Introduction and Historical Overview
Alexander, Joshua (2012). Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Audi, Robert (1999). ‘Self-evidence’, Philosophical Perspectives 13: 205–228.
Audi, Robert (2008). ‘Intuition, Inference and Rational Disagreement in Ethics’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11: 475–492.
Austin, J.L. (1946). ‘Other Minds’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplementary volume 20: 148–187.
Austin, J.L. (1957). ‘A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 57: 1–30.
Ayer, A.J. (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz.
Baz, Avner (2012). When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Beebee, Helen and Julian Dodd (eds) (2005). Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bennett, Karen (2011). ‘Truthmaking and Case-making’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 187–195.
Bigelow, John (1988). The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, Simon (1984). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Braddon-Mitchell, David and Robert Nola (eds) (2009). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Cappelen, Herman (2012). Philosophy without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carnap, Rudolf (1928). The Logical Structure of the World; Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, translated by Rolf A. George. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1967.
Carnap, Rudolf (1932). ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language’, translated by Arthur Pap, in A.J. Ayer (1959) (ed), Logical Positivism. New York: Free Press, pp. 60–81.
Carnap, Rudolf (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chalmers, David J. (2012). Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, David J. (2015). ‘Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?’, Philosophy 90:3–31.
Chase, James and Jack Reynolds (2011). Analytic versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy. McGill: Queen’s University Press.
Chisholm, Roderick, M. (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. London: George Allen and Un win.
Chomsky, Noam (1988). Language and Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Christensen, David (2000). ‘Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality’, Philosophical Review 109: 349–371.
Chudnoff, Elijah (2013). Intuition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conee, Earl (2001). ‘Comments on Bill Lycan’s “Moore Against the New Skeptics’”, Philosophical Studies 103: 55–59.
Correia, Fabrice and Benjamin Schnieder (2012). Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cullen, Simon (2010). ‘Survey-driven Romanticism’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1:275–296.
Daly, Chris (2010). Introduction to Philosophical Methods. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.
Daniels, Norman (1979). ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’, Journal of Philosophy 76: 256–282.
Davidson, Donald (1975). ‘Thought and Talk’, in Samuel Guttenplan (ed), Mind and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7–23.
Dennett, Daniel C. (2013). Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
DePaul, Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (eds) (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Dretske, Fred (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Dummett, Michael (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth Press.
Dummett, Michael (1978). ‘The Justification of Deduction’, in his Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth Press, pp. 290–318.
Durrant, R.G. (1970). ‘Identity of Properties and The Definition of “Good”’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48: 360–361.
Dyke, Heather (2007). Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy. London: Routledge.
Edwards, Paul (1949). ‘Bertrand Russell’s Doubts about Induction’, Mind 58: 141–163.
Enç, Berent (2005). How We Act: Causes, Reasons and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feigl, Herbert and Grover Maxwell (1961). ‘Why Ordinary Language Needs Reforming’, Journal of Philosophy 58: 488–498.
Fetzer, James H. (1984). Principles of Philosophical Reasoning. Totowa: New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld.
Fodor, Jerry A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Foley, Richard (1983). ‘Epistemic Conservatism’, Philosophical Studies 43: 165–182.
Fox, John F. (1987). ‘Truthmaker’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 188–207.
Frappier, Melanie, Letitia Meynell and James Robert Brown (eds) (2012) Thought Experiments in Science, Philosophy, and the Arts. London: Routledge.
Frege, Gottlob (1879). Begriffsschrift, edited and translated by T.W. Bynum as Conceptual Notation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.
Frege, Gottlob (1884). The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number, translated by J.L. Austin, 2nd edition, 1974. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Gauthier, David (1967). ‘Morality and Advantage’, Philosophical Review 76: 460–475.
Gendler, Tamar Szabo (2010). Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology: Selected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodman, Nelson (1955). Fact, Fiction andForecast. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Grice, H.P. (1957). ‘Meaning’, The Philosophical Review 66: 377–88.
Grice, H.P. (1968). ‘Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning and WordMeaning’, Foundations of Language 4: 225–242.
Grice, H.P. (1975). ‘Logic and Conversation’, in Peter Cole, John P. Kimball and Jerry L. Morgan (eds), Syntax and Semantics volume 3: Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41–58.
Grice, H.P. (1978). ‘Further Notes on Logic and Conversation’, in Peter Cole (ed), Syntax and Semantics Volume 9: Pragmatics. New York, NY: Academic Press, pp. 113–128.
