It was Israeli air power, which struck deep into Arab
countries and destroyed over 60 MiG-21's (with the loss of only
two Mirages), which caused the Arabs to agree to a ceasefire in
August 1970. Israelis counted this non-war a victory, but --
although it cost nearly 600 Israeli lives -- the fighting did not
seriously test Israeli defenses in the occupied territories.11
That test came in October 1973. On the afternoon of 6
October, on the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), Egyptian
and Syrian Forces launched a well-coordinated surprise attack in
in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. On both fronts, Israeli
defenses were overrun and the small IDF forces were reduced to
fighting desperate holding actions while mobilization was slowly
taking place. In the Golan, the threat to Israel was more
immediate, since a short Syrian advance would put them among the
towns and settlements of northern Galilee. In the Sinai, the IDF
did not stem the Egyptian advance until 14 October, when IDF
armor defeated that of Egypt in a tremendous tank battle
involving nearly 2,000 tanks. The Israelis quickly seized the
offensive and crossed the Suez Canal, and by 24 October had
completely encircled the 45,000 men of the Egyptian 3rd Army.
Therefore the IDF conducted simultaneous offense and defense,
holding on by a thread in one sector while counterattacking in
another. By 11 October, the Syrian attack had been broken, and
IDF units had advanced to within artillery range of Damascus by
the next day. After a near superpower confrontation; a ceasefire
was imposed in 22 October.
The Yom Kippur War shook the Israelis out of their
complacent sense of military superiority -- for it had been a
near thing. On the other hand, the war increased Arab self-
respect and demonstrated that when supplied with sophisticated
weaponry and equipment, they became more formidable opponents.
The war also led to a number of developments in the continuing
conflict: Egypt signed the first peace treaty between Israel and
an Arab country; Jordan, which had stayed out of the war and
ceased providing a haven for PLO guerillas, became more
determined to shift attention from military to political action;
and attacks by the PLO, both within Israel and abroad, increased
in frequency. Now, however, these attacks did not emanate from
Egypt or Jordan, but from the growing PLO base in Lebanon. And it
was toward Lebanon that Israel turned her attention during the
l970's.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDF
Much of the doctrine and fighting characteristics of the IDF
stem from the pre-state era and the War for Independence. The
Haganah, which formed the core of the new IDF, emerged from a
strong pacifist background and at first strongly opposed the use
of force except in self-defense. This principle of self-
restraint, known to the Haganah as "to keep your weapon clean,"
later developed into the IDF concept of tohar haneshek, or purity
.of arms -- a concept which can loosely be described as morality
in war. Not all members of the Haganah agreed with what some
considered such a naive approach, and the establishment of the
Irgun and LEHI reflected that counter-policy, whose chief
characteristics were lack of restraint and a tendency to identify
as enemies all who stood between them and their goals. It was in
the Haganah that the first operational doctrine was formulated --
based particularly on the main principles espoused by Orde
Wingate. These principles included leadership by personal
example, purposeful discipline based on operational requirements,
careful planning down to the lowest levels, delegation of
authority to subordinates, encouragement of improvisation,
concentration on the main objective, exploitation of surprise and
mobility, use of night operations, and emphasis on ideological
motivation.
In matters of training, the chief influence on the IDF was
the Palmach, both because it served as the training ground for
many of the future leaders and because the training methods were
unconventional. Palmach training emphasized individual
responsbility, stressed the need for independence of action even
to the squad leader level, and instilled as military answers to
the Jewish lack of a conventional military force the concepts of
cohesion, group morale, inventive tactics, and daring
leadership.13 The War for Independence molded the different
elements of the Jewish defenses into a single military
organization based on these principles and practices. The
doctrinal concepts of the Haganah and the Palmach were proven
valid in that war, and the young members of those organizations
became the heroes of the war and the leaders of the post-war IDF.
After the War for Independence, the new IDF began to attain
its shape as a national military force. Confronted immediately
with the problem of how to provide a ready defense without the
draining burden of a large standing army, the IDF adopted a
modified Swiss model of reserve service. The IDF would be made up
of three components: Keva, the relatively small permanent service
of career officers and NCOs; Hova, conscripts undergoing
compulsory service; and Meluimm, the large standby reserve of
those whose compulsory service was completed. The IDF was
organized into an army, air force, and small navy -- all
subordinate to a Chief of Staff who reported directly to the
Minister of Defense. Within the IDF, three regional commands and
a General Staff reported to the Chief of Staff.
Also during these early years, the main strategic and
tactical doctrines of the IDF were defined. Stemming from certain
built-in constraints (lack of geographical depth, numerical
inferiority, and limited economic resources), the IDF developed
doctrinal concepts which still form the basis for Israeli
defense: 1) deterrence of Israel's larger enemies is only
possible through an effective and highly aggressive military
force; 2) effective intelligence is required to deny surprise to
the enemy; 3) pre-emptive attack is necessary to prevent enemy
penetration of Israeli territory; 4) reserve forces, the main
strength of the IDF, must be kept in a high state of proficiency,
equipment, and readiness; 5) a "fast-war doctrine" is necessary
to avert economic and human attrition.
Despite these developments, and partially because of the
IDF's role in assimilating immigrants from a myriad of
backgrounds into Israeli society, the IDF suffered a lapse of
effectiveness until Moshe Dayan became Chief of Staff in 1953.
Dayan, who had been a favored disciple of Orde Wingate, set about
to reinstill the Haganah/Palmach characteristics into an IDF made
up largely of immigrants. This he did while at the same time
developing the IDF's infantry capability in response to Fedayeen
attacks. The Sinai campaign affirmed the overall Israeli
approach, although it revealed weaknesses in logistics,
coordination, and armor. As a result, the armored corps was
greatly increased in number and quality, and air operations
received greater emphasis. The IDF's characteristics and
doctrinal concepts, however, remained the same.14
The June 1967 war further validated IDF doctrine and
character, and seemed also to demonstrate an Israeli edge in the
adaptation of modern, sophisticated weapons and equipment to the
battlefield. However, it was in this area of equipment that the
Israelis noticed problems, for its forces were equipped with a
wide variety of machines -- from modern Centurians to surplus
World War II Shermans. Troops followed the tanks in civilian
buses, and the navy could boast no craft built since 1945. Only
the air force contained quality equipment, and it was outnumbered
by almost three to one. The combination of poor equipment, good
leadership, and swift victory led to overconfidence on the part
of the IDF, especially as the outdated items were replaced by
first rate tanks, personnel carriers, missile boats, and
aircraft. More serious, the IDF combined arms doctrine was
supplanted by the belief (seemingly confirmed in the war) that
successful operations in the Middle East could be conducted with
tanks fighting virtually alone, without supporting infantry.
From an infantry-based force in the early 1950's, the IDF had
become an overwhelmingly armor-heavy force by the 1970's.15
Both the overconfidence and reliance on armored formations
received severe blows in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which
brought with it the realization that courage and initiative might
not in themselves prove sufficient for Israel's defense. In
addition to maintaining a qualitative edge, the IDF must obtain
quantitative comparability as well. In addition, the IDF had
encountered technological innovations for which it was
unprepared, particularly the surface-to-air (SAM) and anti-tank
missiles. Israeli human and equipment losses were high, but the
IDF immediately began to replace these losses and to begin an
enormous expansion in manpower, equipment, and complexity.
Figure 1 details that expansion, but the overall trends were a
great increase in the number of armor and artillery brigades, the
mechanization of infantry and artillery, and the tripling of the
number of tactical aircraft.16
This growth did bring with it certain problems. The
increase in manpower resulted from the acceptance of lower
quality conscripts, which in turn decreased the average quality
of the IDF soldier. Officer selection and promotion became more
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lax, because of both force expansion and the need to replace the
nearly 1,300 officers killed and wounded in the Yom Kippur War.
As the IDF grew, so did its complexity, command and control
difficulties, centralization, and bureaucracy.17 Finally, the
expansion had a severe economic effect: the money spent on
upgrading equipment was significant, and when added to that spent
dismantling IDF bases in the Sinai following the Camp David
Accords with Egypt and rebuilding them in Israel, caused defense
spending to jump from around 21 per cent of the GNP prior to
thewar to a high of 35 per cent in the mid-1970's; the store of
arms and ammunition, which was nearly exhausted early in the war,
was enlarged sufficiently to sustain 28 days of combat; and the
costs of equipment acquisition and force growth led to a cutback
in training time, live-fire exercises, flight time, and other key
training. However, a corresponding effect was the hastened
development of an arms industry in Israel which would reduce
dependence on overseas suppliers.18
Operationally, the IDF learned several lessons from the Yom
Kippur War. First, Israel underestimated the enemy. Second, the
IDF suffered an imbalance in the composition of its forces: the
lack of APC's inhibited mobility; artillery had been neglected
due to emphasis on aviation; and the IDF overrelied on armored
formations. Third, infantry was used very poorly. Fourth,
intelligence was not received in a timely manner nor applied
effectively in operations.19 The overall result of IDF changes
following 1973 was a much larger and more sophisticated force,
with more combat formations and a greater combined arms
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capability. Operational doctrine may have changed in some
technical aspects, but basic doctrine remained the same. That
doctrine is based on consideration of the threat and factors of
geography, population, economic resources, and superpower
intentions: Israel has no strategic depth; its population is
vastly less than its Arab opponents; its economy will not sustain
a prolonged war; and the superpowers will intervene to prevent
the total defeat of an Arab nation. Therefore, doctrine
emphasizes deterrence through the identification of casus belli,
decisive military victory, defensible borders, and an image of
autonomous action. These translate into operational emphasis on
offensive operations, pre-emption, speed, maneuver, exploitation
of technical and command superiority, and combined arms.20
THE PLO AND LEBANON
For much of the forty years of Arab-Israeli conflict Lebanon
has been the one area devoid of direct confrontation. After
agreeing to a ceasefire with the new state of Israel in 1949,
Lebanon was left with a major problem relating to the continuing
conflict -- the more than 100,000 Palestinian refugees who fled
north from 1947 to 1950.21 These refugees, mostly from Arab
settlements in northern Israel, were initially settled in camps
built by the French in the 1930's for Armenian and Kurdish
refugees. Rather quickly, however, the Lebanese government began
transferring them to some fifteen camps based on place of origin
in Israel. As was the case in other Arab countries, the Lebanese
government discouraged the integration of Palestinians into
Lebanon's own population, both because Arab states maintained a
tacit agreement that Palestinian refugees were politically more
useful than Palestinian citizens and because the Christian
leadership in Lebanon feared a sizable increase in the Muslim
population.22 In Lebanon, the conditions were worse for refugees
than in Jordan, Syria, or Egypt: regarded as "non-nationals,"
Palestinians were barred from any government work, including the
military, and their children were generally excluded from
Lebanese schools. However, a number of Palestinians who either
had money, were educated, or were related to Lebanese did manage
to obtain Lebanese citizenship.23
As the camps grew during the 1950's, so did the fledgling
resistance movement. The original Palestine National Assembly,
formed in Gaza in 1948, gradually gave way to more active groups.
In October 1954 a secret resistance group was formed by Yasser
Arafat called "Fatah."24 By 1960, the headquarters of Fatah was
located in Beirut and had published a credo containing five main
points, central of which was the need for "armed struggle" to
liberate Palestine.25 As Fatah expanded its base of support,
another group, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was
established in early 1964 replete with an Executive Committee, a
National Council of elected representatives, and a military
branch -- the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA).26
Late the same year, Fatah launched its first raid into
Israel. Backed mainly at this point by Syria, Fatah moved its
headquarters to Damascus and increased the number of its raids
staged from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan's West Bank. The swift
and thorough Israeli victory in June 1967 left a frustated
Palestinian diaspora, one which became increasingly convinced
that Fatah's program of phasing a guerilla struggle from hit and
run raids to limited confrontation to permanent occupation was
the only hope of wresting Palestine from the Israelis.27 Many
resistance groups sprang up, with differing goals and ideologies,
but all committed to armed struggle. As a result of the war and
the flood of refugees into Jordan from the West Bank, Fatah
activities increased dramatically in Jordan and the PLO itself
became more militant. Fatah's reputation and popularity received
a tremendous boost in the aftermath of the war, when a large
Israeli raid on the Jordanian village of Karameh in March 1968
resulted in scores of Israeli casualties; although the Jordanian
Army was largely responsible for the Israeli losses, Fatah
fighters performed well and Arafat turned the clash into a
propaganda victory which resulted in thousands of volunteers and
which consolidated Fatah's position as the leading organization
in the Palestinian movement.28
Again, violent clashes between Palestinian groups and Israel
increased in number and frequency: nearly a thousand border
incidents occurred between Israel and Jordan in 1968,29 and
skirmishes between guerillas and the IDF along the Lebanese
border were taking place several times a week.30 In December
1968 these incidents brought the first significant retaliatory
raid in Lebanon when IDF commandos landed at the Beirut airport,
carefully evacuated passengers and crew members, and destroyed
thirteen planes belonging to Lebanon's Middle East Airlines --
with no casualties on either side.31 In February 1969, Arafat
was elected Chairman of the PLO and Fatah became the dominant
force of the organization [see Figure 3].32 The strength of the
movement (and resulting Israeli response) had by now become such
that Lebanon began to feel the pressure. A series of battles
between PLO groups and the Lebanese Army resulted in mediation
by Egypt's President Nasser, and in October 1969 Arafat and
Lebanese Army Chief General Emile Bustany met in Cairo and signed
what became known as the Cairo Agreement. This agreement in
effect legitimized the PLO position in Lebanon: Palestinians were
allowed "to participate in the Palestinian revolution through
armed struggle," and even were granted bases for operations in
return for acceptance of Lebanese government sovereignty.33
Thus, by 1969, Arafat's Fatah had taken over the leadership of
the PLO, had become the chief Palestinian player in the armed
struggle against Israel, and had established a legitimate basis
of operation in both Jordan and Lebanon. In addition, the second
great exodus of Palestinians, this time from the West Bank, had
swollen the ranks of all Palestinian groups.
However, 1970 saw a series of events in Jordan which had
severe consequences for both the PLO and Lebanon. The growing
strength of the PLO in Jordan following the June 1967 war was
becoming a threat to King Hussein's government. In addition,
each terrorist attack launched from Jordan brought retaliation
from the Israelis -- in ever-increasing severity. During the
early months of 1970, several clashes occurred as the Jordanian
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Army attempted to control PLO activities, but in September these
battles erupted into all-out war. Following an attempt on
Hussein's life. George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked four American and European
airliners, flew them to remote fields in Jordan, and blew them
up. Hussein turned his army on the Palestinians and by the end
of the month, after thousands of Palestinian deaths, the PLO in
Jordan was crushed. Thousands of fighters fled, mostly to
Lebanon.34
Left in a state of reduced capability and reputation by the
losses of "Black September," elements of the PLO turned
increasingly to terrorism. After more than a year of
recuperation in Lebanon, PLO-trained teams embarked on a series
of spectacular terrorist acts which included the Lod airport
Massacre in May 1972 and the killing of eleven Israeli athletes
in Munich the following August. Israeli reaction again provoked
tension between the PLO and the Lebanese Army which climaxed in
May 1973 then slackened during the Yom Kippur War. During 1974,
terrorist and guerilla actions continued by some PLO factions,
although Fatah curbed its violent activities when it appeared
likely for a while that real political progress was possible. In
the Arab League summit conference in October 1974 Arab leaders
recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of all
Palestinian people," and the next month Yasser Arafat was invited
to address the United Nations General Assembly.35 Yet, as the
PLO seemed within reach of international legitimacy, the
situation in Lebanon was rapidly deteriorating.
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Faced with the growing power of the PLO in Lebanon and
monstrated weakness of the Lebanese Army, the Christians in
Lebanon began seriously to arm themselves. Tensions within the
country rose during the spring of 1975, exemplified by endless
demands and ultimatums, political violence, and denial of
Lebanese government authority by all factions. These tensions
had a number of causes: the PLO was an armed force not integrated
into Lebanon's political system; the Palestinian issue strained
relations between Lebanese Christians and Muslims, since the
former felt abused by Arab support for PLO activities and the
latter felt an almost sacred duty to provide that support; the
Marxist and leftist PLO factions reinforced the Lebanese Left as
a political force; and as southern Lebanon became a PLO base, the
geo-political problem was further exacerbated by the movement of
the Shia population north to Beirut.36 In April, an armed clash
between radical Palestinians and Phalange militia in the Ein al
Rumani quarter of Beirut ignited a civil war which officially
lasted eighteen months but which in fact continues today. That
internal conflict has been described in detail elsewhere,37 but
since it directly affected the Israeli-PLO conflict and set the
stage for the 1982 Israeli invasion, it is worth recounting in
broad terms.
The 1975-76 civil war in Lebanon can be broken into four
relatively distinct phases. Figure 5 shows the line up of forces
as it evolved during the civil war. During the first phase. from
April to June 1975, the clashes between the PLO and leftist
militias on the one hand and the Phalange on the other
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intensified. Phase two, which lasted from June 1975 to January
1976, consisted of all out war between two coalitions: the
coalition for status quo consisted of the Lebanese Front and
other mostly Christian forces, and the revisionist coalition was
made up of mostly Muslim and generally leftist militias and --
sometimes, but not always -- the more left-leaning factions of
the PLO. The third phase saw the initial intervention of Syria
from January 1976 to May 1976; this intervention at first
consisted of sending Syrian-controlled Palestinians to aid the
revisionists, then attempting political mediation, and finally
(when the revisionists spurned Syria-backed reform plans)
dispatching al-Saiqa and Syrian PLA units to aid the Lebanese
Front. In the fourth phase, in May 1976, limited Syria armed
forces invaded Lebanon on behalf of the Lebanese Front and were
defeated; in September, Syria launched an all-out military
offensive which brought the revisionist and PLO forces to the
brink of defeat. By the end of the year, although some sporadic
fighting continued, some sense of normalcy returned in Syria-
controlled Lebanon.38
As a result of the Civil War, the lines were drawn which
continued for several years: the Syrians controlled the north,
east, and Beirut areas; the Christians dominated from Beirut
north along the coast; the Druze controlled the Shouf; and the
PLO exercised authority along the coast from Tyre to Beirut.
