Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
October 25, 2007
The U.S. Government is taking several major actions today to counter Iran’s bid for nuclear capabilities and support for terrorism by exposing Iranian banks, companies and individuals that have been involved in these dangerous activities and by cutting them off from the U.S. financial system.
Today, the Department of State designated under Executive Order 13382 two key Iranian entities of proliferation concern: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC; aka Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Additionally, the Department of the Treasury designated for proliferation activities under E.O. 13382 nine IRGC-affiliated entities and five IRGC-affiliated individuals as derivatives of the IRGC, Iran’s state-owned Banks Melli and Mellat, and three individuals affiliated with Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). The Treasury Department also designated the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) under E.O. 13224 for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations, and Iran’s state-owned Bank Saderat as a terrorist financier. Elements of the IRGC and MODAFL were listed in the Annexes to UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. All UN Member States are required to freeze the assets of entities and individuals listed in the Annexes of those resolutions, as well as assets of entities owned or controlled by them, and to prevent funds or economic resources from being made available to them. The Financial Action Task Force, the world’s premier standard-setting body for countering terrorist financing and money laundering, recently highlighted the threat posed by Iran to the international financial system. FATF called on its members to advise institutions dealing with Iran to seriously weigh the risks resulting from Iran’s failure to comply with international standards. Last week, the Treasury Department issued a warning to U.S. banks setting forth the risks posed by Iran. (For the text of the Treasury Department statement see: http://www.fincen.gov/guidance_fi_increasing_mlt_iranian.pdf.) Today’s actions are consistent with this warning, and provide additional information to help financial institutions protect themselves from deceptive financial practices by Iranian entities and individuals engaged in or supporting proliferation and terrorism. Effect of Today’s Actions As a result of our actions today, all transactions involving any of the designees and any U.S. person will be prohibited and any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen. Noting the UN Security Council’s grave concern over Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, the United States also encourages all jurisdictions to take similar actions to ensure full and effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. Today’s designations also notify the international private sector of the dangers of doing business with three of Iran’s largest banks, as well as the many IRGC- affiliated companies that pervade several basic Iranian industries. Proliferation Finance – Executive Order 13382 Designations E.O. 13382, signed by the President on June 29, 2005, is an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, and at isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems. Designations under the Order prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Considered the military vanguard of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC; aka Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) is composed of five branches (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Basij militia, and Qods Force special operations) in addition to a counterintelligence directorate and representatives of the Supreme Leader. It runs prisons, and has numerous economic interests involving defense production, construction, and the oil industry. Several of the IRGC’s leaders have been sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1747. The IRGC has been outspoken about its willingness to proliferate ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD. The IRGC’s ballistic missile inventory includes missiles, which could be modified to deliver WMD. The IRGC is one of the primary regime organizations tied to developing and testing the Shahab-3. The IRGC attempted, as recently as 2006, to procure sophisticated and costly equipment that could be used to support Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL): The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) controls the Defense Industries Organization, an Iranian entity identified in the Annex to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 on March 30, 2007. MODAFL also was sanctioned, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act, in November 2000 for its involvement in missile technology proliferation activities. MODAFL has ultimate authority over Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which