Grice, H.P. (1981). ‘Presupposition and Conversational Implicature’, in Peter Cole (ed), Radical Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press, pp. 183–198.
Grice, H.P. and P.F. Strawson (1956). ‘In Defense of a Dogma’, The Philosophical Review 65: 141–158.
Grim, Patrick, Gary Mar and Paul St Denis (1998). The Philosophical Computer: Exploratory Essays in Philosophical Computer Modeling. Massachusetts, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gutting, Gary (2009). What Philosophers Know: Case Studies in Recent Analytic Philosophy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacker, P.M.S. (1996). Wittgenstein’s Place inTwentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hanfling, Oswald (2000). Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue. London: Routledge.
Harman, Gilbert (1965). ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’, Philosophical Review 74: 88–95.
Harman, Gilbert (1973). Thought Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Harman, Gilbert (1986). Changein View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Hart, W.D. (1977). ‘Review of Mark Steiner, Mathematical Knowledge’, journal of Philosophy 74: 118–129.
Haug, Matthew C. (2014). Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory. London: Routledge.
Heil, John (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hempel, Carl G. (1945). ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’, Mind 54: 1–26 and 97–121.
Hempel, Carl G. (1950). ‘Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41: 41–63.
Hintikka, Jaakko (1970). ‘The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology’, Synthese 21: 408–424.
Horvath, Joachim and Thomas Grundmann (eds) (2012) Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics. London: Routledge.
Horwich, Paul (2013). Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Howson, Colin and Peter Urbach (1989). Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach, 3rd edition 2005. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court Publishing.
Huemer, Michael (1999). ‘The Problem of Memory Knowledge’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80: 346–357.
Jackson, Frank (1982). ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136.
Jackson, Frank (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jenkins, C.S. (2008). ‘Modal Knowledge, Count erfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience’, Philosophical Quarterly 58: 693–701.
Johnston, Mark (1987). ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83.
Keller, Simon (2009). ‘Review of Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology’, Philosophical Review 118: 273–276.
Kelly, Thomas and Sarah McGrath (2015). ‘Are There Any Successful Philosophical Arguments?’, in John-Christopher Keller (ed), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from van Inwagen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knobe, Joshua and Shaun Nichols (eds) (2008). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kornblith, Hilary (2012). ‘Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?’, in Diego E. Machuca (ed), Disagreement and Skepticism. London: Routledge, pp. 260–276.
Kripke, Saul (1972). ‘Naming and Necessity’, in Gilbert Harman and Donald Davidson (eds), Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 253–355, 763–769.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (1989). ‘Conservatism and Its Virtues’, Synthese 79: 143–163.
Langford, C.H. (1942). ‘The Notion of Analysis in Moore’s Philosophy’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed), The Philosophy of G.E. Moore. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, pp. 321–342.
Levine, Joseph (2001). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, David (1968). ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’, Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–126.
Lewis, David (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, David (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, David (2001). ‘Truthmaking and Difference-Making’, Nous, 35: 602–615.
Lycan, William G. (1975). ‘Occam’s Razor’, Metaphilosophy 6: 223–237.
Lycan, William G. (2013). ‘On Two Main Themes in Gutting’s What Philosophers Know’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 51: 112–120.
McCain, Kevin (2008). ‘The Virtues of Epistemic Conservatism’, Synthese 164: 185–200.
McDaniel, Kris (2011). ‘Trenton Merricks’, Truth and Ontology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 203–211.
McGrath, Michael (2007). ‘Memory and Epistemic Conservatism’, Synthese 157: 1–24.
McTaggart, J.M.E. (1908). ‘The Unreality of Time’, Mind 17: 457–473.
Machery, Edouard and Elizabeth O’Neill (2014). Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Malcolm, Norman (1949). ‘Defending Common Sense’, Philosophical Review 58: 201–220.
Marcus, Ruth Barcan (1967). ‘Essentialism in Modal Logic’, Nous 1: 91–96.
Melia, Joseph (1995). ‘On What There’s Not’, Analysis 55: 223–229.
Merricks, Trenton (2007). Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Montague, Richard (1973). ‘The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English’, in K. J. J. Hintikka, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and Patrick Suppes (eds), Approaches to Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 221–242
Moore, G.E. (1903). Principia Ethica, revised edition, 1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moore, G.E. (1925). ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in J. H. Muirhead (ed), Contemporary British Philosophy, second series. London: George Allen and Unwin, pp. 193–223.