Although Syria initially fought against the PLO, it switched
sides once again when Syrian efforts to impose a long-term
political solution (one which would preserve Syrian superiority
in Lebanon came to nought. Syria-PLO cooperation increased with
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the coming of peace between Israel and Egypt, and by 1980 Syria
had withdrawn from the coastal areas and turned them over to the
PLO. Of all the combatants, the PLO came out of the war in the
best position, with a free hand within the Palestinian "mini-
state." By the early 1980's, the key players in Lebanon had
clearly defined roles. Syria, with military forces in the Bekaa
and Beirut, was able to influence events in Lebanon. The Druze
controlled the Shouf and the enmity between Druze and Christians
had become implacable hatred. The Christians had received the
worst of the fighting, had lost Damour and other towns on the
coast and in the Shouf, and tenuously hung on to the reins of
Lebanese government. The leftist militias had failed to reform
the Lebanese government. The PLO was free to expand its forces
and to concentrate on the struggle against Israel. The Shiites
were building their own forces and attacking the PLO in the
south, after having been a minor player in Lebanon despite their
huge population.
ISRAEL-PLO CONFLICT, 1970-1982
Each instance of PLO-sponsored international terrorism in
the early 1970's brought about swift Israeli response in the form
of bombing attacks on Palestinian refugee camps. For example,
after a PLO attack on a school in Maalot in May 1974, the IAF
launched extensive attacks on PLO positions throughout southern
Lebanon. Other types of retaliation also occurred, such as the
assassination in Beirut of three prominent PLO leaders by Israeli
commandos and agents in April 1973. These retaliatory raids
reflected Israel's belief in swift and severe retribution for
attacks on its citizens, but they also were intended to persuade
the Lebanese government to deal with the PLO in the same way as
King Hussein had in September 1970.40 The Lebanese did not have
the strength to clamp down successfully on the PLO, and the real
effect of the Israeli raids was to intensify Lebanese internal
conflicts and polarize the Lebanese into pro- and anti-
Palestinian camps -- thus contributing to the outbreak of civil
war.41
Israel's response to the Lebanese Civil War was to
strengthen its ties to the Maronite Christians. In response to
appeals for weapons and training, Israel began a program of
covert aid which grew as the Christians began to lose ground in
the fighting.42 In the early months of the war, Israel
established the "good fence" policy wherein southern Lebanese
were provided medical and other care at locations along the
border and were even allowed to enter Israel to work. Israel
provided limited support to Christian militias in the south by
the use of air and artillery attacks on threatening PLO forces.
When the Syrians entered Lebanon, they did so under a tacit
agreement with Israel that Israel would only tolerate Syrian
presence north of a "red line" roughly along the Litani River.
In February 1977, in a rare merging of Syrian and Israeli
interests, the PLO was forced to agree to withdraw its forces
from the Israeli border area in return for the cessation of
Syrian shelling of PLO camps in Beirut. In April, Christian
militias supported by Israeli artillery launched a drive to clear
the border area of PLO and leftist forces, a drive which quickly
stalled but which brought an Israeli declaration that no
Palestinian presence would be tolerated within six miles of the
border.43
Soon after Menachem Begin was elected Prime Minister in May
1977, Israeli intervention in the south increased and the IDF
openly coordinated with Christian militias -- establishing
training programs, conducting joint patrols and support
operations, and building the militia of Lebanese Army Major Saad
Haddad. Responding to a PLO announcement of its intent to
increase operations within Israel, IDF armor and infantry units
crossed into Lebanon in September 1977 in support of Christian
forces, remaining until late in the month. As the PLO grew in
strength with increased arms and a joint pact with the
revisionist Lebanese National Movement, it stepped up its
artillery and rocket attacks on Israelis northern settlements.
The object of Israeli activities in southern Lebanon was to
create a Christian buffer between Israel and the PLO, and during
early 1978 that object seemed plausible. But on 2 March, a joint
leftist-PLO force overran the Christian village of Marun al Ras,
just one mile north of the border, and captured a quantity of
IDF-supplied weapons and vehicles.44 Some response was deemed
necessary by Israel to ensure continued Christian cooperation,
and during the next week IDF forces concentrated at the border as
IAF planes flew reconnaissance missions over Tyre and other towns
in southern Lebanon.44 On 11 March, in an action Israel could
not ignore, PLO terrorists landed on the coast near Tel Aviv,
commandeered a full Israeli bus, and conducted a running gun
battle with security forces before being killed; 37 people died
and 82 were wounded. At dawn on 14 March, the IDF launched
Operation Stone of Wisdom, soon to be known as Operation Litani.
In an action planned for some time, some 15,000-20,000 IDF
soldiers crossed the border and advanced frontally about seven
miles into Lebanon, attacking suspected PLO bases along the way.
The PLO, having had ample warning of the impending attack,
withdrew most of its forces northward. The IDF then advanced all
the way north to the Litani River, and in this move a number of
PLO fighters were caught in villages and in the camps around
Tyre. With little regard for civilian casualties, the IDF
attacked villages used by the PLO and leftist militias 46
cordoned off the Tyre area without entering it, and attacked PLO
locations around Tyre with air and artillery. The IDF intended
to push the PLO out of artillery range of Israel, to destroy its
bases, and to inflict such losses as to discourage PLO activities
in southern Lebanon. Sufficient Palestinian resistance was met,
particularly from al-Saiqa fighters, for the IDF to suffer 16
dead against an estimated 200 PLO fighters killed.47 IDF troops
remained in Lebanon until a ceasefire agreement was concluded,
withdrawing in June.
The results of the Litani operation were mixed: the PLO had
been pushed north of the Litani and a double buffer created to
keep them from returning -- the United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL) zone and the Haddad enclave; the Israeli
commitment to the Christian forces was strengthened; Israel
received, for the first time in any substance, adverse publicity
in the world press for its heavyhanded treatment of southern
Lebanon; some 200,000 people fled the area, mostly Shiites who
ended up in the southern suburbs of Beirut; and, as an indirect
result, the Syrian forces in Lebanon turned against the
Christians in late June. It was this switch by Syria that
brought about the crises of 1981 and ultimately made the 1982
invasion almost inevitable.
After shelling Christian East Beirut for several months in
the summer of 1978 and overrunning several Phalange strongholds
in the north -- and also in the face of ominous Israeli moves on
the Golan Heights -- the Syrians considered their hand
sufficiently strengthened to stop the attacks. However, the
reduced circumstances of the Christians allowed the PLO to
greatly increase its store of arms, consolidate its position in
Lebanon, and take the first steps toward building a conventional
army. In the meantime, Bashir Gemayel had come to the conclusion
that only a unified Christian force could improve Christian
fortunes and had begun merging, sometimes by sheer force, the
various militias into the Phalange-dominated "Kataeb." By the
spring of 1981 Bashir felt strong enough to begin efforts to
establish control of the Christian city of Zahle, in the Syrian-
control led Bekaa Valley. A number of Phalange provocations
resulted in a serious attack on Zahle by Syrian forces, during
which Israel aided the Phalangists by shooting down two Syrian
troop helicopters. The Syrians reacted by moving a number of SAM
batteries into the Bekaa. Israel threatened military action and
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war was narrowly averted by American mediation -- but the
missiles remained in the Bekaa.
Then, in May, Israel resumed air and sea bombardments of PLO
concentrations in southern Lebanon; Palestinian reaction was
restrained and the attacks halted in early June. But the next
month, Israel renewed its air strikes, and after five days the
PLO responded by shelling the coast town of Nahariya. Israeli
retaliation came in the form of an air attack on Palestinian
headquarters in West Beirut in which, despite IAF attempts at
pinpoint bombing, over l00 people were killed, only 30 of whom
were PLO fighters. The PLO then began a twelve-day artillery and
rocket barrage that caused over 60 Israeli casualties and brought
northern Galilee to a standstill, with Israelis fleeing south for
the first time since 1947. The strength of the bombardment and
the IDF"s inability to completely stop it made it relatively easy
for Philip Habib to negotiate a ceasefire. This ceasefire,
although halting the attacks, left Israelis with a feeling that
they were at the mercy of PLO guns in Lebanon. The combination
of that feeling and the appointment of Ariel Sharon as Defense
Minister made invasion a mere matter of time.48
CHAPTERS II NOTES
1There is a strong tendency among certain groups in Israel
to speak of Israel's place in the Middle East in Biblical terms.
One who has done so is former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who
invariably has spoken of the West Bank as Judea and Samaria. A
growing political/social movement, Gush Emunim, rationalizes its
many settlements on the West Bank and its generally antagonistic
stance toward Arabs by Biblical argument.
2Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1979), p. 406.
3Lieutenant Colonel Stephen R. Woods,Jr., The Palestinian
Guerilla Organizations: Revolution or Terror as an End
(Individual Research Report, U.S. Army War College, 1 May 1973),
p. 8.
4Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (New York:
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 1-4.
5Fisher, p. 407.
6Edward N. Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz, The Israeli Army,
1948-1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1983) p. 8.
7Ibid., pp. 10-27 and Schiff, pp. 9-23.
8Schiff, pp. 22-44.
9Luttwak and Horowitz, pp. 141-64. In light of the-subject
of this paper, it is worth noting that after Ariel Sharon, who
was the Brigade commander at Mitla Pass, attacked in violation of
orders with severe casualties, two of his battalion commanders
went over his head to urge Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan to remove
and prosecute him. These two young paratroopers were Mordechai
Gur, Chief of Staff during the late 1970's, and Rafael Eitan,
Chief of Staff during the Lebanon War. Dayan took no action, but
Gur and Eitan thereafter refused to serve under Sharon (Gabriel,
p. 172).
10Ibid., pp. 209-281.
11Schiff, pp. 178-89.
12Ibid., pp. 207-226.
13Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 3-10.
14Ibid., pp. 11-14.
15Ibid., pp. 15-18.
15Ibid., pp. 15-18.
16The Military Balance (London: The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1973 and 1982).
17Gal, pp. 20-24.
18Lawrence Meyer, Israel Now: Portrait of a Troubled Land
(New York, Delacorte Press, 1982), pp. 315-23.
19Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the
Middle East (New York: Random House, Inc., 1982), pp. 321--322.
Also confirmed by interview with Major General Amos Yaron, 4 May
1987.
20Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel's Strategic
Doctrine (Rand Corporation, September 1981).
21John K. Cooley, "The Palestinians," in P. Edward Haley and
Lewis W. Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues
(Syracuse University Press, 1979) p. 22.
22Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 40.
23David Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured County (New York:
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1983). p. 89.
24Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization:
People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984), p. 6. Yasser Arafat was born Abdel-Rahman Abdel-
Raouf Arafat al Qudwa al-Husseini in 1929. His organization was
named Harakat al-Tahru al-Filastiniyya (Palestine Liberation
Movement) whose acronym, Hataf, means "death" in Arabic; Arafat
reversed the acronym to form Fatah or "victory".
25Ibid., p. 24.
26Woods, p. 16.
27Gresh, Alain, The PLO: Towards and Independent Palestinian
State (Bath: Zed Books, Ltd., 1985), p. 15.
28Woods, pp. 20-21.
29Gresh, p. 14.
30Gilmour, p. 93.
31Luttwak and Horowitz, pp. 310-311.
32Cobban, p. 44.
33Cooley, p. 31-32.
34Cobban, pp. 48-53.
35Cooley, pp. 32-33.
36Rabinovich, p. 42.
37See the following sources: Rabinovich, pp. 34-120; Haley
and Snider, pp. 21-112; Cobban, pp. 63-77; Gilmour, pp. 86-157;
et al.
38Rabinovich, pp. 43-56.
39Cobban, p. 55. The commandos landed at night on a Beirut
beach, were met by Israeli agent and driven to the apartments of
the Fatah leaders, killed them, and escaped by sea. The dead
Palestinians were Kamal Udwan, Muhammed Yussef al-Najjar (called
Abu Yussef and PLO "foreign minister"), and Palestinian poet
Kemal Nasir.
40Gilmour, p. 147.
41Halim Barakat, "The Social Context, in Haley and Snider,
p. 19.
42Lewis W. Snider, et al., "Israel," in Haley and Snider, p.
91. For a revealing and detailed account of the initiation and
development of Israeli-Phalange ties between 1975 and 1982, see
Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1984).
43Ibid., pp. 93-95.
44Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 5(43), March
2, 1978, p. G1. Hereafter cited as FBIS.
45FBIS 5(48), March 10, 1978, p. N1.
46The Chief of Staff of the IDF, Mordechai Gur, explained in
an interview on Israeli television that "the questions faced us:
How justified was it for us to take casualties by using less fire
on these villages, and what was the most correct way to hit the
terrorists. We decided that, on all grounds, it would be better
to use the method of directing fire and afterwards moving in to
mop up. As a result of that, these villages were badly hit. FBIS
5(59), 27 March 1978, p. N9.
47Snider, pp. 97-107.
48Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 25-37.
CHAPTER III -- PLANS AND PREPARATIONS
IDF PLANNING
IDF planning for an invasion of Lebanon is some respects
began in 1978, as the IDF reviewed its performance in Operation
Litani. These lessons formed the basis of the "Pine Tree" plan,
in preparation since 1980 and virtually completed for about six
months prior to the invasion. Actually, the plan comprised three
alternative plans, subject to decision and approval by the
civilian authorities. The first, commonly known as "Little
Pines," was an expanded version of Operation Litani, and called
for an advance to the Awali River, north of Sidon. The plan's
salient features were as follows: a hard strike against the PLO,
particularly its military formations and artillery and rocket
positions; avoidance of combat against the Syrians at all costs;
and a forty-kilometer limit of advance as measured from Rosh
Hanikra (on the junction of the coast and Lebanese border). The
question of whether or not to conduct operations in the cities of
Tyre and Sidon was not defined.1
The second plan was a more ambitious version of the first.
The IDF would advance as far north as the vicinity of Beirut, but
would not enter the city, which would be taken by the Phalange
militia. The IDF would avoid combat with Syrian forces and again
a forty-kilometer line was mentioned, this time measured from
Metulla, in the east.2 The advantage of this plan was that it
would include the PLO training and operational base at Damour,
some 12 kilometers south of Beirut.
The third and most ambitious plan, called "Big Pines,"
included war against both the PLO and the Syrians. This plan
called for the seizing of Lebanese territory up to and including
Beirut, which would be taken in a coordinated operation with the
Phalange forces; an advance beyond the Beirut-Damascus highway,
which would cut off Beirut from the main Syrian forces; and the
expulsion of Syrian units from the Bekaa valley.3 One would
expect that this plan would entail deep penetrations, landings
north of Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus highway, and other
tactical maneuvers of the type espoused in IDF doctrine. Yet,
when Major General Amir Drori took over the Northern Command in
September 1981, he instructed his staff to take into account the
contingency that the operation would unfold in successive stages
as approval came piecemeal for further advances deeper into
Lebanon in a more open-ended campaign.4
Detailed planning proceeded throughout the winter and early
spring, even though a decision had not been made as to which plan
would be implemented. When the "Big Pines" plan was proposed to
the Israeli cabinet in December 1981, the reaction was totally
negative. Within the IDF disagreement existed concerning the
efficacy of the plan, with a number of high ranking officers
expressing reservations concerning the abilities and intentions
of the Phalange and the wisdom of attacking the Syrians as well
as the political and military advisability of operations in
Beirut, an Arab capital. Despite these reservations, a number of
Israelis (including Sharon, Eitan, and Drori) visited Beirut and
held liaison discussions with the Phalange. In addition to these
discussions, IDF officers were able to survey the terrain on the
ground, send out reconnaissance patrols to check narrow roads,
passes, and bridges. and even to observe Syrian positions of the
85th Brigade in Beirut.5
Drori's detailed plan for the "Big Pines" contingency had
originally included final objectives in the Beirut and the
Beirut-Damascus highway areas, deep landings and assaults at key
points, and other creative tactical measures. However, because
his mission was being only vaguely defined, and as it became
obvious that the objectives of the Israeli Cabinet were less
ambitious than those of the plan, Drori's planners were forced to
fall back on a more conventional operation -- primarily a
mechanized frontal assault on a wide front -- which could, if
necessary, be tailored to fit any of the three plans.6
TERRAIN
Comprising a rough rectangle some 100 kilometers north to
south and 75 kilometers east to west, southern Lebanon is
compartmented in both directions. Several key rivers flow into
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the sea from the east and form potential barriers: the Litani,
north of Tyre; the Zaharani, eight kilometers south of Sidon; the
Awali, just north of Sidon; and the Damour, 14 kilometers south
of Beirut. The major terrain zones, however, run north-south: the
coastal plain, which extends anywhere from a few meters to
several kilometers from the Mediterranean to the foothills of the
mountains; the Lebanon ridge, which ranges from foothills to
heights of 6,000 feet, encompasses the Shouf and Jbaal Barouk
subranges, and covers roughly two-thirds of the area of southern
Lebanon; the Bekaa Valley, a flat but narrow plain beginning some
25 kilometers north of the Israeli border and extending into
northern Lebanon; and the Anti-Lebanon Ridge, which forms a
natural border between Lebanon and Syria from Mount Hermon in the
south to the Beirut-Damascus highway.
In tactical terms, the terrain is ideally suited to the
defense, especially against armor. In all zones the roads are
few, narrow, and poor. In the coastal zone, the main road is
bordered by the sea and the hills, and when the plain does widen
somewhat, citrus groves cover the area. Few parallel tracks
exist, and wadis and ravines inhibit off-road movement. Along the
road itself, the rivers form obstacles, and the towns of Tyre,
Sidon, and Damour are build astride the road. In the Lebanon
ridge, the roads are worse, steep and serpentine, with villages
at every level area, hilltop, and crossroads; in the Jbaal Barouk
area, only one north-south road exists, with numerous turns
overlooked by steep cliffs. In the Bekaa, the valley floor does
have several roads and allows for off-road movement, but the
entire valley can be covered by direct-fire weapons from the
bordering hills; in addition, the lower Lebanon ridge must be
crossed in order even to reach the Bekaa. The Anti-Lebanon is
virtually impassable, with almost no road: and numerous steep
wadis. The overall effect of the terrain on tactical formations
is to slow and channelize motorized movement, reducing a
formation's combat strength to that of its lead element [see
Appendix A].7
TACTICAL PLAN
The tactical plan, then, consisted of a three-pronged attack
corresponding ding to the Coastal, Lebanon, and Bekaa zones.