was designated under E.O. 13382 on June 28, 2005. The AIO is the Iranian organization responsible for ballistic missile research, development and production activities and organizations, including the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG), which were both listed under UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and designated under E.O. 13382. The head of MODAFL has publicly indicated Iran’s willingness to continue to work on ballistic missiles. Defense Minister Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad Najjar said that one of MODAFL’s major projects is the manufacturing of Shahab-3 missiles and that it will not be halted. MODAFL representatives have acted as facilitators for Iranian assistance to an E.O. 13382- designated entity and, over the past two years, have brokered a number of transactions involving materials and technologies with ballistic missile applications. Bank Melli, its branches, and subsidiaries: Bank Melli is Iran’s largest bank. Bank Melli provides banking services to entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, including entities listed by the U.N. for their involvement in those programs. This includes handling transactions in recent months for Bank Sepah, Defense Industries Organization, and Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group. Following the designation of Bank Sepah under UNSCR 1747, Bank Melli took precautions not to identify Sepah in transactions. Through its role as a financial conduit, Bank Melli has facilitated numerous purchases of sensitive materials for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. In doing so, Bank Melli has provided a range of financial services on behalf of Iran’s nuclear and missile industries, including opening letters of credit and maintaining accounts. Bank Melli also provides banking services to the IRGC and the Qods Force. Entities owned or controlled by the IRGC or the Qods Force use Bank Melli for a variety of financial services. From 2002 to 2006, Bank Melli was used to send at least $100 million to the Qods Force. When handling financial transactions on behalf of the IRGC, Bank Melli has employed deceptive banking practices to obscure its involvement from the international banking system. For example, Bank Melli has requested that its name be removed from financial transactions. Bank Mellat, its branches, and subsidiaries: Bank Mellat provides banking services in support of Iran’s nuclear entities, namely the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and Novin Energy Company. Both AEOI and Novin Energy have been designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 and by the UN Security Council under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747. Bank Mellat services and maintains AEOI accounts, mainly through AEOI’s financial conduit, Novin Energy. Bank Mellat has facilitated the movement of millions of dollars for Iran’s nuclear program since at least 2003. Transfers from Bank Mellat to Iranian nuclear-related companies have occurred as recently as this year. IRGC-owned or -controlled companies: Treasury is designating the companies listed below under E.O. 13382 on the basis of their relationship to the IRGC. These entities are owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders. The IRGC has significant political and economic power in Iran, with ties to companies controlling billions of dollars in business and construction and a growing presence in Iran’s financial and commercial sectors. Through its companies, the IRGC is involved in a diverse array of activities, including petroleum production and major construction projects across the country. In 2006, Khatam al-Anbiya secured deals worth at least $7 billion in the oil, gas, and transportation sectors, among others. IRGC Individuals: Treasury is designating the individuals below under E.O 13382 on the basis of their relationship to the IRGC. One of the five is listed on the Annex of UNSCR 1737 and the other four are listed on the Annex of UNSCR 1747 as key IRGC individuals. Other Individuals involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programs: E.O. 13382 derivative proliferation designation by Treasury of each of the individuals listed below for their relationship to the Aerospace Industries Organization, an entity previously designated under E.O. 13382. Each individual is listed on the Annex of UNSCR 1737 for being involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program. Support for Terrorism -- Executive Order 13224 Designations E.O. 13224 is an authority aimed at freezing the assets of terrorists and their supporters, and at isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems. Designations under the E.O. prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction. IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF): The Qods Force, a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC; aka Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), provides