Naess, Arne (1960). ‘Typology of Questionnaires Adapted to the Study of Ex-pressions with Closely Related Meanings’, Synthese 12: 481–494.
Nagel, Jennifer, Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar (2013). ‘Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs’, Cognition 129: 652–661.
Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Passmore, John (1961). Philosophical Reasoning. London: Duckworth.
Petitot, Jean, Francisco J. Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy (1999). Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Petrinovich, Lewis and Patricia O’Neill (1996). ‘Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral Intuitions’, Ethology and Sociobiology 17: 145–171.
Predelli, Stefano (2002). ‘Holmes’ and Holmes: A Millian Analysis of Names from Fiction’, Dialectica 56: 261–279.
Pust, Joel (2001). ‘Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions’, Philosophical Studies 106: 227–258.
Putnam, Hilary (1975). ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in his Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 215–271.
Quine, W.V.O. (1951). ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Philosophical Review 60: 20–43.
Quine, W.V.O. (1953). ‘Reference and Modality’, in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1961, pp. 139–159.
Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Quine, W.V.O. (1969a). ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in his Epistemology Naturalized and Other Essays. Columbia: Columbia University Press, pp. 69–90.
Quine, W.V.O. (1969b). ‘Natural Kinds’, in Epistemology Naturalized and Other Essays. Columbia: Columbia University Press, pp. 114–138.
Quine, W.V.O. (1970). Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John (1974). ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48: 5–22.
Rey, Georges (1983). ‘A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness’, in Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz and D. H. Shapiro (eds), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. New York: Plenum, pp. 1–39.
Reynolds, Jack James Chase, James Williams and Edwin Mares (eds) (2010). Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides. London: Continuum.
Rieber, Steven (1992). ‘Understanding Synonyms without Knowing that They Are Synonyms’, Analysis 52: 224–228
Rinard, Susanna (2013). ‘Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense’, in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185–212.
Rorty, Richard (1967). The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Russell, Bertrand (1903). Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, Bertrand (1905). ‘On Denoting’, Mind 14: 479–493.
Russell, Bertrand (1911). The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, Bertrand (1914). Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Russell, Bertrand (1919). Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Ryle, Gilbert (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson Press.
Ryle, Gilbert (1954). Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scanlon, Thomas (2002). ‘Rawls on justification’, in Samuel Freeman (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 139–167.
Schaffer, Jonathan (2008). ‘Truth-maker Commitments’, Philosophical Studies 141: 7–19.
Shapiro, Stewart (1991). Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sider, Theodore (2005). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silverman, Hugh J. and Donn Welton (eds) (1988). Postmodernism and Continental Philosophy. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
Simons, Peter (2000). ‘The Four Phases of Philosophy: Brentano’s Theory and Austria’s History’, The Monist 83: 68–88.
Skyrms, Brian (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Joel and Peter Sullivan (2011). Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soames, Scott (2003a). Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Soames, Scott (2003b). Philosophy in the Twentieth Century volume 2: The Age of Meaning. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sober, Elliott (1988). Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Sorensen, Roy (1992). Thought Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stampe, Dennis A. (1977). ‘Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation’, in Peter French, Howard K. Wettstein, and T. E. Uehling (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, volume 2. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 42–63.
Stevenson, C.L. (1944). Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stove, David (1991). The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies. Oxford: Blackwell.
Strawson, P.F. (1950). ‘On Referring’, Mind 59: 320–344.
Strawson, P.F. (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen.
Strawson, P.F. (1963). ‘Carnap’s Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 503–518.
Suppes, Patrick (1968). ‘The Desirability of Formalization in Science’, Journal of Philosophy 65:651–664.
Tarski, Alfred (1933). ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’, in John Corcoran (ed), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938, translated by J. H. Woodger, 2nd edition. Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 152–278.
Thomson, Judith (1971). ‘A Defense of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 47–66.
Unger, Peter (2014). Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Cleve, James (1979). ‘Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle’, Philosophical Review 88: 55–91.
van Inwagen, Peter (2006). The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weatherson, Brian (2003). ‘What Good Are Counterexamples?’, Philosophical Studies 115: 1–31.
Weinberg, Jonathan M., Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2001). ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’, Philosophical Topics 29: 429–460.
Whitehead, Alfred North and Bertrand Russell (1910, 1912, 1913). Principia Mathematica, volumes 1–3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1988). Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy (2007a). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Williamson, Timothy (2007b). ‘Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 89–123.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.