Drori, as Northern Command, would divide his forces into three
sectors -- West, Center, and East. The invasion would begin in
all three sectors simultaneously, with a pre-dawn attack preceded
by night attacks to seize key areas, bridges, crossroads.8
In the West, a task force commanded by Major General
Yekutiel Adam would originally consist of one division, the 91st,
under Brigadier General Yitzhak Mordechai. Mordechai would attack
north along the coastal road with two brigades of mechanized
infantry and a lead armored brigade, the 211th, whose mission
would be to punch through army defenses, bypassing Tyre and
Sidon. Follow-on brigades would mop up resistance in those
cities. The lead task force would link up with the 36th Division
striking from Metulla through Nabitiye to the Zaharani and Sidon
areas. Elements of the 96th Division, under Brigadier General
Amos Yaron, would conduct an amphibious landing at one of three
sites -- the mouth of the Zaharani, or the Awali, or north of
Beirut at the Christian port of Jounieh. The mission of the
western force as a whole was to destroy the PLO strongpoints up
to and including Sidon.
In the center, Division 36 under Brigadier General Avigdor
Kahalani would attack from around Metulla, cross the Litani,
seize Beaufort Castle and the road junctions around Nabitiye,
then swing west along several routes to link up with Mordechai on
the coast. Division 162, under Brigadier General Menachem Einan,
would follow Kahalani to Nabitiye, then move north around Jezzine
along the western slopes of the Jbaal Barouk. Einan's force was
somewhat understrength and consisted of a tank brigade, two
battalions of infantry, and an artillery regiment -- the 211th
armored brigade under Colonel Eli Geva having been loaned to
Mordechai. The mission of the central force was to destroy PLO
resistance in the Lebanon ridge, to complete the encirclement PLO
forces south of the Zaharani, and to prevent reinforcement or
withdrawal between the coast and the Bekaa.
The eastern task force was the largest, with three divisions
and two independent forces, and was commanded by Major General
Avigdor Ben-Gal, former commander of Northern Command. Division
252 (Brigadier General Immanuel Sakel), minus one tank brigade,
would advance from the Golan Heights along two routes: one toward
the town of Hasbaiya at the head of the Bekaa, and one along Wadi
Cheba along the slopes of Mount Hermon toward Rachaiya. Division
90, under Brigadier General Giora Lev, was a full combined arms
division which could advance through Marjyoun to the vicinity of
Koukaba. Two special task forces were also placed under Ben-Gal:
Vardi force, under Brigadier General Danni Vardi was a task
organized, two-brigade force which would capture Jezzine and
proceed north along the western slopes of Jbaal Barouk; Special
Maneuver Force, under Brigadier General Yossi Reled, was also a
two-brigade force, organized for tank killing and made up of
paratroopers and infantry supported by anti-tank guided missiles
and Cobra helicopters, which would advance along the crest of the
Jbaal Barouk. Finally, Division 880 under Brigadier General Yom-
Tov Tamir would be in reserve. The initial mission of Ben-Gal's
force would be first to block Syrian forces in the Bekaa and
second to make untenable any offensive action by them unfeasible
by flanking movements to the east and west.
The plan and organization of forces could support either the
"Big Pines" or a less ambitious modification. It seems clear from
the tactical planning and deployment that Drori's concept of
operations was in fact open-ended. In the west, the force could
stop at the Awali, continue to Damour, or push on to Beirut. In
the center, Einan's division could continue north to cut the
Beirut-Damascus highway. In the east, tactical dispositions would
be such that favorable position and force ratio would enhance
Ben-Gal if combat with the Syrians should take place; if not,
then Peled and Vardi would be in position to support Einan in a
move toward the Beirut-Damascus highway.
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IDF PREPARATIONS
IDF preparation for war in Lebanon had, in effect, been
taking place for a number of years. First, the evacuation of the
Sinai and the Camp David Accords freed a number of units for
deployment in the north. Second, the Operation Litani in 1978 and
the near war in July 1981 had further increased Northern
Command's readiness. Third, in December 1981 the IDF had
concentrated forces along the Syrian and Lebanese
borders,ostensibly to deter any Syrian response to Israel's
annexation of the Golan Heights. In addition to concentrating its
forces, the IDF had surveyed the terrain in southern Lebanon,
checked roads and bridges, and created models of key terrain
features.10 Many false alarms, whether by design or coincidence,
had occurred during early 1962; during April, after the death of
an IDF soldier in southern Lebanon from a land mine, an alert
even went so far as to designate D-Day and H-Hour.11 The effect
of these preparations and alerts, followed by the inevitable
stand downs, was to allay the fears of Israelis, Palestinians,
and Syrians alike.
PLO PREPARATIONS
The PLO had ample warning of an impending Israeli invasion.
The massing of troops on Israel's northern border in December was
followed by a statement by the Israeli ambassador to the United
States that an Israeli invasion was only "a matter of time."12
Incidents such as the killing of an Israeli diplomat in Paris and
the ensuing retaliatory attacks in Lebanon by the IAF produced
war predictions in both the U.S. and Lebanon.13 Arafat's response
to these events, and particularly to the July 1981 confrontation,
was to increase his available firepower. He more than tripled the
PLO's artillery capacity from July 1981 to June 1982, from about
80 pieces and rocket launchers to 250; these he divided among
seven new artillery battalions.14 In addition, he took a number
of other steps to prepare the PLO fighters for war: standing
orders, along with range cards, were issued to Fatah units
assigning specific targets in northern Israel; brigade-level
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maneuvers were held with the Karameh Brigade in the Bekaa Valley
using 130 mm guns and T-34 tanks; regional commands were
established in an attempt to provide some unity of command and
transcend factional loyalties; militias in the refugee camps were
given increased training to free the battalions in the south to
fight a more flexible campaign; shelters and emergency stores
were established in the camps and hillside tunnels; ammunition
and supplies were distributed from main dumps to likely areas of
combat; and fortifications were constructed, particularly around
Nabitiye and Beaufort. As the likelihood of war increased in
April, Arafat attempted to mobilize all Palestinian males from
age 16 to 39, a move which elicited little response. Finally,
Arafat raised the level of alert in 28 April and deployed the
460th Battalion, with T-54/55 tanks, along the coast between the
Awali and Beirut.15
PLO defensive strategy was predicated on the assumption that
the IDF would stop short of Beirut. For this reason the Karameh
and Yarmuk Brigades were pulled back closer to the Syrian
positions in the Bekaa and orders were issued to other units to
hold back the Israelis, but not at the expense of sacrificing
entire units -- in short, to fight a delaying action. The
objective apparently was to offer stiff resistance, yet avoid the
Israeli trap until a ceasefire imposed by the superpowers could
take effect.16 Although PLO defensive strength has been
estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 (including Beirut), only about
4,000 of this total were trained members of the Palestinian
Liberation Army (PLA); some of these were divided into three
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brigades -- Kastel around Nabitiye, Yarmuk in the so-called "iron
triangle" south of the Litani, and Karameh integrated with Syrian
positions in the Bekaa -- and one newly formed tank battalion
near Beirut. This deployment consisted both of a series of
platoon-sized outposts built on high ground, with trenches and
bunkers protected by wire and minefields, and of other
concentrations in groves, wadis, and open areas. Additional PLA
forces were under direct control of the Syria Army in the Bekaa.
The remainder of the PLO fighting strength consisted of armed
militia in the refugee camps, particularly al-Bas and Rashidiye
near Tyre, Ein Hilwe near Sidon, and the Beirut camps.
In terms of equipment, the PLO did possess some 80 tanks (60
of which were obsolete T-34's), over 250 artillery pieces and
rocket launchers, numerous small arms, and considerable
ammunition. But despite this appearance of conventional
strength, no battle plan was ever disseminated, and the PLO had
no ability either to coordinate units or move supplies within the
battle zone.17
SYRIAN PREPARATIONS
The Syrian presence inLebanon had diminished from three
divisions in 1976 to one division and one mixed brigade --
roughly 30,000 men. The 1st Armored Division in the Bekaa,
commanded by Rifaat Assad (the brother of Syrian President Hafez
Asaad), was deployed in defensive positions in depth. Both
Syrian formations and doctrine followed the Soviet model, and
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defensive doctrine called for combined-arms operations, combat
teams whose structure was fixed in advance, and a defense based
on massive firepower. To provide this firepower, the Syrians
depended on air defense in depth by various SAM sites reinforced
by anti-aircraft guns, and a ground defense characterized by a
profusion of anti-tank weapons and units. The defense would
depend on intensive fortifications and exploitation of natural
obstacles to a depth of 20-30 kilometers.18 The 85th Brigade was
deployed in the Beirut area in an armed presence role, with the
additional of the security of the Beirut-Damascus highway.
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In addition to the three main antagonists, Lebanese militias
could possibly become involved in any fighting. The Israelis
expected the Christian Lebanese Forces, some 10,000 strong,to
fight as allies against the PLO. The leftist National Movement
coalition counted some 10,000-11,000 fighters who were nominal
allies of the PLO.19
As war neared, the opponents consisted of some seven
divisions and two independent brigades of the IDF, 60,000-78,000
strong, arrayed against 15,000 PLO fighters, one Syrian armored
division, and one Syrian brigade.
CHAPTER III NOTES
1Gabriel, pp. 60-61.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 45.
5Ibid., pp. 47-55.
6Ibid., p. 109.
7Gabriel, pp. 72-75.
8Ibid., pp. 75-80. See also Schiff, pp. 47-55.
9Personal interview with Major General Amos Yaron, 1 May
1987.
10Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 47.
11Ibid., p. 54.
12Facts on File (New York, 26 February 1982), p. 87.
13Current History (81:476, September 1982), pp. 282-285.
14Schiff and Ya'ari, p 84.
15Ibid., pp. 85-90.
16Mark Heller, ed., Thg Middle East Military Balance, 1983
(Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 11.
17Gabriel, pp. 47-53.
18Heller, p. 233.
19Ibid, pp. 153-154.
CHAPTER IV - INVASION
The Israeli attack was preceded by two days of preparatory
fires. All day Saturday IDF artillery had fired on targets
within range, and on Sunday morning the IAF had attacked selected
targets such as suspected bunkers, weapons storage areas, and
known PLO positions. The storage areas were known to be well
dug-in, so the IAF used ordnance to suit the occasion: delayed
fuze bombs and cluster bombs around bunker entrances which
effectively prevented Palestinians from gaining access to stored
weapons and ammunition.1 As the Israeli Cabinet announced that
an operation was under way which was designed to push the PLO
beyond a forty-kilometer line and urged the Syrians to refrain
from action, the tanks of Colonel Eli Geva's brigade attacked,
supported by air strikes conducted along the coast and artillery
fires which preceded the lead units.2
6 JUNE
At 1100 on Sunday, 6 June, Colonel Eli Geva's 211th Brigade
began moving north up the coastal highway through the UNIFIL
zone. Already assembled in the Haddad Enclave north of the
Israeli-Lebanese border, Geva's armored brigade formed the
spearhead of the main attack as Operation Peace for Galilee
began. Although Geva himself was a veteran of the desperate
fighting on the Golan Heights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War,
only two of his company commanders had seen combat.3
The 211th Brigade was followed by the remainder of
Mordechai's Division 91. This division, like others in the
Central and Western Sectors, was strung out along the narrow
coast road. Its lead echelon consisted of Geva's tanks, M-113
armored personnel carriers (APC's), and jeeps with mounted
machineguns. These were closely followed by combat engineer
units with an array of bridges by which to pass over the river
and wadi obstacles. Next came communications vans, supply trucks
and ambulances, and bringing up the rear were self-propelled
howitzers and 175mm guns, reserve infantry, and the remainder of
the logistics vehicles.4 From the start, traffic jams plagued
the column as Geva's brigade moved north.
A half hour after starting, Geva's lead company ran into the
first PLO ambush. Using RPG's (rocket propelled grenades), PLO
fighters waited until Geva's column was extremely close before
opening fire. IDF tanks destroyed the position, but the column
lost time; ordered to push on by Geva, the tanks raced into a
road junction just as IAF planes bombed it, resulting in some
damage and further delay.5 Further ambushes from positions among
the citrus orchards led Geva to order his leading elements to
push on and leave the mopping up to follow-on units.6 This
tactic increased the speed of advance, but PLO fighters were thus
able to fire a second and third time from the same positions; RPG
fires that left tanks unscathed had a greater effect on the
following APC's, setting some on fire and causing the troops to
ride on top or walk rather than risk burns. Acknowledging the
risk, Geva ordered fuel and ammunition trucks to stay behind the
mop-up forces, which prevented their destruction but also made
rearming and refueling the tanks a slower process.7
Geva's mission was to bypass Tyre and push on toward Sidon.
Tyre itself is located on a peninsula to the west of the main
coast road, but six refugee camps spread roughly east from Tyre,
across the Israeli axis of advance. Of the six, three were
heavily populated and developed as PLO defensive strong points--
Rachidiyeh, east of the coast road and south of Tyre; al-Bas,
alongside the road west of Tyre; and Burj al Shemali, west of al-
Bas.8 Geva, with his lead battalion, decided not to drive through
the crossroads next to al-Bas, but instead detoured inland off
the road and bypassed the camps. Unfortunately , a following
paratrooper battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Uri Geiger,
missed the turn and stumbled into the al-Bas crossroads, where it
was ambushed. Three tanks and two APC's were quickly lost,
including Geiger's, and in the ensuing extrication Geiger was
captured.9
The main force under Mordechai soon came up and established
blocking positions along the coast road. By 1600, using an
engineer bridge to replace the Qasmiye Bridge destroyed the day
before by the IAF, Geva was across the Litani. At dusk, the 211th
brigade halted and laagered in a soccer field at Sarafend, some
22 kilometers north of Tyre. The main force had halted about five
kilometers north of the city, having left a brigade deployed
around the camps at Rachidiyeh and al-Bas.10
Meanwhile, Yaron's amphibious force had finally received
orders concerning its landing site, which was designated as a
site near the estuary of the Awali River, five kilometers north
of Sidon. These orders also informed Adam that the advance of
Division 91 would continue past Sidon to the outskirts of Beirut.
After dark, Navy teams conducted a beach reconnaissance area, and
about 2300 Yaron's paratroopers began landing, unopposed but for
some unaimed Katyushas. Initially, troops were brought in by
helicopter, followed by tanks and other heavy equipment landed by
LCU's. Their initial objectives were quickly taken as one platoon
seized the bridges over the Awali and another the heights east of
the highway. In only a couple of hours, tanks and other vehicles
were brought ashore, the brigade landed, and the beachhead was
secured. After disembarking their loads, landing craft headed
south to Nahariya to embark more troops and equipment. By dawn,
Yaron had cut the line of communication between units in the
south and PLO headquarters in Beirut.11
In the Central Sector, Brigadier General Avigdor Kahalani's
Division 36 also began its attack at 1100. From its assembly area
around Metulla, the division launched a two-pronged attack toward
Nabitiye through the Arnoun Heights. The left column, with the
armored brigades, crossed the Litani via the Akiye Bridge, west
of the PLO strongpoint at Beaufort Castle. The right column, with
the Golani Infantry Brigade mounted on APC's, crossed at the
Hardele Bridge to the east, under anti-tank and artillery fire
from the heights. Both columns bypassed Nabitiye, and after
seizing the road junction one kilometer north of the town, the
Golani Brigade continued north toward Jbaa as most of the PLO
withdrew in front of it; the tank brigades turned left along the
road toward the Zaharani function.12 As the Division moved toward
Nabitiye, it dropped off a reconnaissance unit from the Golani
Brigade to seize Beaufort Castle. The castle, with its commanding
view of the northern Galilee, had been a source of PLO propaganda
and a sore spot for Israelis for years. Although defended by only
a small PLO detachment and of little consequence to the invading
forces, it was ordered taken despite reservations by a number of
Golani officers, and it was seized in a desperate night attack in
which several Israelis and all the PLO defenders were killed.13
Division 162, under Menachem Einan, was to follow in trace
of Kahalani's force, then push north along the western slopes of
the Jbaal Barouk. Einan's division had been sent south for
exercises in late May; having returned to the northern border
only the week before, it had not received either orders or an
alert until late on Friday the 4th -- when many men had been sent
home on weekend leave. With most of his force reassembled on the
6th, Einan did not receive permission to begin movement until
1530. One half hour later, his orders were changed instead of
crossing the Litani at the Hardele Bridge he would cross via the
Akiye to the west. After redirecting his force with some loss of
time, Einan found himself bunched up behind a traffic jam of
Kahalani's logistics vehicles, where he remained throughout the
night.14 Aside from the Beaufort action and isolated PLO
resistance, little fighting occurred in the Central Sector on the
first day.
Activities were limited in the east. Ben-Gal's force
advanced from northern Galilee and the Golan Heights along a
broad front. On the eastern flank, Immanuel Sakel's Division 252
advanced from the Golan Heights on two axes: the first through
Wadi Cheba on the slopes of Mount Hermon, via a 12-mile engineer
road constructed ahead of the column by IDF engineers; the second
overland toward Hasbaiya. Division 90, commanded by Giora Lev,
moved through Marjayoun toward Lake Qaraoun, with a brigade
advancing on its right flank along the main highway leading into
the Bekaa Valley. Moving through the night, Lev reached the
vicinity of Koukouba in the early morning and halted. Vardi
Force, with its three mixed brigades, followed in trace of
Division 90, then continued northwest toward Masgharah; one
armored brigade under Colonel Hagai Cohen, followed in trace of
Einan's division, as did Peled's Special Maneuver Force. With the
Syrians remaining north of the "Red Line," no fighting occurred
in the Eastern Sector.
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7 JUNE
The next dawn found the IAF continuing to attack PLO
strongpoints along the coastal route of advance and in Beirut.
