CN104754071A - Method for detecting DNS (Domain Name-implementation and Specification) tunnel data based on DNS protocol standard - Google Patents
- ️Wed Jul 01 2015
Info
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Publication number
- CN104754071A CN104754071A CN201310755997.7A CN201310755997A CN104754071A CN 104754071 A CN104754071 A CN 104754071A CN 201310755997 A CN201310755997 A CN 201310755997A CN 104754071 A CN104754071 A CN 104754071A Authority
- CN
- China Prior art keywords
- dns
- packet
- data
- protocol
- content Prior art date
- 2013-12-31 Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
- H04L61/45—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping
- H04L61/4505—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping using standardised directories; using standardised directory access protocols
- H04L61/4511—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping using standardised directories; using standardised directory access protocols using domain name system [DNS]
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of computer networks, and discloses a method for distinguishing standard DNS (Domain Name-implementation and Specification) protocol data and DNS tunnel data. The system acquires a data packet of a DNS port. When the data packet reaches a detection system, 1, the system examines the length of data packet content and considers that the data is the DNS tunnel data if the length is greater than 512 bits; 2, the system examines the content of the data packet and judges whether the standard DNS protocol is met (for example, a client transmits DNS Query, and a server responds DNS Response). If the standard DNS protocol is met, the system considers that the data is the DNS protocol data, and otherwise considers that the data is the DNS tunnel data. By using the method, the DNS tunnel data can be recognized and differentiated service is performed, or the non-DNS protocol data is stopped from penetrating through the DNS port.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to technical field of the computer network, is a kind of method distinguishing standard DNS Protocol data and DNS tunneling data.
Background technology
Along with the development of Internet technology, how to control Intranet user access the Internet and become the emphasis of network management.Traditional network management distinguishes various network service with port, is realized the control of extranet access by open or closedown certain port.DNS name resolution, as most basic Internet service, needs to open to use to user usually.Its DNS Protocol that uses, default port is UDP53.In view of DNS port is generally open, much software employs DNS tunneling technique one after another and outside connects.DNS Protocol data and DNS tunneling data all use identical port, therefore can not simply by close port control DNS tunneling data, otherwise user cannot resolve domain name.Traditional port controlling method cannot tackle DNS penetration tunnel technology, and the safety of internal network in unwarranted extranet access serious threat.
Summary of the invention
The object of the invention is to propose a kind of method distinguishing standard DNS Protocol data and DNS tunneling data, use the present invention can identify DNS tunneling data and differentiated services is carried out to it, or stoping non-DNS Protocol data to penetrate DNS port.
DNS tunneling data Cleaning Principle:
The DNS Protocol of standard defers to RFC1035 (Domain names-implementation and specification) standard.
Description according to RFC document:
1, the content size (not comprising IP head and UDP head) entrained by DNS packet must not more than 512 bytes.
2, DNS packet must comprise header information, and in header information, show that this packet is DNS Query or DNS is Response.
3, DNS client sends DNS Query inquiry of the domain name request to service end, after DNS service end receives client query request, will return the DNS Response response message of identical ID.
DNS tunneling data then adopts proprietary protocol, and it does not defer to DNS Protocol standard.In order to carry more data information, the content size of packet usually can more than 512 bytes.The packet content that client issues service end does not meet DNS Query inquiry of the domain name request format; The packet content that service end returns to client does not meet DNS Response response message format yet.
According to these difference, we can distinguish by the packet of DNS port is DNS Protocol packet or DNS tunneling data bag.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is present system network design mode figure
Fig. 2 is DNS data packet header information format
Fig. 3 is that present system is to client data bag overhaul flow chart
Fig. 4 is that present system is to service end packet overhaul flow chart
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the present invention is further described in detail.
Grid deployment way:
See Fig. 1, present system is deployed in the egress gateways place of local area network (LAN) connecting Internet usually, catches the packet of designated port from network.This port is generally UDP53, also can specify or increase other ports if desired.
Data packet detection method:
The standard detected is to judge whether the packet by this port meets DNS Protocol, as long as the packet not meeting RFC1035 document description can be judged to be DNS tunneling data bag, otherwise is DNS Protocol packet.
RFC1035 regulation DNS packet content length must not more than 512 bytes.If packet content length is greater than 512 bytes, then this packet can be judged to be DNS tunneling data bag.
Specify that DNS packet must comprise the header information of 12 bytes see Fig. 2, RFC1035.Header information the first two byte (totally 16) is No. ID, and the DNS query bag that client sends and the DNS respond packet that service end returns must have identical ID.Header information the 17th is QR flag bit, and QR flag bit is this packet of 0 expression is DNS Query packet, and QR flag bit is this packet of 1 expression is DNSResponse packet.Header information 26-28 position retains position (Z flag bit), and the Z flag bit of DNS packet is necessary for 0.
Here select for the efficient detection mode of one: by detecting packet content length, QR flag bit and Z flag bit, determine whether DNS Protocol packet.But and do not mean that the present invention can only in this, as unique detection method.
1, client data detects
See Fig. 3, system acquisition issues the packet of service end to client, first calculates the packet content length not containing IP head and UDP head.If packet content length is greater than 512 bytes, then judge that this packet is as DNS tunneling data bag.Then packet content the 17th (QR flag bit) is extracted.If QR flag bit is not 0, then judge that this packet is as DNS tunneling data bag.Then packet content 26-28 position (Z flag bit) is extracted.If Z flag bit is not 0, then judges that this packet is as DNS tunneling data bag, otherwise be DNS Protocol packet.
