The Problem of Other Minds

1. 1.

   Other advocates of theory-theory favor an account in terms of innate theory-of-mind “modules” (for discussion, see Gopnik 1996).

2. 2.

   For a more detailed discussion of theory of mind, see Gallagher and Zahavi 2007, chapter 9.

3. 3.

    The neutral monists’ (very implausible) further reductive step may be ignored here.

4. 4.

   In a recent paper on the history of psychology, Alan Costall argues that both the “introspectionism” usually believed to have preceded behaviorism as the dominant trend in psychology and Watsonian behaviorism “were arguing from the same premise, the antithesis of behaviour, on the one hand, and mind and consciousness on the other. Both were committed to an overly subjectivized conception of subjectivity, and an overly objectivized conception of behaviour” (Costall 2006, 649). Interestingly, Costall also argues that the current “cognitivist” paradigm, contra its own self-image, has not abandoned this Cartesian picture. The theory-of-mind debate would seem to support this claim (cf. Leudar and Costall 2004).

5. 5.

   For a contemporary version of the argument, see Noë 2004.

6. 6.

   The best explanation argument and at least some versions of theory-theory work with a similar symmetry: mental states as such (whether mine or someone else’s) are unobservable theoretical entities.

7. 7.

   For discussion of these points, see Overgaard 2007, chapters 5 and 7.

8. 8.

    Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the fifth annual meeting of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology, University of Copenhagen, in April 2007, and at the second workshop of the Research Network on the Philosophy of Mind, University of Hull, in July 2007. I am grateful to both audiences for helpful discussion and to Shaun Gallagher for comments on the penultimate draft of the chapter.

• Avramides A (2001) Other minds. Routledge, London

  Google Scholar 

• Ayer AJ (1990) Language, truth and logic. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth

  Google Scholar 

• Carruthers P (1991) Introducing Persons. Routledge, London

  Google Scholar 

• Churchland PM (1988) Matter and consciousness, Revised edn. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

  Google Scholar 

• Costall A (2006) Introspectionism and the mythical origins of scientific psychology. Conscious Cogn 15:634-654

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Dennett DC (1971) Intentional systems. J Philos 68:87-106

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Descartes R (1984) Meditations on first philosophy (trans: Cottingham J). In: The philosophical writings of Descartes, vol II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 3-62

  Google Scholar 

• Gallagher S, Zahavi D (2007) The phenomenological mind. Routledge, London

  Google Scholar 

• Gallese V, Goldman AI (1998) Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends Cogn Sci 2:493-501

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Goldman AI (2000) Folk psychology and mental concepts. Protosociology 14:4-25

  Google Scholar 

• Gopnik A (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Behav Brain Sci 16:1-14

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Gopnik A (1996) Theories and modules; creation myths, developmental realities, and neurath’s boat. In: Carruthers P, Smith PK (eds) Theories of theories of mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 169-183

  Google Scholar 

• Gordon RM (1996) Radical simulationism. In: Carruthers P, Smith PK (eds) Theories of theories of mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 11-21

  Google Scholar 

• Hobson RP (1991) Against the theory of ‘theory of mind’. Br J Dev Psychol 9:33-51

  Google Scholar 

• Hull CL (1943) Principles of behavior: an introduction to behavior theory. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York

  Google Scholar 

• Husserl E (1989) Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: second book (trans: Rojcewicz R, Schuwer A). Kluwer, Dordrecht

  Google Scholar 

• Husserl E (1995) Cartesian meditations: an introduction to phenomenology (trans: Cairns D). Kluwer, Dordrecht

  Google Scholar 

• Hyslop A (1995) Other minds. Kluwer, Dordrecht

  Google Scholar 

• Leslie AM (1987) Children’s understanding of the mental world. In: Gregory RL (ed) The Oxford companion to the mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 139-142

  Google Scholar 

• Leudar I, Costall A (2004) On the persistence of the ‘problem of other minds’ in psychology. Theory Psychol 14:601-621

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Merleau-Ponty M (1962) Phenomenology of perception (trans: Smith C). Routledge, London

  Google Scholar 

• Mill JS (1979) In: Robson JM (ed) An examination of Sir William Hamilton’s philosophy: collected works, vol IX. University of Toronto Press, Toronto

  Google Scholar 

• Noë A (2004) Action in perception. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

  Google Scholar 

• Overgaard S (2007) Wittgenstein and other minds. Routledge, New York

  Google Scholar 

• Overgaard S, Zahavi D (2009) Understanding (other) minds: Wittgenstein’s phenomenological contribution. In: Levy D, Zamuner E (eds) Wittgenstein’s enduring arguments. Routledge, London, pp 60-80

  Google Scholar 

• Russell B (1949) The analysis of mind. Allen & Unwin, London

  Google Scholar 

• Ryle G (2000) The concept of mind. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth

  Google Scholar 

• Sartre J-P (1989) Being and nothingness: an essay on phenomenological ontology (trans: Barnes HE). Routledge, London

  Google Scholar 

• Scheler M (1954) The nature of sympathy (trans: Heath P). Routledge and Kegan Paul, London

  Google Scholar 

• Searle J (1983) Intentionality: an essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  Google Scholar 

• Wittgenstein L (1963) Philosophical investigations (trans: Anscombe GEM). Blackwell, Oxford

  Google Scholar 

• Wittgenstein L (1967) In: Anscombe GEM, von Wright GH (eds) Zettel (trans: Anscombe GEM). University of California Press, Berkeley

  Google Scholar 

• Wittgenstein L (1980) In: von Wright GH, Nyman H (eds) Remarks on the philosophy of psychology, vol II (trans: Luckhardt CG, Aue MAE). Blackwell, Oxford

  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors and Affiliations

1. Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade, 140-142, DK-2300, Copenhagen S, Denmark

   Søren Overgaard

2. Philosophy Department, University of Hull, Hull, HU6 7RX, United Kingdom

   Søren Overgaard

Editors and Affiliations

1. FB Philosophie und Philologie, Universität Mainz, Jakob Welder-Weg 18, Mainz, 55128, Germany

   Daniel Schmicking

2. Dept of Philosophy & Cognitive Sciences, University of Central Florida, Colbourn Hall 411, Orlando, 32816-1352, U.S.A.

   Shaun Gallagher

Cite this chapter

Overgaard, S. (2010). The Problem of Other Minds. In: Schmicking, D., Gallagher, S. (eds) Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_14

Download citation

• .RIS
• .ENW
• .BIB

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_14

• Published: 24 November 2009

• Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

• Print ISBN: 978-90-481-2645-3

• Online ISBN: 978-90-481-2646-0

• eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)