During the day, a few Syrian MiG's challenged IAF planes over
Beirut, with the Syrians losing one MiG in the process.15 Geva
got his brigade on the move early, pushing toward Sidon after
overcoming an ambush in Sarafend which cost the lives of his lead
tank and lead company commanders, along with the loss of two
APC's.16 As Geva moved north, crossing the Zaharani River after
finding the bridge intact, the main force under Mordechai began a
series of link-ups and mopping-up operations. Leaving one armored
and one infantry brigade to secure the refugee camps around Tyre,
Division 91 pressed north af ter Geva to link up with Kahalani's
division moving west from around Nabitiye. The road junction at
the mouth of the Zaharani was chosen as the link-up point: it was
open enough to assemble a division-sized force; a petroleum
refining area offered a refueling capability, if needed; and the
area contained a small but excellent port facility. Around noon,
Kahalani's two armored brigades linked up with Mordechai's
remaining units, and both divisions artillery began to engage
targets around Sidon.17
Near Sidon, Kahalani's remaining brigade -- the Golani --
reached the coast just south of the city. The Golani were to open
the road, which passed through the Ein Hilwe camp (the largest in
Lebanon), so that Geva's brigade could continue north and link up
with Yaron's amphibious force. The infantrymen from the Golani
Brigade attacked into Ein Hilwe in the early afternoon, but
became pinned down and were forced to fight their way out again
at dusk.18 Kahalani was in command. Short one brigade at the
start of the operation (loaned to Sakel in the east), he lost two
more to Mordechai at the Zaharani; Mordechai therefore sent his
own lead brigade forward to assist Kahalani in opening the road
through Sidon. This brigade did not arrive until after dark,
however, and at the end of the day, the attack in the west was
stalled in front of Sidon.19
A few kilometers to the north, Yaron's force waited for
Geva's column to link up and to bring the empty APC's for Yaron's
paratroopers. Meanwhile, though, the beachhead was strengthened
as CH-53's ferried troops and equipment from Israel and a second
landing was made at 1430. This landing, made in broad daylight
less than three kilometers from the port of Sidon, was covered by
continuous smoke missions requested by Yaron; Israeli F-4's
managed to keep a layer of smoke between Sidon and the landing
for nearly two hours, until the landing was completed. Pressure
eased on Yaron's force as PLO attention turned to Geva and
Kahalani, coming up from the south and east. By nightfall,
Yaron's Division 96 was ashore, with one brigade of paratroopers
having moved on foot from hill to hill to a position on the ridge
overlooking the town of Damour.20 The amphibious operation had
gone smoothly, but without the armored strength and additional
APC's of Geva's column, Division 96 could make only limited
progress.
Behind the lead elements, other units began the task of
mopping up bypassed Palestinian resistance.21 In the morning, one
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brigade attached to Mordechai had attacked from the Israeli
border to the northwest, through Bint Jbail, and linked up at
Jouiya with another brigade attacking east from Tyre. With this
movement, the entire area south of the Litani was cut off from
the north, and IDF units began the task of reducing pockets of
resistance and rounding up suspected PLO members from the
villages within the "Iron Triangle."22 Meanwhile, the brigades
left by Mordechai around Tyre began the task of clearing the
refugee camps.
Palestinian resistance up to this point had been fitful and
uncoordinated, largely through the fault of its leaders. The
commander of the Kastel Brigade and overall commander in the
south, Haj Ismail, fled after hearing of Yaron's landing, turning
up the next day in the Bekaa with a report that he had led a
tactical retreat when attacked by the U.S. Sixth Fleet.23 Other
PLO commanders likewise ran out on their men, who then either
resisted, fled north, or melted into the civilian population.
Serious resistance, then, was not offered by the PLO regulars
but by the militia forces in the refugee camps, whose built up
areas and narrow alleyways afforded excellent defensive
opportunities.24
The reduction of the Tyre camps -- particularly Rachidiyeh,
Burj al Shemali, and al-Bas -- began the afternoon of 6 June,
would take four days to accomplish, and would cost the Israelis
21 dead and 95 wounded. There was little urgency in subduing the
Tyre camps, since the northbound column had already moved on, so
Israeli soldiers were urged caution in order to hold down
casualties. The IDF advanced by steadily securing chunks of the
camps and forcing the defenders into an ever-smaller, area. Each
camp was ideal for small-unit defense, however, and the PLO
fighters were able to block the narrow roads and alleys, use
RPG's at short range, drop hand grenades into Israeli APC's, then
flee to other positions. IDF troops were fired on from the
ground, windows, and rooftops -- from the front and from behind.
All this occurred in an area thick with civilians. When the camps
were finally taken, IDF soldiers uncovered some 74 bunkers in
Rachidiyeh, 80 in Burj al Shemali, and some 213 underground
shelters and arms stores in al-Bas.25 The fighting was made
particularly difficult because of the IDF's rules of engagement,
which dictated that soldiers in heavily populated areas would
take risks to preserve the safety of civilians, that no grenades
or satchel charges would be used prior to assaulting buildings,
and that damage to mosques and churches would be avoided.26 Yet,
mounting Israeli casualties led to heavy IDF use of air and
artillery support with attendant civilian casualties.27 In the
end, the camps at Tyre were subdued on 9 June, after four days of
heavy fighting.
In the Central zone, Einan's lead brigade finally broke free
of Kahalani's supply train before dawn, but then had to stop to
refuel. Not until after daylight did the brigade reach Nabitiye.
Still behind Kahalani's forces, this time the Golani Brigade,
Einan did not receive permission to cross the Zaharani until
1400. As the Golani moved west toward Sidon, Einan finally broke
free; securing the key crossroads south of Jezzine -- the only
east-west road south of the Beirut-Damascus highway between the
Bekaa and the coast -- he bypassed Jezzine and pushed north into
the Shouf, halting near the Basin River about 0100. During the
night, with Cohen's brigade in a blocking position at the Jezzine
crossroads, Syrian and PLA units in battalion strength occupied
the town of Jezzine itself.28
The Eastern Sector remained quiet, with Lev's division
halted around Koukouba and Hasbaiya, Sakel continuing northward
along the slopes of Mount Hermon, and Vardi Force moving along
secondary roads toward Masgharah--at the foot of Jbaal Barouk
between Jezzine and the Bekaa. During the day, Ben-Gal began to
mass his artillery in the vicinity of Hasbaiya, from where it
could range from Masgharah in the northwest to Kafr Quq in the
northeast.29
8 JUNE
As in previous days, the IAF began launching strikes in the
early morning of 8 June. Strikes against Beirut again brought
Syrian reaction, this time resulting in the loss of six Syrian
MiG's -- to none for the IAF. As the day progressed, the IAF flew
dozens of Close Air Support strikes in the Central Sector and
particularly in the west, against resistance at Tyre and Sidon.30
Syrian SAM radars locked on to IAF planes, but the batteries
withheld fire. As battles continued at Rachidiyeh and Burj al
Shemani, the Golani brigade made another attempt to create a
corridor through the Ein Hilwe camp at Sidon. Attacking at 0700,
the infantrymen again penetrated the camp only to become pinned
down in the narrow streets. A second assault was mounted by
paratroopers toward the city of Sidon itself, but it too bogged
down. The IAF dropped leaf lets and on loud speakers urged
civilians to flee, but dozens of airstrikes and considerable
artillery support were needed in order to extricate the attacking
forces at dusk. Geva, impatient at the delay, requested to be
allowed to skirt the bottleneck to the east along secondary roads
and tracks in the steep hills inland of the city. Moving out in
the evening, Geva's force slowly worked its way through the
hills, without headlights along the tracks and paths which were
characterized by steep cliffs on the right and a sheer drop on
the left. Although losing two tanks, Geva broke out of the hills
north of Sidon and linked up with Yaron's force at dawn on 9
June. Yaron, not content merely to wait, had started his main
force toward Damour on foot, supported by naval gunfire from
Israeli boats moving up the coast.31
In the Central Sector, IDF ground units met Syria resistance
for the first time. Einan's tired division moved out at 0700,
reaching the road junction leading to Damour before halting for
some four hours. Urged forward by Drori, the lead units advanced
only to be attacked around 1530 by French-made Gazelle
helicopterss the Gazelles popped up above a ridgeline and fired
HOT missiles, hitting one Israeli tank; as the tank was being
evacuated, the Gazelles fired again from another position. As the
helicopters turned toward their base, a tank platoon and infantry
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battalion in APC's managed to find a way around the blocked road
and continued toward Ein Zhalta. Around 2300, this force
approached Ein Zhalta, some eight kilometers from the Beirut-
Damascus highway but more than 20 by road. Unknown to the
Israelis, the area around Ein Zhalta was defended by a brigade-
strength Syrian force consisting of a few dozen tanks and
commando units. After passing through the villages, the Israelis
started descending a steep slope with tanks in the lead when the
Syrians opened tire with tanks from the opposite ridge and RPG's
and Saggers from the surrounding wadis. After two hours of
fighting, during which the IDF infantry attempted to clear the
wadis and reach the opposite ridge, the Israelis backed their
vehicles out of range. Meanwhile, Einan's main force advanced
through Beit ed Dein and joined the lead battalion at Ein
Zhalta.32
To the south, Cohen's 460th Brigade was to advance from its
blocking positions near jezzine to support an attack by Vardi on
Masgharah, but Israeli RPV's (remotely piloted vehicles)
discovered a Syrian force moving south through the Shouf toward
the town. Israeli planes attacked the Syrian force, inflicting
some losses, and at 1330 Cohen's attack commenced without
artillery support. As IDF tanks reached the center of town they
were ambushed by the Syrian and PLA force which had occupied
defensive positions during the night. The first Israeli company
managed to reach the tar side of town, but the following company
was attacked by Syrian commandos with Saggers and forced to fall
back after losing three tanks. A second battalion was sent into
the town, but one company took a wrong turn and found itself on a
ridge to the west; it was engaged by Syrian tanks from a nearby
ridge and lost five tanks before retreating back into the town.
The battle continued throughout the afternoon until the Syrian
forces withdrew around nightfall.33
Leaving one battalion in Jezzine, Cohen sent two battalions
eastward toward Masgharah -- one along the main road and the
other on a narrow secondary road. The two battalions
simultaneously approached a crossroad at Ein Katrina, mistook
each other for Syrians, and engaged in a two-hour firefight
resulting in a number of dead and wounded before the mistake
became known.34 The day ended with significant casualties among
IDF forces in the Central Sector, but with the area west of the
Bekaa firmly in Israeli hands to within several kilometers of the
Beirut-Damascus highway. On the other hand, Syrian forces had
engaged IDF units, inflicted losses, and still held the strategic
highway.
In the East, Lev remained halted and Sakel continued toward
Rachaiya in the eastern Bekaa Vardi occupied Masgharah during
the night and Peled's Special Maneuver Force began moving
northward along the eastern slopes of Jbaal Barouk, to the west
of Lake Qaraoun. The Israelis had positioned their forces right
up against Syrian positions in the Bekaa, but without
attacking.35 However, the Syrian force was being slowly flanked
to both sides: with the Israelis controlling the high ground to
either side of the valley, the Syrian position in the southern
Bekaa was becoming an indefensible salient. Recognizing the
threat from both ground and air, the Syrians reinforced on the
ground and moved five additional SAM-6 batteries into the Bekaa,
bringing the total SAM batteries in Lebanon to 19.36
9 JUNE
The ninth of June was a day when the war dramatically and
substantially outgrew the objectives originally approved by the
Israeli Cabinets the advance along the coast passed Damour and
began to close in on Beirut; in the center, IDF forces
immediately threatened the Beirut-Damascus highway; and in the
west, the Israelis attacked the Syrians head-on both on the
ground and in the air.
The Eastern Sector battles raged from Tyre to north of
Damour. In Damour, the PFLP had created well fortified positions
in the ruins of the town, used as a training base for the PLO.
After heavy air and artillery preparation (during which the
sector commander, Major General Adam was killed by PLO
artillery), Yaron's division, reinforced by units from Kahalani
and Geva, attacked and seized the town. Faced with the continued
prospect of heavy fighting along the coast road, Yaron tasked the
commander of the 35th Paratrooper Brigade to take his brigade
through the Shouf and approach Beirut from the hills rather than
along the coast. Drori approved the maneuver and Yair led his
paratroopers, reinforced by tanks, into the Shouf. As the tanks
slowly advanced along the winding roads, the paratroopers
proceeded on foot along the hills and ridges. In this way, the
paratroopers surprised at least two PLO ambushes which were lying
in wait for the tanks, routing both. In this maneuver, Yair
advanced along the road toward Souk al Gharb, halting around
midnight short of Kafr Mata. Meanwhile, as Yair had feared,
Yaron's other two brigades were blocked south of Khalde.37
To the south, the camps at Rachidiyeh and Burj al Shemali
were finally taken in the afternoon. But the real fight was at
Ein Hilwe, where the main force was still stopped. At dawn, the
paratroopers and infantry renewed their attack, concentrating on
a route along the edge of Ein Hilwe, a few blocks from downtown
Sidon. Preceded by artillery and air bombardment, the Israeli
attack slowly advanced along two parallel streets and in the
afternoon the way was finally opened through Sidon. Kahalani
immediately sped north toward Damour, leaving the unenviable task
of reducing Ein Hilwe and the Sidon casbah to Mordechai's men,
moving up from their recent battles around Tyre. During the
afternoon, Mordechai personally took command and began his
systematic campaign by capturing the hills and villages around
Sidon. As events unfolded elsewhere in Lebanon, Mordechai began
the section-by-section assault on Ein Hilwe that was to take
until 14 June to accomplish.38
At Ein Zhalta, Einan's force had closed up during the night
and was strung out along the narrow road. At dawn, Syria
commandos attacked. APC's and tanks were hit and caught fire. Men
were killed trying to rescue the wounded from burning vehicles.
Finally, Einan ordered a cessation of rescue attempts and the
column retreated in reverse gear, with a loss of 11 killed and 17
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wounded.39 Meanwhile, an infantry battalion was helilifted behind
the Syrians and promptly attacked the defenses from the rear as
Einan brought fire from the front. After a battle of several
hours, the Syrian force withdrew, and Einan reorganized his force
and continued north, halting for the night still some 12
kilometers short of the Beirut-Damascus highway.40
Lev's division in the Eastern Sector could advance no
farther without meeting the Syrians, but Sakel and Peled could
and did continue moving north along the flanks of the Bekaa. On
this day, however, the Israeli Cabinet gave approval for
offensive air operations against the Syrians in Lebanon.41 The
resulting overwhelming IAF victory over Syrian SAM's and
interceptors has been described in detail in a number of
publications. 42 Briefly, the IAF had possessed a plan for
attacking the SAM sites in the Bekaa at least since the summer of
1981. By midday on 9 June, RPV's had located most of the SAM
sites and had relayed pictures back to Northern Command and the
IAF's Northern Regional Control Unit.
At 1400, the attack began. RPV's simulated attacking
aircraft, forcing the Syrians to switch on their acquisition and
fire control radars, and in some cases actually to engage the
RPV's. The drones pinpointed the locations of radars and missile
sites and relayed the information to Israeli E-2C Hawkeye and the
RC-707 control aircraft. As the Hawkeyes and specially equipped
tactical aircraft and RPV's conducted electronic jamming and
deception, a flight of 96 IAF planes attacked the missile sites.
Led by a flight of F-4's armed with Maverick and Shrike anti-
radiation missiles which destroyed most of the radar systems, IAF
F-4, F-15, F-16, and Kfir C-2 aircraft destroyed the batteries
one-by-one using a variety of ordnance -- laser-guided and tv-
guided bombs; television, infra-red, and anti-radiation missiles;
and even iron bombs. At the same time, the IDF artillery provided
suppression on all batteries and anti-aircraft gun locations
within range. A second wave of 92 IAF planes struck at 1550. As
this wave attacked, Syrian interceptors joined the fray, and in
the ensuing air battle 29 Syrian MiG-21, -23, -25, and SU-7
aircraft were shot down. By the end of the day, 41 Syrian planes
had been destroyed in air-to-air combat, mainly by F-15's but
also by other IAF planes using AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles and
Israeli-modified versions of the AIM-7 -- Shafir 2 and Python 3.
By day's end, 17 of the 19 SAM batteries had been destroyed.43
As the air battle was unfolding, Ben-Gal was ordered to
attack, and in mid-afternoon Lev attacked in the center and Vardi
on the left, to the west of Lake Qaraoun. Both attacks aimed at
the Syrian headquarters at Joub Jannine, some 25 kilometers from
thu Koukouba-Hasbaiya line.44
10 JUNE
The Israeli attacks on Syrian positions in the Bekaa brought
Syrian reaction in the west. There, Syrian forces had remained in
Beirut and out of the fighting, but now the 85th Brigade began
to deploy tank and commando teams south and east of Beirut --
around Khalde and the hills south of Beirut and along the Shemlan
ridge area. As Yair continued his advance through the Shouf
villages toward Souk al Gharb, Yaron remained stalled before Kafr
Sil, south of the airport. The Syrians had taken up fortified
positions in the village, located on a ridge running almost to
the sea across the coast road, with clear fields of fire and no
room for Yaron to maneuver. Yaron sent the Golani Brigade,
reinforced by a tank battalion and eight bulldozers, into the
hills east of Kafr Sil in an attempt to flank the PLO-Syrian
defense.45
In the Center, Einan pushed past Ein Zhalta and advanced to
the outskirts of Ein Dara. During his advance, RPV's had spotted
a Syrian ambush, and TOW Cobras were sent into action.
Approaching from the rear, the Cobras destroyed several Syrian
tanks and effectively broke up the ambush. By nightfall, Einan
had deployed his force on the hills around Ein Dara, from where
he could observe the Beirut-Damascus highway.46 Here he would
remain for nearly two weeks.
The main battles of 10 June were fought in the Eastern
Sector, between the IDF and the Syrian 1st Armored Division. The
Syrian air force again sent up interceptors as the IAF destroyed
the remaining two SAM batteries, resulting in 25 more Syrian
MiG's being shot down. Meanwhile, Ben-Gal continued to attack
along a fairly wide front. On the right, Sakel broke out of the
wadis and seized Rachaiya. In the center, Lev attacked along the
winding roads, pushing through Syrian resistance. After seizing a
key crossroads near Lake Qaraoun, Lev continued on to seize Joub
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Jannine around dusk. Peled had advanced through the foothills of
the Jbaal Barouk to within five kilometers of the Beirut-Damascus
highway before being ordered to pull back to more defensible
positions by Drori.47
Although the advance in the east had covered a good deal of
ground, Syrian resistance had been stiff. The Syrians defended a
series of strongpoints along the winding roads. Each strongpoint
conducted a separate, integrated defense with obstacles, mines,
tanks, and commandos using Saggers and RPG's; at times, such as
in the defense of the crossroads near Lake Qaraoun, the defense
was supported by artillery and by Gazelle helicopters using HOT
missiles. The Israelis used counterbattery fire, Cobra
helicopters in both the anti-tank and anti-air mode, and infantry
assaults to overcome Syrian defenses.48
Having breached the Syrian 1st Armored Division's front line
and seized Joub Jannine, and with a ceasefire scheduled to take
place the following day, Ben-Gal urged his units forward in the
night. On the right flank, Sakel's lead unit began advancing from
Rachaiya toward Kafr Quq, but was stopped by a destroyed bridge
across a wadi; while it waited for engineer support to arrive,
Syrian commandos attacked in the darkness, destroying several
vehicles before withdrawing. Ordered to resume the advance,
Sakel's units were unable to do so due to lack of fuel. The one
narrow road which formed Sakel's main supply route was so clogged
with traffic that neither the refuelers nor the engineer bridging
unit could reach the lead elements until after 0300.