material support to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). The Qods Force is the Iranian regime’s primary instrument for providing lethal support to the Taliban. The Qods Force provides weapons and financial support to the Taliban to support anti-U.S. and anti-Coalition activity in Afghanistan. Since at least 2006, Iran has arranged frequent shipments of small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, and probably man-portable defense systems to the Taliban. This support contravenes Chapter VII UN Security Council obligations. UN Security Council resolution 1267 established sanctions against the Taliban and UN Security Council resolutions 1333 and 1735 imposed arms embargoes against the Taliban. Through Qods Force material support to the Taliban, we believe Iran is seeking to inflict casualties on U.S. and NATO forces. The Qods Force has had a long history of supporting Hizballah’s military, paramilitary, and terrorist activities, providing it with guidance, funding, weapons, intelligence, and logistical support. The Qods Force operates training camps for Hizballah in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and has reportedly trained more than 3,000 Hizballah fighters at IRGC training facilities in Iran. The Qods Force provides roughly $100 to $200 million in funding a year to Hizballah and has assisted Hizballah in rearming in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. In addition, the Qods Force provides lethal support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and guidance to select groups of Iraqi Shi’a militants who target and kill Coalition and Iraqi forces and innocent Iraqi civilians. Bank Saderat, its branches, and subsidiaries: Bank Saderat, which has approximately 3200 branch offices, has been used by the Government of Iran to channel funds to terrorist organizations, including Hizballah and EU-designated terrorist groups Hamas, PFLP-GC, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. For example, from 2001 to 2006, Bank Saderat transferred $50 million from the Central Bank of Iran through its subsidiary in London to its branch in Beirut for the benefit of Hizballah fronts in Lebanon that support acts of violence. Hizballah has used Bank Saderat to send money to other terrorist organizations, including millions of dollars on occasion, to support the activities of Hamas. As of early 2005, Hamas had substantial assets deposited in Bank Saderat, and, in the past year, Bank Saderat has transferred several million dollars to Hamas. E.O. 13224 1. Entity: BANK SADERAT IRAN AKA: Iran Export Bank AKA: Bank Saderat PLC Location: PO Box 15745-631, Bank Saderat Tower, 43 Somayeh Avenue, Tehran, Iran, and all offices worldwide, including: Location: 16 rue de la Paix, 75002 Paris, France Location: Postfach 160151, Friedenstr 4, D-603111 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Location: Postfach 112227, Deichstrasse 11, 20459 Hamburg, Germany Location: PO Box 4308, 25-29 Venizelou St, GR 105 64 Athens, Attica, Greece Location: 3rd Floor, Aliktisad Bldg, Ras El Ein Street, Baalbak, Baalbak, Lebanon Location: 1st Floor, Alrose Bldg, Verdun Rashid Karame St, Beirut, Lebanon Location: PO Box 5126, Beirut, Lebanon Location: Alghobeiri Branch - Aljawhara Bldg, Ghobiery Blvd, Beirut, Lebanon Location: Borj Albarajneh Branch - Alholom Bldg, Sahat Mreijeh Kafaat St, Beirut, Lebanon Location: Sida Riad Elsoleh St, Martyrs Square, Saida, Lebanon Location: PO Box 1269, 112 Muscat, Oman Location: PO Box 2256, Doha, Qatar Location: No 181, Makhtoomgholi Ave, 2nd Floor, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan Location: PO Box 700, Abu Dhabi, UAE Location: PO Box 16, Liwara Street, Ajman, UAE Location: PO Box 1140, Al-Am Road, Al-Ein Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, UAE Location: PO Box 4182, Murshid Bazar Branch, Dubai City, UAE Location: Sheikh Zayed Rd, Dubai City, UAE Location: Khaled Bin Al Walid St, Dubai City, UAE Location: PO Box 4182, Almaktoum Rd, Dubai City, UAE Location: PO Box 316, Bank Saderat Bldg, Al Arooba St, Borj Ave, Sharjah, UAE Location: 5 Lothbury, London, EC2R 7HD, UK Location: PO Box 15175/584, 6th Floor, Sadaf Bldg, 1137 Vali Asr Ave, 15119-43885, Tehran, Iran 2. Entity: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS (IRGC) - QODS FORCE AKA: Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami (Pasdaran) AKA: Sepah-e Qods (Jerusalem Force) DESIGNATIONS BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT PURSUANT TO E.O. 13382 1. Entity: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AKA: IRGC AKA: IRG AKA: AGIR AKA: The Iranian Revolutionary Guards AKA: The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution AKA: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami AKA: Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami AKA: Pasdaran-e Inqilab AKA: Revolutionary Guards AKA: Revolutionary Guard AKA: Sepah AKA: Pasdaran AKA: Sepah Pasdaran AKA: Islamic