A more severe problem occurred in Lev's advance, where a
brigade moved up toward Sultan Yakoub, situated in a narrow
valley some eight kilometers northeast of Joub Janine. Lacking
intelligence concerning Syrian deployment in the area, the
brigade was actually moving into the forward positions of a
relatively fresh Syrian mechanized brigade. As the lead
battalion, a reserve unit, approached the village, it was
attacked by Saggers from both sides of the road. Most of the
Saggers having been fired from too close, the damage was
negligible and the battalion sped through the village. On the
other side, now inside the narrow valley, the battalion commander
discovered that only three of his companies had made it through
the village and decided to wait until light. Unknown to him, he
had halted in the middle of the Syrian positions, and during the
night the Syrians realigned themselves and closed in toward the
force without opening fire. Aware of Syrian presence but unable
to pinpoint its location, the IDF tanks and APC's kept up a
reconnaissance by fire throughout the night. At dawn, the force
began to draw Sagger and armor-piercing fires from the hills, as
Syrian commandos approached closer with RPG's and Saggers. An IDF
attempt to relieve the force was halted to the east, and the
situation began to grow desperate as a result of dwindling
ammunition and increasing losses. After seeking help from higher
headquarters, the commander coordinated artillery support for a
breakout. Supported by some 11 battalions of artillery firing
both on Syrian positions and in a box around the withdrawing
companies, the Israelis buttoned up and raced the five kilometers
back to safety, losing a tank and four men killed in the escape.
The engagement had cost the Israelis some eight tanks and 35 men
killed or seriously wounded. The tanks, containing equipment
innovations and classified materials, were neither recovered nor
destroyed, and the next day the Syrians towed them away.49
11 JUNE
With a ceasefire scheduled to take effect at noon, both the
Israelis and the Syrians spent the morning of 11 June maneuvering
to gain the most advantageous positions. Sakel resumed his
advance on the right flank of the Bekaa, but was immediately
attacked by Syrian Gazelles, which slowed his progress and
inflicted some losses. By noon, Sakel had pushed through Kafr
Quq and had reached the village of Yanta, only 25 kilometers from
Damascus, where it met the advance units of the deploying Syrian
Third Division. At around 1100, elements of the division's 82nd
Armored Brigade stumbled into Peled's position to the west and
lost nine T-72 tanks. At 1200 the ceasefire took effect and
fighting in the Eastern and Central Sectors halted.50
Such was not the case in the Western Sector, however. Along
the coast, Yaron seized Khalde and attempted to advance toward
the airport, only to be halted by stiff resistance from a joint
force of PLO and Syrian 85th Brigade, dug in and equipped with
Sagger and Milan anti-tank missiles. The Golani attempt to
envelop to the east ran up against a Syrian ambush in the wealthy
suburb of Dokha; the fight continued throughout the day until the
Syrian positions were broken by artillery and air strikes. At
1115, Yair attacked Syrian defenses around Kafr Shem Shamoun and
by noon had seized the vital crossroads leading to Aley on the
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one hand and to Souk al Gharb and Baabda on the other. At noon,
the Israelis called for the Syrians to observe the ceasefire by
standing aside -- an offer that was declined. At nightfall, Yair
had seized the hills overlooking the road junction but failed to
advance farther. At this point, Yair proposed that he change the
direction of his attack from Aley, where a strong Syrian force
was located, to Baabda, which would bring him to the Beirut-
Damascus highway closer to Beirut but without engaging Syrian
units. Drori agreed to the change.51
12 JUNE
On 12 June, Yair cautiously continued his attack, opposed by
a mixed battalion of Syrian commandos, PLO fighters, and tanks
concealed in draws and among the houses. By 1600, he had advanced
only some 500 meters toward the Shemlan ridge, but by nightfall
his force had seized the ridge and halted a few kilometers short
of Ein Anub, the last position before reaching the suburbs
controlled by the Phalange. Meanwhile, the Golani enveloping
force was in a serious fight around Kafr Sil. Opposed by a
Syrian-PLO force consisting of some 28 T-54 tanks and commando
units, the Golanis resumed the attack in the afternoon. As a
paratroop battalion (detached from Yair at Damour) assaulted
Syrian positions on Radar Hill overlooking the town, the Golani
infantry fought their way into the center of town and Yaron's
tanks came up from the south, supported by Cobra helicopters
making runs from seaward. The battle raged all afternoon and into
the night, with Israeli infantry taking on Syrian tanks with
RPG's and even climbing tanks to drop grenades down the hatches.
The fight continued for 19 hours, centered on two main streets
only a kilometer long, and finally ended the next morning with
the Israelis controlling the village, from where they could see
the runways of Beirut Airport below.52
It was on 12 June that the main bunker in the Ein Hilwe
refugee camp near Sidon was finally captured. On 7 June, a
battalion from the Golani Brigade had tried and failed to
penetrate the camp; a larger attack the following day yielded the
same results. On the 9th, after a route had been opened through
Sidon, Mordechai began a systematic attack to seize the Ein Hilwe
camp section by section. The defenders, under a Muslim zealot
called Haj Ibrahim, were mostly PLO militia fighting on home
ground. Mordechai's attacks were made by infantry on foot, with
tanks and self-propelled artillery close behind and able to be
brought up against enemy positions. On 10 June, the Israelis
seized two mosques used as strongpoints by the defenders, but
came up against heavy fire from the camp hospital. Rather than
attack the hospital and inflict heavy casualties among the
civilians sheltered there, Mordechai chose to arrange for its
evacuation. By Friday morning, 11 June, the hospital was
deserted -- the PLO defenders having chosen to depart along with
the civilians. In order to reduce casualties among the numerous
civilians and his own force, Mordechai tried a number of means to
encourage the civilians to flee and the defenders to surrenders
leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, local delegations, Israeli
psychologists, and demonstrations of fire power against selected
targets. However, the defenders rejected all appeals and
encouraged (in some cases by execution) the civilian population
to remain in the camp. The Israelis resumed the attack, heavily
supported by air and artillery; by Friday evening the school was
taken, and at 1900 on Saturday, the main bunker was destroyed by
Israeli engineers. The fighting would continue for two more days,
when the PLO defenders of last position fought to the last man.
The defense was zealous, cruel, and effective.53
13-25 JUNE
At 0130 on 13 June, Yair continued his attack toward Ein
Anub. At dawn, the PLO-Syrian force withdrew. By 1300, Yair had
linked up with Phalange forces at Basaba and sent his force
speeding toward Baabda, the Christian suburb overlooking the city
and site of the Presidential Palace. Resistance had ceased
outside the city itself, and by nightfall the Golani had reached
Baabda from Ash Shuweifat, and Yaron had positions in the hills
south of the airport, in Baabda, in blocking positions facing
east along the Beirut-Damascus highway, and across the highway in
the Monte Verde area. Consolidation continued on the 14th, and by
the end of the day, the Israelis were firmly linked up with the
Phalange in East Beirut and deployed across the highway, but with
a substantial Syrian force along the Aley ridge and around
Bhamdoun. For the next several days, except for artillery duels
and occasional firefights in the Beirut area, both sides spent
the time consolidating their forces. While the IDF built up its
strength around Baabda and waited for the Phalange to act, the
PLO began fortifying its strongholds in West Beirut.
On 19 June, IDF paratroopers began to creep forward in the
hills south of Bhamdoun in order to gain a more secure hold on
the Beirut-Damascus highway. Drori asked permission to mount an
orderly attack but, no such attack having been authorized by the
Israeli Cabinet, his request was refused. The paratroopers
continued their small-unit actions, losing several men. On 22
June, an IDF armored force was ambushed and trapped near the
highway, and that night a Golani battalion was shifted from
around Beirut to extricate the trapped tanks. At the same time,
the IAF struck Syrian reinforcements moving west, destroying some
130 tanks and transporters. On 24 June, a coordinated attack was
launched all along the highway. As paratroopers attacked from
Baabda eastward toward Jamhur and the Golani attacked westward
through Bhamdoun, other forces under Einan advanced on Sofar from
the south. Syrian resistance was weak and units withdrew eastward
along the highway, allowed to pass without harm by the Israelis.
The Syrians consolidated their defense along the pass at Dar al
Beidar, the last pass in the Jbaal Barouk and last strongpoint
before the Syrian border. However, with the highway firmly in
control from Beirut to Sofar, the Israelis were content to stop
the attack except for some occasional shelling.54 Another
ceasefire was declared on 25 June.
The Israelis now found that they had outrun their own goals
and plans. Somewhere along the line the announced war aims had
grown from the original one of pushing the PLO beyond a forty-
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kilometer zone to goals which were much more, ambitious:
establishment of a stable government in Lebanon, one which would
be sensitive to Israeli interests; removal of all Syrian military
forces in Lebanon; and extermination or expulsion of the PLO.
Now, having defeated the PLO in the south, surrounded its forces
and headquarters in Beirut, linked up with the Phalange, and
pushed the Syrians back nearly to their border, the IDF had no
plans for a next step. As it became apparent that the Phalange
would not take on the PLO in West Beirut, the Israelis were being
forced to decide among the following options: attacking into the
city to destroy the PLO; laying seige to a city of half a million
people; or attempting to reach a political settlement.
CHAPTER VI--NOTES
1Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 118.
2Gabriel, p. 82.
3Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 118.
4John Leffin, The War of Desperation: Lebanon 1982-85 (London:
Osprey Publishing, LTD., 1985), p. 47.
5Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 120.
6Ibid.
7Gabriel, p. 82.
8Cooley, p. 28.
9Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 120-121, Two days later, as IDF forces
overran Al-Buss, Geiger and one of his soldiers were murdered by
their captors.
10Gabriel, p. 83.
11Interview with Major General Amos Yaron, 1 May 1987. General
Yaron stated to me that although he did not receive the orders
until 7 June, he was sure in his own mind that his objective was
Beirut.
12Gabriel, pp. 83-84.
13Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 124-31, and interview with Lieutenant
Colonel Jacob Amar, Golani Infantry Brigade. The Beaufort Castle
action became the subject of some controversy in Israel.
14Ibid., pp. 116-17.
15Gabriel, p. 85.
16Schiff and Ya'ari, pp., 138-39.
17Gabriel, pp. 85-87.
18Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 142.
19Gabriel, p. 90.
20Interview with Major General Yaron.
21Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 123.
22Gabriel, p. 86.
23Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 123.
24Ibid., p. 137.
25Ibid., p. 139.
26Laffin, pp. 52, 59.
27Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 140-41.
28Ibid., pp. 157-60.
29Gabriel, p. 91.
30Ibid., p. 92.
31Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 142-144.
32Ibid., pp. 160-161.
33Ibid., pp. 157-159.
34Gabriel, p. 94.
35Ibid., pp. 94-95.
36Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 159.
37Interview with Major General Yaron.
38Schiff and Ya'ari,pp. 144-145.
39Ibid., p. 162.
40Gabriel, p. 97.
41Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 166.
42Details of the air battle can be found in Gabriel, pp. 97-
100; Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 164-168; and Laffin, pp. 65-75. A
particularly good account is given in Gordan M. Clarke, et al,
The 1982 Israeli War in Lebanon: Implications for Modern
Conventional Warfare (Research Report, The National War College,
April, 1983), pp. 16-21.
43See Chapter VII for a discussion of air tactics and equipment.
44Gabriel, p. 100.
45Conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Amar.
46Gabriel, p. 102.
47Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 173-175.
48Ibid., p. 172.
49Ibid., pp. 174-179.
50Ibid.
51Ibid., pp. 185-190.
52Conversations with Major General Yaron and Lieutenant Colonel
Amar.
53Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 142-150.
54Gabriel,p. 111.
CHAPTER V -- SEIGE
Several factors mitigated against an early Israeli assault
on the PLO in West Beirut: 1) during the last two weeks of June,
the IDF was less concerned with the PLO than with the continued
Syrian presence along the Beirut-Damascus highway and the
possibility of a Syrian attack;1 2) the PLO was sending panic
signals that it would immediately quit the city;2 3) Israeli
leaders still had hopes that Bashir Gemayel's Phalangists would
and could attack in their stead;3 and 4) the IDF had neither the
numbers of infantry nor the experience in urban fighting to
confidently enter the city.4 However, by the end of June the PLO
leadership had decided that the Israelis would not quickly invade
Beirut and that the PLO could perhaps improve both its bargaining
position and its political image by holding out. Meanwhile, the
United States had begun its attempt to negotiate an orderly
evacuation of the PLO and was urging Israel not to enter the
city. So the seige was begun, more as an accident of war than by
design.
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Once the Israelis decided on a seige, they took several steps
to strengthen their hand. First, through psychological
operations (PsyOps) they attempted to convince both the PLO and
civilians that if they remained in Beirut they would die.
Second, they allowed and encouraged the civilian population to
evacuate the city, leaving open two well-publicized escape
routes. Third, they demonstrated by the use of air and artillery
that they would not allow the integration of the PLO into
civilian areas to deter them from attacks. Tactically, the IDF
made several decisions that affected the seige: they made maximum
use of air, artillery, and naval gunfire; they divided targets in
the city at the Corniche Mazraa, carefully controlling strikes
north of that street but exercising less restraint in bombardment
to the south -- the area of the Palestinian refugee camps and the
PLO stronghold. They would make no massive ground assaults but
would tighten the noose by seizing selected strongpoints.5 The
IDF went so far as to construct a huge master map, with each of
the buildings in West Beirut numbered, so as to provide precise
firing data.6
When the seige actually began is difficult to determine, but
by l July, after a ceasefire of nearly a week, the IDF began
psychological warfare operations. The IAF dropped leaflets and
conducted mock bombing runs, high ranking Israelis made radio
broadcasts, and special teams made loudspeaker announcements --
all to convince the PLO that attack was imminent. However, the
PLO had decided to dig in and wait, so on 3 July IDF forces moved
into East Beirut, seized the key crossings along the Green Line
which had separated the city since 1975, and began shelling the
Lailaki and Burj as Barajnah camps just north of the airport. On
4 July, the seige began in earnest as the IDF shut off all food,
water, and electricity in West Beirut. Golani Infantry began to
inch toward the southernmost Palestinian camps as artillery and
gunboats shelled areas of the city in a slow, steady bombardment
which was kept up for the next two days. On 9 July, the PLO
initiated a severe exchange with a concentrated barrage by 130mm
guns and Katyushas; the IDF responded with their own artillery
and with some 27 captured Katyusha launchers. This duel lasted
for the next two days, with the IDF using its artillery and the
76mm guns and Gabriel missiles of the gunboats against PLO
positions around the airport and university. The PLO returned
fire on IDF positions from the coast to Baabda, and an IDF ground
probe near the airport resulted in several casualties and the
loss of two tanks. An unofficial ceasefire went into effect on
the evening of 12 July which held for over a week while
negotiations proceeded.
On 21 July, the PLO struck back, launching three separate
attacks outside the Beirut areas a raid behind IDF lines in the
Bekaa, a rocket attack on a bus carrying Israeli soldiers near
Tyre, and a Katyusha rocket attack on several Israeli towns in
northern Galilee. The next day the IDF launched attacks --
consistent with the announced policy of "disproportionate
response" -- which continued through 30 July. In Beirut, the IAF
made its first air attack on the city since 25 June, striking the
camps and PLO strongpoints in a 90-minute raid supported by
artillery and tank fire. Elsewhere. the IDF artillery engaged
Syrian positions in the Bekaa, from where PLO ambushes were
initiated, and the IAF struck hard at the PLO camp and Syrian
barracks in Baalbek. Air, naval gunfire, and artillery attacks
continued for the next three days against PLO headquarters in the
Fakhani district of West Beirut, the camps, and PLO positions.
By Monday the smoke and dust were so thick in the Fakhani
district that Israeli aircraft had to drop flares during the day
to illuminate naval gunfire targets. Meanwhile, on the 23rd,
three new Syrian SAM-8 locations were detected in the Bekaa and
were promptly destroyed by the IAF.
On 27 July, the bombardment of Beirut intensified: targets
in non-Palestinian areas (including ambassadorial residences and
an apartment building housing staff of the American University
Hospital) were shelled for the first time, with heavy civilian
casualties; the Corniche Mazraa and the downtown areas were
brought under fire; and gunboats pounded the port area. On the
next day, the IDF continued to hit the same areas, as well as
Manara and Bain Militaire, resulting in a number of large fires
that began to burn out of control. The PLO retaliated with a six-
hour shelling of IDF positions. Meanwhile, Israeli infantry and
armor continued to advance a few yards at a time near the
airport, supported by point blank fire from tanks and self-
propelled artillery. The bombardment continued on the 29th and
30th, with rising civilian casualties, until a ceasefire went
into effect amid progress in the negotiations. 31 July was
quiet.
However, apparently in an effort to seize key objectives
prior to a negotiated settlement, the IDF struck hard on 1
August. Beginning at 0300, the Israelis subjected the city to
fourteen straight hours of air, naval, and artillery bombardment
At the same time, the IDF launched a two-pronged ground attack in
the vicinity of the airport with Golani infantry, paratroopers,
and tanks; by mid-afternoon the airport had been seized and PLO
forces pushed back to the outskirts of the Burj as Barajnah camp
and into the Ouzai district. The IDF continued the attack the
next day, with the Israelis battling into the center of the Ouzai
district north of the airport and sealing off the Burj al
Barajnah camp except for its northern edge. At the same time, the
Israelis deployed over 200 tanks along the Green Line,
particularly at the Port and Museum crossings. This reinforcement
continued on 3 August, when negotiations stalled after an
appearance of real progress.
As if in answer to the pace of the negotiations, the
Israelis launched the most devasting attack of the seige to date
on 4 August. In the morning, the IDF began an intense naval and
artillery barrage which struck the length of the city from the
port area to near the airport. For the first time, the IDF used
white phosphorus rounds, with the resulting, inevitably well-
publicized, civilian burn casualties. A three-pronged ground
assault began with an attack at the Port Crossing in the north
which advanced some 500 meters, then halted. The main attack come
at the Museum Crossing, where a force of tanks and paratroopers,
with engineers and bulldozers in the lead, headed straight for
the PLO headquarters in the Fakhani District. The PLO had
expected an attack here and had created a sufficient number of
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fortified strongpoints that the attack made limited progress and
stalled completely by nightfall. The third prong was a
continuation of the attack in Ouzai. Here the PLO also fought
stubbornly, but by dusk the Golani and paratroopers had pushed
through the district and reached the main junction in Bir Hanan.
By day's end, IDF forces had flanked PLO positions in the camps
on three sides, but had sustained their heaviest single-action
losses of the war in doing so -- 19 killed and 64 wounded.
Although skirmishing in the Fakhani District and elsewhere
continued, the human cost of the 4 August attack (and the extreme
displeasure of the Unitd States government) resulted in a
tapering off of action for the next several days. By 9 August the
negotiations had made a breakthrough and agreement seemed
imminent, so much that some PLO units actually disengaged to
return to their families, and others caused a run on luggage in
West Beirut. But on the 10th, the IAF struck at the PLO camps
with bombs and rockets, and naval gunfire and artillery resumed.
The shelling and air strikes contined the next day, and, in
addition, an IDF armor brigade moved north along the coast to
positions only ten miles south of Tripoli, sending a signal to
all concerned that the Israelis were willing to destroy the PLO
throughout all Lebanon if necessay.
On 12 August, to the public dismay of much of the world, the
Israelis staged a massice air attack on Beirut which lasted from
0600 to 1730. Although considerably short of the magnitude
described by the press, the damage and civilian casualties were
considerable. With its potential to undermine the negotiations,
the attack frightened the Israeli Cabinet into rescinding
Sharon's authority to conduct any military operations without
first receiving Cabinet approval. Begin ordered an immediate
ceasefire that evening. This time the ceasefire held,
negotiations were completed, and on 21 August French elements of
the Multi-National Force landed in Beirut. The first contingent
of PLO fighters departed the following day.
The seige was ended with the cost to the IDF of 88 dead and
750 wounded -- some 32 per cent of the total wounded up to then
and 24 per cent of the war's total. Estimates of PLO losses are
varied, but it appears that around 1,000 were killed during the
seige; equipment losses according to the IDF totaled some 960
tons of ammunition, 243 combat vehicles, 159 anti-tank weapons,
13 heavy mortars, 12 artillery pieces, 38 anti-aircraft guns, and
108 communications sets. Civilian losses are even more difficult
to determine, due to the wildly divergent estimates provided by
different sources. However, the best estimates (agreed upon by
American doctors in Beirut, IDF intelligence, PLO leaders, and
Lebanese militia leaders) indicate that between 5,000 and 8,000
civilians were killed in Beirut -- almost 8 civilians for every
PLO fighter.7
CHAPTER V NOTES
1Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 203-204.
2Rabinovich, p. 140.
3Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 199-201.
4Gabriel, p. 128.
5Ibid., pp. 136-138.
6The information concerning daily events of the seige was
synthesized from three sources except where otherwise noted:
Gabriel, pp. 139-159; Facts on File, June-September, 1982; and
the New York Times, 1 July 1982-15 August 1982. Descriptions of
the fighting during this period were validated by discussions
with Major General Yaron and Lieutenant Colonel Amar.
7Various sources.
CHAPTER VI -- OCCUPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Israel seemed to have won a great victory. On 1 September,
the last of the PLO fighters had been evacuated from Beirut and
scattered throughout the Arab world. Bashir Gemayel had been
elected President of Lebanon and seemed potentially capable of
restoring order to the country. The Syrians were isolated in the
northern Bekaa and unable to influence the action in most of
Lebanon. However, the victory was to be short lived.
OCCUPATION
Even before the evacuation of PLO fighters from Beirut, IDF
military intelligence had uncovered a PLO plan to leave some
2,000 fighters in the city, equipped with false papers, hiding
places, and funds.1 These armed men, plus the thousand or so
members of leftist militias who had fought alongside the PLO,
formed a threat not only to IDF forces in Lebanon but
particularly to the ability of Bashir Gemayel to establish
government authority in Beirut. The IDF therefore was instructed
to make plans for the seizure of the unoccupied areas of West
Beirut. On 14 September, before the plan could be carried out,
Gemayel was killed in a Syrian sponsored bombing while making a
speech in the Christian suburb of Ashrafiya. In the wake of
Bashir's assassination, the IDF seized control of West Beirut,
with Yaron's men pushing south from the positions they had seized
in early August and Mordechai moving east from the Port Crossing.
Some resistance was met and a number of casualties taken.2 The
IDF stayed out of the refugee camps, however, because the
Phalange had finally agreed to take action, ostensibly against
the fighters believed to have stayed behind. For three days the
Israelis guarded the entrances to the camps of Sabra and Shatilla
while the Phalange went on a rampage the result of which has been
well publicized. The massacre of Palestinians brought the return
of the Multi-National Force of French, Italian, and American
units to Beirut, upon which IDF withdrew to the hills surrounding
the city.3
Earlier, the IDF had begun to confront the situation in the
area under its control outside Beirut. In southern Lebanon, the
Israelis were forced to make certain decisions concerning the
divided population under its control -- Christians, Shiites,
Druze, and Palestinians. Even before the war there had been a
number of senior officers who were skeptical of the Phalange's
ability and willingness to stabilize the country. Now, some of
these officers urged a policy that would result in a de facto
partition in Lebanon: the arming and co-opting of the Shiite
population in the south. The idea was dismissed by Sharon but in
July, when Phalangist attempts to exert authority in Sidon
resulted in some excesses, the IDF encouraged Haddad's militia to
deploy as far north as the Awali River in order to force the
Phalangists out of the territory to the south. Although there was
much discussion of winning the support of the Shiite majority in
the south and of cooperation with the Shiite militia (Amal) which
had fought the PLO prior to the war, the presence of significant
radical Khomeini supporters among the Shiites precluded such
action. In fact, efforts were made to weaken Amal's influence by
cultivating rival Shiite groups.4
Another problem for the IDF was that of the Palestinian
refugee camps, which housed scme 100,000 people. The IDF's
initial policy was to destroy those houses which had served as
bunkers or arms caches and to leave the camp residents to fend
for themselves. However, the IDF did provide the camps with food
and medical aid and in October, when the weather began to turn
colder, with tents as well. An attempt had been made to convince
the Lebanese government to locate the refugees elsewhere in
Lebanon, but when that attempt met with little support the IDF
began to select and arm a small Palestinian militia in the camps,
one made up of men judged to prefer a Lebanese identity to that
of a refugee.6
The Shouf presented perhaps the most difficult problem.
Traditional stronghold of the Lebanese Druze, the mountains had
been the scene of cruel and bitter fighting between Kemal
Junblatt's militia and Maronite forces during the civil war.
Junblatt had asserted Druze control throughout the Shouf and,
although closely allied to the PLO, had not allowed a large PLO
presence in the area; his son, leader of the Druze after his
death, chose not to resist the Israeli advance in June. However,
when the IDF began to allow Phalange units into the Shouf in
August, the Druze struck back and pushed the Phalangists out
except for small pockets of Maronite resistance. During that
early period, the IDF chose to adopt a neutral stance and tried
to restrict the fighting, a stance which was interpreted by Walid
Junblatt as pro-Phalange.6
By the time of Bashir Gemayel's death, the Israelis had
managed to alienate nearly all the Lebanese factions, even the
Phalange. However, having committed themselves to a new order in
Lebanon based on Maronite hegemony, the IDF had little choice but
to pursue that goal. It is not within the scope of this study to
chronicle the myriad events in Lebanon from September 1982 to
June 1985, when the last IDF units left Lebanese soil. The
attempts of the Lebanese government to exert its authority and
its subsequent near-total collapse, the role of the Multi-
National Force, the PLO rebellion in the north, the Druze-
Phalange and Shiite-Palestinian fighting -- all contribute to a
portrait of a nation in chaos. However, as a natural consequence
of the invasion, IDF forces did remain in Lebanon for three
years, and its activities as an occupation army contributed to
the Lebanese morass.
Soon after the end of the fighting, the IDF reduced its
force strength in Lebanon from around 85,000 to 35,000, and by
January 1983 that strength had dropped even further, to around
20,000. Deployed generally with a division in the Beirut-Shouf
area and another division in the Bekaa Valley, the force was
supplemented by reserve units which performed their annual
training in the operational setting of Lebanon for about thirty
days at a time.
In southern Lebanon, in addition to the activities already
described, the IDF rounded up thousands of Palestinian males
immediately after the fall of the refugee camps and placed them
in detention camps until their loyalties and prior activities
could be sorted out. By the end of June, a military governor had
been appointed and by 22 June some 5,000 to 6,000 people were
under detention with a massive manhunt under way for anyone who
might have escaped the Israeli net. The detainees were
incarcerated in the camp at Ansar, between Tyre and Nabitiye.7
Subsequently, duties in the south became mired in a deadly rut of
hit-and-run attacks on IDF personnel followed by searches and
reprisals.
Security gradually became stricter as the IDF established
more checkpoints and patrols; these security measures in turn
alienated the predominantly Shiite population in the south. At
the same time, with an eye on future security, the IDF expanded
and trained Haddad's militia and other pro-Israeli groups. In the
Bekaa, the pattern of attack and reprisal was much the same. In
addition to maintaining a defensive posture toward the Syrians,
the IDF held the Syrian Army responsible for attacks mounted from
territory under its control and did not shy away from retaliation
against Syrian military as well as PLO targets. In the Shouf and
around Beirut, IDF attentions focused on maintaining order and
rebuilding the Lebanese Army as a necessary foundation for
government stability.
In addition to the almost daily snipings and attempted
ambushes, other military action occurred from September until
January:
31 August -- the IAF shot down a MiG-25 on a reconnaissance
flight over the Beirut;
4 September -- a PLO force captured eight Israelis from the
Nahal infantry brigade who were manning an
observation post north of Bhamdoun;
8 September -- IAF planes destroyed Syrian SAM's in
the northern Bekaa;
12 September -- Israeli planes destroyed one SA-5,
then conducted a heavy bombing of Syrian and
PLO positions in the Bekaa;
3 October -- the IDF suffered 6 killed and 22 wounded in
the ambush of a troop-carrying bus near Aley;
4 October -- IAF planes attacked and destroyed an SA-5
battery near Dar al Beidar;
31 October -- Syrian forces fired two SAM's at IAF
reconnaissance planes;
11 November -- the Israeli military headquarters in Tyre was
destroyed with 90 killed (originally thought
to be a car bomb, it was later determined to
have been an accidental explosion);
19 November -- gunmen in Sidon fired on an IDF jeep patrol,
killing one Israeli.
Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel began on 3 January
1983, under the auspices of the United States. In line with their
revised war aims, Israel hoped that the talks would result in a
formal peace treaty between the two countries, the withdrawal of
Syrian forces from Lebanon, and some kind of guarantees for the
security of Israel's northern border. It was in order to reach
these goals that the IDF remained in Lebanon, roughly in the same
positions it had held at the end of June. During the nearly five
months that the negotiations lasted, the IDF continued to suffer
casualties in guerilla-style attacks in the Shouf, on the Beirut-
Damascus highway, and particularly along the coast road. Tensions
rose between Israel and Syria, and the two forces traded
artillery and mortar fire on a number of occasions.
More serious, however, were three occurrences which did not
involve actual fighting. First, a number of increasingly
provocative incidents took place between IDF soldiers and U. S.
Marines near the southern suburbs of Beirut.8 Second, the Kahan
Commission, appointed to investigate Israel's role in the
September Sabra and Shatilla massacres, published its findings.
The commission found that Defense Minister Sharon and high
ranking officers of the IDF bore "indirect responsibility" for
the massacre and made specific recommendations for the removal of
several from their posts.9 These findings, while affirming
Israeli doctrines of morality in warfare, shook the officer
corps. Many officers felt that they had been asked to fight a
difficult war, one not in keeping with Israeli defense doctrine
and different from the previous wars of survival, and now they
were being punished for mistakes of omission not involving
Israeli troops: in the words of the commission, "those who in our
view did not fulfill the obligations placed on them."10 The third
occurrence was a result of the decline in popular support for the
war in Israel. During a demonstration in Jerusalem by the Peace
Now movement, a grenade was thrown into the crowd of marchers,
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killing one and wounding eleven. The dead man was an IDF reserve
officer who had fought in Lebanon, as were several of the
wounded. The shock was not so much that IDF members would be
actively opposing the war, forIsrael has a long tradition of free
expression by its soldiers, but in the depth of division among
Israelis that the incident revealed.
On 17 May, an agreement was signed by Lebanese and Israeli
negotiators which fell short of diplomatic relations, although it
did call for the establishment of "liaison offices." The
agreement called for the opening of the border to trade and
movement, the establishing of a security region up to the Awali
River (to be patrolled for the first two years by joint IDF-
Lebanese Army patrols and with two Lebanese Army brigades
providing overall security), and the withdrawal of Israeli forces
within eight to twelve weeks after the agreement took effect. The
agreement brought sharp reaction from Syria, which closed its
border with Lebanon, fired on IAF planes, and made menacing
movements in the Bekaa and on the Golan Heights. Tensions eased
in a few days, but Syria categorically refused to recognize the
agreement or to withdraw her own forces, a move required by
Israel as a precondition for withdrawing the IDF. As the
stalemate continued, Israeli losses in Lebanon mounted: five
soldiers were killed in the Shouf during the week of 23 May; two
died in a car bomb attack near Beirut on 8 June; three more were
killed in an ambush outside Tyre. These attacks could only partly
be traced to the PLO, usually small groups who were infiltrated
from Syrian-held territory. The remainder were made by indigenous
Lebanese -- Shiite radicals, Druze, and leftist Muslims.
WITHDRAWAL
During the summer, with much support building for the move
within Israel, talk surfaced concerning an Israeli withdrawal. As
casualties mounted and with a political solution seeming less and
less likely, Israeli officials began suggesting a partial
withdrawal to more defensible lines, a move opposed by both the
Lebanese and American governments as undermining the chances for
Lebanese stability. On 20 July, the Israeli Cabinet approved a
plan to redeploy Israeli troops south of the Awali River. In
tactical terms, although this move would not appreciably shorten
IDF lines, it would straighten the front across Lebanon to the
Bekaa. More important, it would remove IDF soldiers from the
Shouf, the Beirut-Damascus highway, and the area around Beirut --
areas where most of the casualties were being incurred. During
August, the IDF constructed defensive positions along the Awali,
with bulldozers creating bunkers, gun emplacements, observation
posts, supply roads, and helicopter landing pads. As the pullout
grew nearer, violence between Christians and Druze increased in
intensity. On the afternoon of 3 September, the Israelis began to
displace in convoys consisting of hundreds of APC's and tanks
moving south from around Beirut and from the Shouf. By the
following morning, the withdrawal was complete.
The Israeli withdrawal had two immediate consequences: the
Druze militia quickly seized control of most of the Shouf, and
the Multi-National Force became increasingly embroiled in the
confessional fighting around Beirut -- culminating in the October
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suicide bombings of the Marine and French headquarters.
Meanwhile, the IDF acted to consolidate its hold over south
Lebanon. Saad Haddad, suffering from cancer, stepped down as head
of the Israeli-backed militia, and the Israelis searched for a
replacement.
The IDF continued it its attempt to foster good relations
with the Shiites in the south, but Shiite antipathy was on the
increase. Stringent Israeli security measures -- such as the
destruction of houses belonging to members of the anti-Israeli
militias, the continuing incarceration of a number of Shiites in
the Ansar prison camp (still containing some 7,000 inmates), and
restrictions on movement to and from the Beirut area -- resulted
in clashes such as one on 17 October: an IDF convoy tried to
force its way through a Shiite religious procession, was
confronted by the crowd, and opened fire. On 4 November, a
suicide driver drove an explosive-laden truck into the IDF
headquarters compound in Tyre and killed 28 Israelis and 32
Arabs. The IAF retaliated with strikes on PLO and Syrian
positions along the Beirut-Damascus highway, even though the
radical Shiite Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the
bombing. Immediately following the Tyre attack, the IDF sealed
all roads leading from Israeli territory to the north, halting
all trade from the agricultural south to the Beirut markets. By 7
November northbound traffic was resumed, but by then the tension
had mounted between Syria and Israel as each underwent partial
mobilization of reserves. Israel continued its air raids on 16
November against PLO positions behind Syrian lines, with the loss
this time of one aircraft.
After serious disturbances at the Ansar camp during the
summer, Israel found a solution to the problem. On 24 November,
4,500 Palestinians were exchanged for six Israeli soldiers and
the camp was closed. The six soldiers were initially greeted as
heroes, but were later sharply criticized by Rafael Eitan,
President Chaim Herzog, and others for their surrender to PLO
attackers in September 1982. In December, the PLO bombed a
Jerusalem bus, killing four and wounding 46, in the first serious
attack by the PLO inside Israel since 1979. The attack did not,
however, signify a rise in PLO fortunes. On 20 December, Yasser
Arafat and some 4,000 followers staged a repeat performance when
they were evacuated by sea from Tripoli under pressure from anti-
Arafat Palestinians and Syrian forces. Israel had tried to
prevent the evacuation, with Israeli gunboats shelling Arafat's
positions in response to the Jerusalem bombing and effectively
preventing the evacuation for several weeks until pressured to
stop by the United States.
During the remainder of the winter, the situation in Lebanon
deteriorated drastically. Israeli planes continued their periodic
attacks on PLO positions, and the IDF continued to increase its
security measures in the south. On 31 December, the army again
closed the crossing points between Israeli territory and the
north as it launched a sweep which resulted in a number of
arrests by Israeli security forces. In February, Druze and Shiite
militias routed the Lebanese Army and took control of West
Beirut, leading to the withdrawal of the U. S. Marine contingent
of the Multi-National Force. The deteriorating situation, coupled
with Katyusha attacks on northern Israel, brought increased
attacks by the IAF on known or suspected PLO positions in
Hammana, Bhamdoun, Damour, and Souk al Gharb. On 21 February, t
strong armored patrol moved as far north as Damour in a warning
to the competing factions. As the Multi-National Forces withdrew,
domestic pressure for additional withdrawal grew in Israel. An
opinion poll conducted in February found that 39 per cent of
Israelis favored immediate and unconditional withdrawal from
Lebanon, while only 19 per cent favored remaining; these
percentages were probably reflected in the IDF as well. To cap
off the sense of frustration felt by Israelis, on 5 March the
Lebanese cabinet formally abrogated the May 1983 Agreement. And
in the third PLO attack in three months, a bomb exploded aboard
an Israeli bus in Ashdod, killing-three and wounding seven.
PLO attacks in Israel continued with the seizure of a bus on
12 April and an attack on a Jerusalem crowd by three members of
the PFLP which wounded 48 people. Security in Israel itself was
beginning to seem more precarious than before the war. And in
June, the Lebanese themselves urged Israel to withdraw its forces
from Lebanon. The cycle of attack and retaliation continued in
southern Lebanon:
28 March -- Israeli forces stormed a Shiite village, killing
at least six villagers;
3 April -- Two IDF patrols were attacked by PLO ambushers
near Nabitiye, wounding ten;
1-9 April -- IDF and Syrian batteries exchanged fires in
the Bekaa;
27 May -- Three IDF soldiers were killed in ambush;
28 June -- 40 Shiite prisoners were released by the IDF and
twenty more by the South Lebanese Army, but on
the same day 100 Shiites were arrested in
Maarakeh after an IDF soldier was shot dead.