Revolutionary Corps AKA: Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Location: Tehran, Iran 2. Entity: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS AKA: Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics AKA: MODAFL AKA: MODSAF Location: Located on the West Side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran DESIGNATIONS BY THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT PURSUANT TO E.O. 13382 Bank Melli 1. Entity: BANK MELLI IRAN Location: Ferdowsi Avenue, P.O. Box 11365-171, Tehran, Iran, and all offices worldwide, including: Location: 43, Avenue Montaigne, Paris 75008, France Location: Holzbrucke 2, 20459 Hamburg, Germany Location: Nobel Avenue 14, Baku, Azerbaijan Republic Location: P.O. Box 2643 PC 112, Muscat, Oman Location: P.O. Box 5270, Oman Street, Al Nakheel, Ras al Khaimah, UAE Location: P.O. Box 248, Al Marash R/A, Hamad Bin Abdullah Street, Fujairah, UAE Location: P.O. Box 459, Al Burj Street, Sharjah, UAE Location: P.O. Box 1888, Clock Tower, Industrial Road, Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, UAE Location: P.O. Box 2656, Hamdan Street, Abu Dhabi, UAE Location: P.O. Box 3093, Khalid Bin Waleed Street, Bur Dubai, UAE Location: P.O. 1894, Beniyas Street, Dubai, UAE Location: No. 111-27, Alley - 929, District - Arasat Street, Baghdad, Iraq Location: 704-6 Wheelock House, 20 Pedder Street, Hong Kong, China 2. Entity: BANK KARGOSHAEE AKA: Kargosa’i Bank Location: 587 Mohammadiye Square, Mowlavi St., Tehran, 11986, Iran 3. Entity: BANK MELLI IRAN ZAO Location: Number 9/1, Ulitsa Mashkova, Moscow 103064, Russia 4. Entity: MELLI BANK PLC Location: 1 London Wall, London, EC2Y 5EA, United Kingdom 5. Entity: ARIAN BANK (Joint Venture between Banks Melli and Saderat) AKA: Aryan Bank Location: House 2, Number 13, Wazir Akbar Khan, Kabul, Afghanistan Bank Mellat 6. Entity: BANK MELLAT Location: 327 Taleghani Avenue, 15817 Tehran, Iran, and all offices worldwide, including: Location: P.O. Box 375010, Amiryan Street #6, P/N-24, Yerevan, Armenia Location: Keumkang Tower, 13th and 14th Floors, 889-13 Daechi-Dong, Gangnam-Ku, Seoul 135-280, South Korea Location: P.O. Box 79106425, Ziya Gokalp Bulvari No. 12, Kizilay, Ankara, Turkey Location: Cumhuriyet Bulvari No. 88/A, PK 7103521, Konak, Izmir, Turkey Location: Buyukdere Cad, Cicek Sokak No. 1-1, Levent, Istanbul, Turkey 7. Entity: MELLAT BANK SB CJSC AKA: Mellat Bank DB AOZT Location: P.O. Box 24, Yerevan 0010, Republic of Armenia 8. Entity: Persia International Bank PLC. Location: Number 6 Lothbury, Post Code: EC2R 7HH, United Kingdom IRGC Entities: 9. Entity: KHATAM OL ANBIA GHARARGAH SAZANDEGI NOOH AKA: Khatam Ol Ambia AKA: Ghorb Khatam AKA: Khatam Al-Anbya Location: Number 221, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, 4th Phase, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, Iran 10. Entity: ORIENTAL OIL KISH Location: 2nd Floor, 96-98 East Atefi St., Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran Alternate location: Dubai, UAE 11. Entity: GHORB KARBALA AKA: Gharargah Sazandegi Karbala-Moasseseh Taha AKA: Gharargah Karbala Location: No. 2 Firouzeh Alley, Shahid Hadjipour St., Resalat Highway, Tehran, Iran 12. Entity: SEPASAD ENGINEERING COMPANY Location: Number 4 corner of Shad Street, Mollasadra Ave., Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran 13. Entity: GHORB NOOH Location: P.O. Box 16765-3476, Tehran, Iran 14. Entity: OMRAN SAHEL Location: Tehran, Iran 15. Entity: SAHEL CONSULTANT ENGINEERS Location: Number 57, Eftekhar Street, Larestan Street, Motahhari Avenue, Tehran, Iran Mailing address: P.O. Box 16765-34, Tehran, Iran 16. Entity: HARA COMPANY AKA: Hara Institute Location: Tehran, Iran 17. Entity: GHARARGAHE SAZANDEGI GHAEM AKA: Gharargah Ghaem Location: Number 25, Valiasr Street, Azadi Square, Tehran, Iran AIO Individuals: 18. Individual: BAHMANYAR MORTEZA BAHMANYAR DOB: December 31, 1952 POB: Tehran, Iran Passport: I0005159 (Iran) Alternate Passport: 10005159 (Iran) 19. Individual: AHMAD VAHID DASTJERDI AKA: AHMED DASTJERDI VAHID DOB: January 15, 1954 Passport: Diplomatic Passport A0002987 (Iran) 20. Individual: REZA-GHOLI ESMAELI DOB: April 3, 1961 POB: Tehran, Iran Passport: A0002302 (Iran) IRGC Individuals: 21. Individual: MORTEZA REZAIE AKA: Morteza Rezai DOB: circa 1956 22. Individual: MOHAMMAD HEJAZI DOB: circa 1959 23. Individual: ALI AKBAR AHMADIAN AKA: Ali Akbar Ahmadiyan DOB: circa 1961 POB: Kerman, Iran 24. Individual: HOSEIN SALIMI AKA: Hossein Salami AKA: Hoseyn Salami AKA: Hussayn Salami Passport: D08531177 (Iran) 25. Individual: QASEM SOLEIMANI AKA: Ghasem Soleymani AKA: Qasmi Sulayman AKA: Qasem Soleymani AKA: Qasem Solaimani AKA: Qasem Salimani AKA: Qasem Solemani AKA: Qasem Sulaimani AKA: Qasem Sulemani DOB: March 11, 1957 POB: Qom, Iran Passport: 1999 Diplomatic Passport 008827 (Iran) 2007/928
Treasury and State Department Iran Designations Identifier Information
Pursuant to E.O. 13224 (Terrorism) and E.O. 13382 (WMD)
October 25, 2007