On 21 July, the roads to southern Lebanon were closed yet
again following the Lebanese government decision to shut down the
Israeli Liaison Office in Beirut. The roads were reopened a few
days later but the IDF imposed tighter restrictions on vehicles,
often stripping them completely to search for explosives. Traffic
remained snarled and Lebanese travelers increasingly discomoded.
In August, automobile traffic was banned altogether as part of
the "Iron Fist" policy in Lebanon. Nor was Israel's ally, the
South Lebanon Army (formerly Haddad's militia, now commanded by
former general Antoine Lahad) helping the situation any: on 20
September, Druze elements of this force attacked and killed
thirteen Shiite villagers in reprisal for an ambush the day
before. This "army," now 2,200 men strong, was created as an
instrumental part of Israel's northern security.
In October, the Israeli government made public a list of
four demands to be met before it would completely withdraw its
force form Lebanon, a force now down to about 10,000 men. The
demands illustrate how far Israeli aims had fallen since the
evacuation of the PLO: 1) a Syrian commitment not to move troops
into southern Lebanon; 2) a Syrian commitment to prevent guerilla
infiltration from territory under its control; 3) the continued
deployment of Lahad's South Lebanon Army in a security zone
adjacent to the Israeli border; and 4) the redeployment of UNIFIL
troops to a zone north of Lahad's and stretching from the coast
to the Syrian border. Four days after the announcement, the 600th
Israeli soldier to be killed in Lebanon died in a rocket grenade
attack on the Zaharani bridge.
On 8 November, pullout talks began between Lebanon and
Israel, which broke off in January with no agreement; but on the
14th, the Israeli Cabinet announced a decision to withdraw the
IDF in three stages. The plan called for an initial pullback to a
line from the Litani River to Nabitiye, followed by a second
withdrawal in the Bekaa to new positions near Hasbaiya, and
completed by a total pullback to Israel itself. The first stage
began on 20 January 1985 and was completed on 16 February, when
IDF troops left Sidon and were replaced by a Lebanese Army force
of 1,800 men. This stage was not without conflict, however.
During the withdrawal, 15 soldiers were killed and 105 wounded,
including the colonel who was senior advisor to the South Lebanon
Army (SLA); dozens of SLA members were assassinated; and about
one-third of the SLA deserted in the face of Shiite death
threats.
In the weeks that followed, the clashes increased as the IDF
stuck to its "Iron Fist" policy and the Shiites stepped up their
attacks. From mid-February to mid-March, eighteen more Israelis
were killed and another 35 wounded. The "Iron Fist" policy called
for preventive raids on Shiite villages, dusk to dawn curfews,
and severe travel restrictions, and at first seemed to have an
effect. However, on 4 March a bomb destroyed a Shiite mosque in
Marakah, killing about fifteen people including two Amal leaders.
The day before, the village had been occupied by a strong IDF
raiding force, and the blast was naturally blamed on the
Israelis. On the 10th, a suicide bomber drove a truck into an
Israeli convoy and detonated its hidden explosives: twelve were
killed and fourteen wounded. The next day, the army attacked the
town of Zrariyah, north of the new defense line, in a raid
preceded by artillery fire. The IDF force killed some 40 Amal
fighters, captured most of the male population and a large store
of weapons, and destroyed eleven houses. On 9 April, a sixteen
year-old Shiite girl drove a car bomb into an IDF convoy, and the
next day Israeli forces conducted an early pullout from the area
around Nabitiye. The same day, the 647th Israeli was killed in
the war -- a reserve major who stepped on a land mine near
Hasbaiya. By April, the IDF had killed over eighty Shiite
guerillas in five weeks, and the Ansar camp -- nearly emptied in
the prisoner exchange in November 1983 -- held over 1,800 Shiite
prisoners. Early that month, 700 were released and 1,000 were
transferred to Israel.
The pullout continued when the IDF withdrew from the Bekaa
on 24 April and from Tyre on the 29th. On 20 May, Israel freed
1,150 prisoners in exchange for the release of the last three
known Israeli prisoners in PLO hands. This exchange, however,
included more than PLO militia: 121 Palestinian guerillas, 150
Shiites from Ansar, and 879 convicted prisoners from Israeli
jails -- 380 of whom had been serving life sentences. Some 600 of
these were allowed to remain in Israel and the Occupied
Territories. The release of a number of well-known terrorists --
including the only surviving member of the Japanese Red Army
squad that killed 26 people in the 1972 Lod Airport massacre and
two members of the PLO team that killed 33 civilians near Tel
Aviv in 1978 -- caused a furor in Israel, but it underscored the
long standing Israeli policy of doing whatever was necessary to
secure the release of captive Israeli soldiers. Attacks on IDF
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forces continued, and in two separate engagements Israeli missile
boats sank vessels carrying PLO guerilla raiding parties.
On 10 June, after a 53-mile security fence was erected
(complete with sensors, search lights, and obstacles -- all
connected to a central computer), the last large combat unit was
withdrawn from Lebanon. As if to mark the occasion, two Katyusha
rockets fired from southern Lebanon impacted in Galilee as the
troops were crossing into Israel. After three years, 654 IDF dead
and 4,000 wounded, and an estimated 17,000 Lebanese killed, this
phase of the continuing Lebanese war was over.
CHAPTER VI NOTES
1Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 250.
2General Yaron informed me that his unit met moderate
resistance when it entered West Beirut in September, mostly from
leftist militias.
3It is not within the purview of this paper to delve into the
detail of the Sabra and Shatilla massacres. Anyone wishing to do
so can find a complete account from the Israeli side in Schiff
and Ya'ari, pp. 250-286, the Report of the Kahan Commission, and
elsewhere.
4Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 238-240.
5Ibid., pp. 240-242.
6Ibid., pp. 242-245.
7Facts on File. The information in the remaining portion of the
chapter is derived from the editions of Facts on File from
September 1982 to June 1983 and from the author's own knowledge
of events.
8This series of confrontations, shoving matches, and near
shootings reached a head when the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
General Robert H. Barrow, formally charged that Israeli troops
had persistently "harassed, endangered, and degraded" Marines
around Beirut. The IDF responded with charges that the PLO was
staging attacks from Marine-controlled areas. The situation was
somewhat resolved in late March with a more detailed description
of IDF-Marine relations, but did not fully end until the IDF
pulled back to the Awali in September.
9The Kahan Commission found that responsibility for the
massacre was borne by Sharon, Chief of Staff Eitan, Chief of
Intelligence Saguy, Northern Commander Drori, and Beirut area
commander Yaron. Eitan was allowed to retire when his term was
over a short time after the release of the findings; Saguy was
removed from his post and soon retired; Drori was allowed to
remain at his post. Yaron was barred from holding a field command
for a minimum of three years and today, nearly five years later,
still has not returned to command; he was recently denied
credentials from the government of Canada for the post of
Military Attache to that country.
10Although we did not discuss the subject in detail, General
Yaron related to me that he had little faith in the Phalange even
before the massacre and that although he was closely watched by
higher headquarters, they provided him little assistance or
advice.
CHAPTER VII -- IDF LESSONS LEARNED
Each episode of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a test, one in
which each side has ample and obvious opportunity to evaluate its
warfighting skills, personnel, and equipment. And each war poses
problems different from those of the last. As the 1967 conflict
was dominated by air and armor, the 1973 war saw the preeminence
on missiles designed to counter those same aircraft and tanks.
The Lebanon War posed its own problems for all the combatants.
The war in Lebanon gave the IDF the opportunity to test the
reorganization begun in 1973, but that reorganization was based
primarily on war in the open desert and the Lebanon war was
characterized by urban, mountain, seige, and occupation warfare.
Viewed from the vantage of June 1982, IDF operations appear up to
the high standards which have characterized Israel's other
conflicts. Yet there have been a number of military writers who,
noticing the absence of the bold strokes which have characterized
Israel's past wars, have argued that the IDF's performance in
Lebanon reveals a decline in military prowess.1 However, the only
way to judge the IDF's performance in Lebanon is to examine its
actions in light of the special circumstances of that war. It
would be absurd, for example, to fault the Marine Corps for lack
of mobility at Peleliu by a comparison with Patton's breakout
from Normandy, and it is equally misleading to compare IDF
operations in Lebanon with those in the Sinai. In order to make
a competent judgment, it is helpful to examine the various
categories of performance separately.
Tactics
A number of criticisms have been directed at the IDF for its
tactics in the June invasion, among which are the following: the
IDF shoved extreme caution in the MOUT operations in Tyre, Sidon,
and Beirut; the rates of advance in Lebanon were too slow,
resulting in the failure to capture or kill a single PLO leader;
poor tactical measures resulted in a number of serious ambushes,
especially by Syrian forces in the Center and East; the IDF
exhibited a tendency to substitute firepower and frontal attack
for tactical maneuver; the Israeli forces did very little
fighting at night; the IDF used conventional military tactics
against a guerilla force. Each of these charges contains some
truth, but each must be examined in light of the political
constraints under which the IDF was forced to operate.
The IDF did exercise a great amount of caution in urban
fighting during the invasion and seizure of Beirut. A number of
reasons can be advanced for that caution: inexperience in urban
warfare, concern for friendly casualties, concern for civilian
casualties, lack of time pressure (especially in Tyre and, later,
in Sidon), the nature of the Beirut fighting, and the warfighting
characteristics of the IDF. The only MOUT operations conducted by
Israel in the past 30 years were in Jerusalem in 1973 and Suez in
1973, and neither were of the scale of those in Lebanon. IDF
inexperience did show at first, as units attempted to enter the
camps around Tyre and Sidon with tanks in the lead and troops
riding in APC's, but the soldiers quickly learned to advance on
foot and bring the tanks and self-propelled artillery up only
when they had a target. By the time they penetrated Beirut in
July and August, IDF soldiers had grasped the fundamentals of
urban warfare and were practicing it with some innovation and
flexibility. Concern for casualties was a real influence on MOUT
operations. The rules of engagement prohibited indiscriminate use
of supporting arms, particularly in Tyre and Sidon, and the
ethical framevork of the IDF makes it very difficult for its
soldiers to accept heavy civilian casualties as a necessary part
of war. The Israeli concern for friendly casualties is well
known, and in a war where time has become less important and
where the ends are somewhat controversial, concern for friendly
casualties assumes an even greater significance.2 Finally, the
Israeli warfighting doctrines of speed and maneuver have little
place in urban fighting; whether an army can excel at both to the
same degree is debatable, and it is doubtful if -- considering
its history -- the IDF would wish to allow a lessening of its
current offensive cast of mind.
The second criticism, that rates of advance were slow, hinges
on several justifications: that the coastal advance was held up
for two days before Sidon, that Einan's division in the Center
and Ben-Gal's forces in the East failed to reach the Beirut-
Damascus highway, and that no high ranking PLO leaders were
killed or captured. Again, explanations exist which mitigate
these criticisms. On the coast, thanks to Yaron's amphibious
landing, IDF troops were as far north as Damour on the third day
of the war, and by 10 June two divisions were past Damour and
closing on Beirut. Unless the objective from the beginning was to
drive into the heart of Beirut, which no one suggests, this
advance seems to have satisfied the operational requirements. In
the Center there is perhaps more reason to criticize, although
the fault here must lie with the planners who stripped Einan's
division of much of its strength and chose a route that would
entangle it with the rear elements of Division 36. When Einan ran
into stiffening Syrian resistance, he was less a priority than
the force struck at Sidon, and by itself his division did not
have the strength to push through or the size for significant
maneuver. The advance in the East only lasted a day and a half.
The Syrians fought from prepared defenses on familiar ground and,
most important, had had three days warning prior to the Israeli
attack. The failure to kill or capture a PLO leader is easily
explained by the fact that nearly all of them fled at the first
sound of gunfire, abandoning their units to fend for themselves.3
It is true that the IDF did not display the speed in the
advance which has become one of its hallmarks, and it is also
true that much of the time during the advance units halted at
night. This may be a valid criticism not of IDF tactics, by of
force structure and doctrine. Armor heavy forces have a difficult
time in terrain that favors the infantry defender (such as most
of Lebanon is), and the near disasters at Ein Zhalta and Sultan
Yakoub show what can happen to armor when it ventures unsupported
into prepared defenses. At any rate, this criticism must be
balanced against that of a slow rate of advance: if you want to
move quickly, put your tanks in front and don't stop; if you want
to move at night, put dismounted infantry in front and move
slowly. There were, however, several instances of night
operations which were noteworthy: Yaron's amphibious landing; the
Golani attack at Kafr Sil; the Golani and paratroop attack in
Beirut in August; and the infantry attacks along the Beirut-
Damascus highway in June.
The criticisms of over-reliance on firepower and conventional
tactics may possibly be justified in light of past wars, but
again, Lebanon was different. One of the reasons a force relies
on speed -- hits quickly and hard and flies like the wind -- is
that if it does not, it will be overwhelmed by its enemy's
superior forces. In Lebanon, the IDF was by far the superior
force in every measurable way; it therefore could afford to rely
more on its combat power than it could in other wars. Even so,
there are a number of examples of imaginative tactics: Yair's
indirect attack through the Shouf; Yaron's handling of the battle
at Kafr Sil; Peled's move up Jbaal Barouk; and Sakel's advance
through Wadi Cheba.
IDF tactics in Lebanon did suffer initially from emphasis on
armored warfare, but the soldiers themselves soon learned the
lessons of mountain and urban warfare. Criticisms of IDF tactics
are in some cases valid, but all can be laid to three causes: 1)
IDF force structure had enhanced the roles of tanks and
artillery, but virtually ignored the role of infantry on foot; 2)
the objectives of the war were revealed gradually, denying
commanders the opportunity to look ahead and devise more
effective tactics; and 3) the Syrians, against whom the IDF had
its toughest problems, had ample warning of the IDF attack and
could easily determine what were its final objectives.
Armor
The Lebanon War more than vindicated the Israeli-built
Merkava tank. No Merkava crewmen were killed and only six
suffered even light burns; moreover, every Merkava hit by enemy
fire was repaired within 48 hours.4 In addition to its toughness,
the Merkava has a number of characteristics which make it
appealing to Israelis. The frontal armor and placement of the
engine in front make it nearly impervious to frontal hits. The
105mm cannon, although not very large, is supported by highly
effective Israeli ammunition and a superior laser range finder,
sight, and barrel shroud. Its greatest appeal to the Israelis is
the fireproofing of the tank -- with seven armored, self-sealing
fuel tanks, fireproof containers for ammunition, and the
effective Spectronix fire-suppression system.
The M-113 APC did not fare so well, tending to burn quickly
when hit. Such was its reputation that troops sometimes refused
to ride in them, preferring to walk alongside and forego the
armor protection rather than chance burning to death. Most of the
APC's destroyed were deployed with tanks and without an infantry
screen, and the majority of APC losses occurred in the Central
and Eastern Sectors -- partly because Syrian opposition was more
formidable than that of the PLO, but partly because Amos Yaron,
an infantryman himself, made good use of dismounted infantry. The
shock effect of Israeli armor was severely hampered by the narrow
roads which forced the tanks to advance single file.
Infantry
One lesson the IDF did learn in Lebanon was that it had
neglected infantry for too long. As has been noted, the IDF opted
for tank formations and relegated infantry to the secondary role
of mopping up what the tanks left. The Yom Kippur War showed the
ineffectiveness of that doctrine, but the solution of IDF
planners was to put infantry in APC's so they could keep up with
the tanks and to increase the number of self-propelled artillery.
It would be the artillery, it was thought, which would suppress
the enemy's anti-tank guided missiles. In fact, the ratio of
infantry formations to armored actually declined between 1973 and
1982, at a time when the overall force had increased nearly 100
percent. In Lebanon, however, anti-armor ambushes were sprung at
close range from previously unnoticed prepared positions; by the
time artillery was brought to bear, the attackers had fled and
the losses sustained.
Part of the problem lies in IDF doctrine and part lies in the
unwillingness to take casualties. The argument centers on the
proposition that overall casualties may be less if infantry takes
the lead in terrain which is inhospitable to armor. Although the
IDF has acknowledged the problem by starting up an additional
infantry brigade, the Givati, it must still structure its forces
for the most likely type of warfare -- and that is armored
warfare in open terrain.
Artillery
Lebanon was the first real test for the IDF's expanded
artillery arm. Artillery was generally effective in Lebanon and
was used in a number of different roles: SEAD and counterbattery
fire in the Bekaa; fire support for ground units, in the direct
fire mode in MOUT; and in long-range sniping based on
intelligence from RPV's, aircraft, or other sources. Although its
mobility was not tested, and in fact most Israeli guns could have
displaced only once and still provided support over the whole
battle area, no problems were discerned either. Despite the
publicity surrounding the damage and civilian casualties, which
although exaggerated were still disturbingly high, there is no
doubt that IDF artillery took pains to put rounds on target.
However, its performance must be measured in light of the
complete Israeli air superiority and the lack of significant PLO
artillery capability.
Air Operations
The offensive air operation against the missile batteries in
the Bekaa on 9 June was a meticulously planned and executed
operation. The plan itself had been developed in the late 1970's
as a result of lessons learned in the Yon Kippur War, and had
been fleshed out with information gathered on the Syrian SAM's
since their deployment in the summer of 1981. IAF doctrine places
priority on offensive air operations against enemy air and air
defense as a prerequisite for being able to conduct ground
strikes and close air support missions, so when the decision was
made to destroy the SAM's the IAF put all its energies into doing
so.
The operation called for extremely precise coordination of
RPV's, electronic warfare, ground artillery, standoff missiles
and bombs, and strike aircraft. The sophistication required
central control by the Northern Regional Control Unit (RCU)
located at Northern Command. The priorities of the operation
itself were first the acquisition and fire control radars of the
batteries, then the missiles themselves, and finally the
supporting anti-aircraft guns. The radars were taken out while
the launching aircraft were out of range of the guns and the
radars themselves confused by jamming, false lock-ons of RPV's,
and artillery suppression fires. Once the radars were killed, it
was a relatively easy matter to take on the missiles and ZSU's.
The overwhelming Israeli success in the air battle against
Syrian interceptors was made possible by a combination of Israeli
superiority and Syrian deficiencies. The IAF not only had better
airborne radar and excellent air-to-air ordnance, but their
command and control was deadly efficient. The RCU was able to
obtain sufficient advance warning of Syrian flights from a
combination of sources: the E2-C Hawkeye and RC-707 aircraft,
ground and airborne spotters, balloon supported radar, and
intelligence intercepts of Syrian tower and strike flight
frequencies. Guided to the battle by the RCU, Israeli pilots were
then virtually on their own to carry on the fight, which they did
with deadly efficiency.5
Close Air Support missions were flown from the first day of
the invasion. The IAF primarily flew missions against preplanned
targets, but answered a number of on-call and immediate requests
as well. These were forwarded from Northern Command, who received
them from the divisions, where an air liaison officer was
located. The RCU did the allocation and mission tasking for these
strikes, the speed of which was improved by the fact that all
field intelligence reports were forwarded directly to the
operational flying units. Once the Syrian SAM and interceptor
threat was removed, CAS missions were flown not only by attack
aircraft but also by tactical fighters on strip alert or Combat
Air Patrol.6 There were some instances of air support being slow
to arrive and other instances of friendly casualties from IAF
missions. This may be due to the IDF belief that positive control
by air or ground observers in not necessary; in fact, the IAF
does not provide air officers below the division, or sometimes
separate, brigade level.7 The pilots themselves tend to be
careful in releasing their ordnance, and there were numerous
instances, especially in Beirut, where pilots returned to base
with their ordnance because they could not positively identify
and engage their targets.
Among the aviation innovations of the war were the Cobra and
Defender gunships, used by the Israelis for the first time in a
significant anti-tank role. Under the control of the ground
commander, these helicopters proved a valuable asset and
accounted for a high percentage of the Syrian armor destroyed by
the Israelis. However, they were under virtually no anti-air
threat, so their utility against a more sophisticated defense is
yet to be determined.
Engineers
Combat engineers were a vital part of Israeli operations
throughout the war. From truly impressive engineering feats such
as the construction of a twelve-mile road in Wadi Cheba during
the first days of the war to the combat role of leading the
attack at the Museum crossing in Beirut, the engineers compiled
an enviable record. Often walking beside the lead tanks, IDF
engineers opened five critical routes of advance for the armored
vehicles, spanned a number of obstacles, and built a number of
roads -- often while under fire. During the occupation and
withdrawal phases of the war, engineers laid some 400 miles of
road and constructed defensive positions and compounds. Their
performance more than justified their post-1973 integration into
the combined arms units of the IDF.8
Logistics
The logistics capability of the IDF has improved
considerably since the 1973 war. Although not nearly as
devastating a conflict, the Lebanon War demonstrated that Israel
does have a logistical capability which can serve its needs.
Unlike the American method of resupplying front line units, in
which supplies are sent forward in answer to requests from the
front, the Israelis method is to stockpile ammunition and
supplies as close to the leading units as possible. Although
equipped with sufficient vehicle for overland transport, the
Israelis quickly ceased to rely on that means due to the clogged
roads, preferring instead to conduct most resupply by air.
Helicopters vere used to ferry supplies to the lead units, while
C-130's delivered supplies near the battle zone by using roads as
landing strips. The navy played a limited role in resupply,
except during the first few days of the war when Yaron's force
was heavily resupplied by sea. In the end, however, the logistics
effort in Lebanon did not tax the IDF very much due to the
limited forces involved, the short distances, and the proximity
to Israel proper.
Israel Naval Force (INF)
The Lebanon War marked the first time that the IDF conducted
joint operations in anything larger than a raid. The INF made
several contributions to the operations blockade of the southern
coast of Lebanon and of Beirut; naval gunfire against Palestinian
targets in support of ground operations; and the amphibious
landing north of Sidon on 6 and 7 June. Throughout the summer of
1982, INF surface craft and submarines patrolled the coast of
Lebanon, both to prevent the escape of PLO fighters by sea and to
prevent their resupply. This the Israelis did successfully.9
Naval Gunfire support, particularly for Yaron's force, was
readily available but, like air support, depended on preplanned
targets identified by near real time intelligence rather than on
requests from the ground units. During the siege of Beirut, NGF
was integrated into the overall bombardment plans along with air
and artillery. The most significant action of the INF was in the
amphibious operation at the mouth of the Awali; although this
operation was aided considerably by the use of IAF helicopters
and does not represent any long range amphibious capability, it
did demonstrate the tactical utility of amphibious warfare in a
coastal area such as that surrounding much of Israel -- so much
so that by 1985 the INF had increased its number of Amphibious
ships and landing craft from nine to fifteen, including two
hovercraft.10
Command and Control
Although the IDF has historically espoused unity of command,
unit integrity, and the practice of tasking commanders then
allowing them to fulfill their missions with little outside
interference, the Lebanon War marked a departure from that
practice. From the beginning, unit integrity on the division
level was lost: units were given from a division in one sector to
a division in another (such as Kahalani, who gave a brigade to
Sakel in the Eastern Sector); units began their attacks in one
sector and completed them in another, such as Kahalani's attack
from the Center to the West and Cohen's attack on Masghara which
was launched trom the Central Sector; units were switched
frequently, such as the Golani Brigade, which belonged at various
times to Kahalani's 36, Mordechai's 91, Yaron's 96, and Einan's
162 -- all in the space of less than three weeks. In addition,
the switching and combining of units often resulted in one man
commanding while another of equal rank remained on the scene with
nothing to do while his forces were being commanded by the other.
The fact that the war was fought on a single front (and that it
was above all Ariel Sharon's war) meant that the commanders on
the scene were often visited by senior officers who tended to
make decisions on the spot. This was especially true at Beirut,
which for a while was the only game in town: Yaron was frequently
graced by the presence of Drori, Eitan, and Sharon, which made it
somewhat difficult for him to plan and carry out his own actions.
In short, the IDF worked under some command and control
constraints which would have crippled many armies, and its
commanders showed a considerable flexibility in dealing with the
situation11
In summary, the IDF demonstrated some remarkable warfighting
capabilities, and also discovered some incipient flaws in the
organization as it had expanded since 1973. However, possibly
the most severe result of the war ma have been to the character
of the IDF itself. Most of its cherished principles were tested
in Lebanon, from the fighting in heavily populated areas to the
bombardment of Beirut. But most potentially damaging was the long
period of occupation between 1982 and 1985. During this period,
the IDF was taken out of its self-styled role of mobility and
combat decisiveness and placed into one of static police-type
functions. Forced into continual conflict with the local
population, many IDF soldiers reacted with confusion, doubts, and
resentment -- particularly when the occupation itself proved so
unpopular in Israel. Four years worth of conscripts gained their
experience (which they would carry with them into the long years
of reserve service) in Lebanon. This, combined with the lack of
normal training during this period and the cutback in training
due to economic constraints caused by the war's cost, may portend
a period of diminished ability on the part of the IDF for some
time to come. Worse, in a service where ethics and morality are
real and inherited parts of military doctrine, the erosion of
morale, motivation, and the sense of ethics which occurred during
the occupation could have far reaching effects --effects which
may not become apparent until the next major conflict.
CHAPTER VII NOTES
1The critics include a number who are highly regarded in
military affairs and whose writings are normally pro-Israeli; see
Trevor N. Dupuy and P. Martell, Flawed Victory: The 1982 War in
Lebanon, Richard Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee, and Ze'ev
Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War.
2General Yaron told me that after the initial invasion, when
the political struggle became paramount, the highest priority
among commanders from the small unit level on up became to
conserve the lives of their men.
3See Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 136-137.
4Gabriel, pp. 197-200.
5Clarke, pp. 16-20.
6Ibid., pp. 20-21
7Interview with General Yaron.
8Gabriel, pp. 208-210.
9Having been on a ferry bound from Jounieh to Cyprus during the
summer of 1982 which was stopped by Israeli patrol craft, I can
testify to the thoroughness of the blockade.
10Mark A. Heller, ed., The Middle East Military Balance, 1985,
(Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1986), p. 126.
11General Yaron pointed out that the command and control
problems associated with the frequent shuffling of units were not
the problem for the IDF that they might be for another service:
the IDF is a small service where the senior officers tend to know
one another fairly well, and the basic unit of the IDF is the
brigade, which can operate independently or as part of a larger
force with no diminution of its capability.
12Gal, pp. 246-251.
CHAPTER VIII -- CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to assess the results of the war in
Lebanon in the same way that one can with most wars. Israel's
past wars have ended with the attainment of the objectives set by
the government, both military and political, and a clear sense of
victory on the part of the IDF. Had the IDF packed up and gone
home in September 1982, having attained more than the limited
goal it set out to achieve, then the results could have been more
clearly determined: expulsion of the PLO from southern Lebanon up
to and including Beirut; the weighting of the Lebanese domistic
scene in favor of the Christian factions; removal of Syrian
presence from much of Lebanon and a vastly reduced Syrian
influence in that country; and a Lebanese populace which was
fairly sympathetic to Israel.
In such a case, the Israeli use of military force would have
been consistent with doctrine, and even the seige warfare in
Beirut could have been accepted as a necessary action in a war
fought to protect the existence of the state. However, the IDF
remained in Lebanon for three years in a role inconsistent with
Israeli doctrine, a role which reflected a more Clauswitzian
approach in which the military force acts as an instrument of
foreign policy. At any rate, in order to reach an understanding
of the results of this war, an evaluation of the war must be made
on two levels: first, the military performance of the IDF and,
second an assessment of the results in light of the announced war
aims.
In terms of military performance, the IDF would have
appeared highly successful had the war terminated prior to the
seige of Beirut. As has already been discussed, certain flaws in
performance have been noted by observers and IDF officers alike,
and the IDF has already made some hard choices in the correction
of those deficiencies. Some will not be corrected because the IDF
sees its most likely future conflict as not in the mountains and
built up areas of Lebanon but in the more open terrain to the
east and south.2 If one breaks the war into three phases --
invasion, seige, and occupation -- the evaluation of IDF
performance becomes easier.
During the invasion, the IDF performed well, despite the
tactical constraints placed on the IDF in the beginning. These
constraints consisted of the refusal or inability to determine
final tactical objectives from the outset, restrictive rules of
engagement, and a force structure not designed for the terrain of
Lebanon. Nevertheless, the IDF did reach Beirut in six days, did
seize much of the Beirut-Damascus highway, did push the Syrians
back in the Bekaa while inflicting severe losses on them, and did
virtually destroy air and air defense capability in Lebanon.
However, the Syrians fought stubbornly and well on the battalion
level and below, causing Israeli setbacks and withdrawing slowly
and in good order while continuing to hold key Israeli
objectives.3 Overall, however, the Israeli performance during
the invasion must be considered consistent with its performance
in past wars, although its superiority in numbers and equipment
made Lebanon less than a true test of its capabilities.
Neither the seige nor the occupation were indicative of the
IDF's military competence. In these phases there was no room for
innovation or for fast, hard-hitting warfare. Decisions were
made above the level of the commanders on the scene, to include
when and where to initiate bombardments and when and where to
attack on the ground. This was a type warfare for which the IDF
was unprepared, and any mistakes in execution must be directed
more toward the policy makers who placed the IDF in the position
of maintaining a seige and acting as an army of occupation than
at the IDF itself, for nothing in the army's doctrine or previous
guidance from civilian authority indicated that it would be asked
to perform these types of duty. Observers of the war are divided
as to just how careful the IDF was in its concern for civilian
casualties in Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut, with the more responsible
experts insisting that the IDF took great pains to hold
casualties to a minimum; nevertheless, civilian damage and
casualties were significant and the number of civilians killed
and wounded far exceeded the casualties among the combatants on
either side.4 For this also the Israeli civilian authority must
take most of the responsibility. In sum, the IDF's performance
during the seige and occupatian was mixed, but even though it was
acting out of the role for which it was designed and trained, the
IDF did conduct itself satisfactorily within the constraints
under which it operated.
The results of the war in terms of Israel's war aims is
somewhat easier to assess in light of the events of the past five
years. But the war aims themselves reflect the nature of the
conflict as one out of the mainstream of Israeli doctrine. When
the war began, the only announced aim was to push the PLO out of
southern Lebanon in order to provide for the security of northern
Israel. This aim was reflected in the operational plan under
which the invasion started. However, very quickly, that objective
was replaced with a number of other aims much more ambitious and
much more in the nature of political, rather than national
security, policy.5 These aims, as has already been mentioned,
were the destruction of the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon, the
creation of a stable and sympathetic Lebanese government, and the
removal of Syrian armed presence from Lebanon.
The first goal seemed to have been accomplished in August
1982, when the PLO was evacuated from Beirut and its fighters
scattered from Yemen to Algeria. In the following year the PLO
became even more fragmented when dissident elements forced the
withdrawal of Arafat's followers from Tripoli and northern
Lebanon. However, there remained in Lebanon some 6,000 PLO
fighters under the wing of the Syrian forces in the northern
Bekaa,6 and by the end of 1985 that number had increased to
8,500, including some 2,500 in Beirut and 2,000 in the vicinity
of Tyre and Sidon.7 In addition, recent attempts by al-Amal to
defeat the PLO in the camps of Sidon and Beirut have been
unsuccessful, causing some observers to foresee a resurgence in
PLO presence and influence in Lebanon.8 Even if the PLO fails to
reestablish itself in Lebanon, the possibility exists that its
hostile presence in southern Lebanon has been replaced by the
equally hostile presence of armed Shiite radicals. The growing
conflict between IDF occupation forces and the Shiite community
has been previously discussed, but a new dimension to that
conflict may be emerging with the anti-Israel activities of the
Hizbollah group.9 Thus far those activities have been directed at
Israeli and SLA targets within the security zone in southern
Lebanon itself, but the conflict has the potential to spill over
Israel's northern border at any time. In addition, there have
been several recent incidents of attempted PLO infiltration of
Israel which may signal a renewed PLO strength and aggressive
policy in Lebanon. In summary, although the number of incidents
inside northern Israel have been drastically curtailed as a
result of the defeat of the PLO in 1982, the potential exists for
an increase in anti-Israeli actions originating from Lebanon --
this time from both the PLO and Shiite groups. In total, the
first objective of the Lebanon War must be judged only a partial
success.
The second aim, to establish a stable government in Lebanon,
is without doubt an unqualified failure. Without detailing the
waxing and waning of the Lebanese government's fortunes since
1982, it is sufficient to say that today (in fact, since 1983),
there is no Lebanese government capable of anything more than
issuing passports. Not only did the war fail to establish a
friendly, Christian-dominated government, but the possibility of
any stable government in Lebanon seems more and more remote.
The third goal was to remove Syrian presence from Lebanon.
The recognition that this goal was obviously unsuccessful must be
tempered by an awareness of the Lebanese situation since 1982.
Even when the first two aims seemed to have been met, Syrian
recalcitrance acted as a stumbling blocks the Syrians would by no
means agree to a withdrawal from Lebanon in conjunction with the
Israelis and therefore were able to effectively scuttle the May
17, Agreement between Israel and Lebanon before it had any chance
of fulfillment; Syria offered a haven for PLO fighters in the
Bekaa Valley from which they could stage raids on the IDF in
Lebanon and from which many have now moved back into Beirut and
Sidon; and despite having taken severe losses during the June
fighting, Syria was able to quickly replace those losses with
better Soviet equipment accompanied by a number of Soviet
advisors.
Yet, this war aim is a total failure only when considered
hand-in-hand with the other two. Since the collapse of any hope
of effective government in Lebanon, the Syrians have themselves
become bogged down in the never-ending cycle of confessional
warfare and changing factional alliances. Syrian troops have
returned to Beirut, but they have been no more able to establish
order than were the Americans and Israelis before them. In fact,
however, it may be that Syrian power in Lebanon will be the one
thing which prevents any radical change to Lebanon's form of
government, for despite Syrian support for Iran in its conflict
with Iraq, Syria has no interest in seeing a Shiite Islamic
government in Lebanon and would rather maintain some form of the
status quo. At present, Syria is the only party with whom one
can deal concerning Lebanon and that situation is better than
having factional anarchy -- for the Israelis as well as for the
Lebanese.
In conclusion, the overall results of the Lebanon War have
been mixed. Although the IDF generally fought well, the
experience in Lebanon during the seige and occupation may have
had some detrimental long-term effects on its underlying
character. The failure of Israeli war aims reflects the ill-
advisedness of attempting to solve long-standing and complex
political problems in the Middle East by military action. Such an
approach simply does not work, as many have found out to their
regret. Any solution to the problems of Lebanon and of the
Palestinian must be found outside the arena of armed conflict, a
lesson that the Israeli experience in Lebanon teaches well.
CHAPTER VIII NOTES
1Zvi Lanir, "political Aims and Military Objectives." Israeli
Security Planning in the 1980's (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1984). pp. 40-43.
2In this sense, the IDF has reacted somewhat like the U. S.
forces after Vietnam, where the prevailing idea was not so much
to learn the lessons of counterinsurgency and limited warfare but
toreturn to the traditional focus on conventional warfare.
3An indication that the IDF placed more importance in the
drive up the coast than in the limited engagement with Syria may
be inferred by the fact that the elite units (paratroopers,
Golani Brigade, Geva's 211th Brigade) were all on the coast.
4The author has personally seen evidence of pinpoint accuracy
in the IDF bombing in West Beirut, particularly north of the
Corniche Mazraa; in some cases a single building was destroyed
while those around it remained untouched. On the other hand, I
have also seen whole city blocks which were level led by the IDF.
5Ze'ev Schiff argues convincingly that the final aims were
those held by Defense Minister Sharon from the beginning and that
much of the operational planning was predicated on Sharon's
desire to lure the Israeli Cabinet into step-by-step decisions
which would eventually encompass those war aims. Schiff's
argument has credence in Israel and within the IDF.
6Heller, The Middle East Military Balance, 1983, p.187
7Heller, The Middle East Military Balance, 1985, p.197
8See Nora Bustany, "Palestinian's Victories in Lebanon Mark
Arafat's Resurging Influence," Washington Post, December 23,
1986, p. A15. Ms. Bustany is Lebanese and lives in Beirut, and
her reporting concerning Lebanon is accurate and responsible.
Ironically, the reemergence of the PLO in Lebanon has been
accomplished with the aid of the Phalange, which now sees al-Amal
and the Shiites as a greater threat than the PLO.
9See the Washington Post, February 15, 1987, pp. A1 and A22;
also, September 23, 1986 and May 5, 1987.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alpher, Joseph, ed. Israel's Lebanon Policy: Where To?.
Jerusalem: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1984.
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