2, service end Data Detection
See Fig. 4, system acquisition issues the packet of client to service end, first calculates the packet content length not containing IP head and UDP head.If packet content length is greater than 512 bytes, then judge that this packet is as DNS tunneling data bag.Then packet content the 17th (QR flag bit) is extracted.If QR flag bit is not 1, then judge that this packet is as DNS tunneling data bag.Then packet content 26-28 position (Z flag bit) is extracted.If Z flag bit is not 0, then judges that this packet is as DNS tunneling data bag, otherwise be DNS Protocol packet.
The data communication of client and service end is two-way.Therefore can select only to detect client data, also can select only to detect service end data, can also select to detect client data and service end data simultaneously.
The advantage of this detection method is that it is simply efficient.Use the method to filter DNS port data, can ensure all DNS Protocol packets normal through, tackle most of non-DNS Protocol packet simultaneously, make it to form DNS tunnel.Want complete identification DNS Protocol packet or DNS tunneling data bag, suitably increase ID checking, the checking of other flag bits and inquiry response content format and verify.
Above embodiment is only unrestricted for illustration of the present invention.Those of ordinary skill in the art should be appreciated that and revise distortion to the present invention or equivalent to replace, and do not depart from scope of the present invention, and it all should be encompassed in the middle of claim of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. distinguish the method for standard DNS Protocol data and DNS tunneling data for one kind.It comprises following steps:
(1): system acquisition designated port packet;
(2): check the content-length of packet and judge whether it exceedes designated length, if exceeded, thinking DNS tunneling data;
(3): check packet content and judge whether it meets standard DNS Protocol.If met, think DNS Protocol data, otherwise think DNS tunneling data.
2. method according to claim 1, described step (2) judges whether packet is DNS Protocol packet.It is characterized in that: check that whether the content-length of packet is more than 512 bytes.
3. method according to claim 1, described step (3) judges whether packet is DNS Protocol packet.It is characterized in that: check the DNS Query data packet format whether packet content that client issues service end meets RFC1035 and describe.
4. method according to claim 1, described step (3) judges whether packet is DNS Protocol packet.It is characterized in that: check the DNS Response data packet format whether packet content that service end issues client meets RFC1035 and describe.
Priority Applications (1)
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CN201310755997.7A CN104754071A (en) | 2013-12-31 | 2013-12-31 | Method for detecting DNS (Domain Name-implementation and Specification) tunnel data based on DNS protocol standard |
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CN201310755997.7A CN104754071A (en) | 2013-12-31 | 2013-12-31 | Method for detecting DNS (Domain Name-implementation and Specification) tunnel data based on DNS protocol standard |
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CN201310755997.7A Pending CN104754071A (en) | 2013-12-31 | 2013-12-31 | Method for detecting DNS (Domain Name-implementation and Specification) tunnel data based on DNS protocol standard |
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Cited By (5)
* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third partyPublication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN109474575A (en) * | 2018-09-11 | 2019-03-15 | 北京奇安信科技有限公司 | A kind of detection method and device in the tunnel DNS |
CN109842588A (en) * | 2017-11-27 | 2019-06-04 | 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 | Network data detection method and relevant device |
CN111343042A (en) * | 2020-02-05 | 2020-06-26 | 网宿科技股份有限公司 | DNS analysis test method and test system |
CN112367312A (en) * | 2020-10-30 | 2021-02-12 | 北京亚鸿世纪科技发展有限公司 | Detection method and device for studying and judging DNS hidden tunnel |
CN115297083A (en) * | 2022-08-03 | 2022-11-04 | 左道明 | Domain name system tunnel detection method and system based on data volume and behavior characteristics |
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CN103179100A (en) * | 2011-12-26 | 2013-06-26 | 中国移动通信集团广西有限公司 | A method and device for preventing domain name system tunnel attack |
CN103326894A (en) * | 2013-05-29 | 2013-09-25 | 深信服网络科技(深圳)有限公司 | DNS tunnel detection method and device |
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- 2013-12-31 CN CN201310755997.7A patent/CN104754071A/en active Pending
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CN103179100A (en) * | 2011-12-26 | 2013-06-26 | 中国移动通信集团广西有限公司 | A method and device for preventing domain name system tunnel attack |
CN103326894A (en) * | 2013-05-29 | 2013-09-25 | 深信服网络科技(深圳)有限公司 | DNS tunnel detection method and device |
Cited By (10)
* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third partyPublication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN109842588A (en) * | 2017-11-27 | 2019-06-04 | 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 | Network data detection method and relevant device |
CN109842588B (en) * | 2017-11-27 | 2022-01-07 | 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 | Network data detection method and related equipment |
CN109474575A (en) * | 2018-09-11 | 2019-03-15 | 北京奇安信科技有限公司 | A kind of detection method and device in the tunnel DNS |
CN109474575B (en) * | 2018-09-11 | 2022-04-12 | 奇安信科技集团股份有限公司 | A kind of detection method and device of DNS tunnel |
CN111343042A (en) * | 2020-02-05 | 2020-06-26 | 网宿科技股份有限公司 | DNS analysis test method and test system |
CN111343042B (en) * | 2020-02-05 | 2022-02-22 | 网宿科技股份有限公司 | DNS analysis test method and test system |
CN112367312A (en) * | 2020-10-30 | 2021-02-12 | 北京亚鸿世纪科技发展有限公司 | Detection method and device for studying and judging DNS hidden tunnel |
CN112367312B (en) * | 2020-10-30 | 2022-10-11 | 北京亚鸿世纪科技发展有限公司 | Detection method and device for studying and judging DNS hidden tunnel |
CN115297083A (en) * | 2022-08-03 | 2022-11-04 | 左道明 | Domain name system tunnel detection method and system based on data volume and behavior characteristics |
CN115297083B (en) * | 2022-08-03 | 2023-09-12 | 左道明 | Domain name system tunnel detection method and system based on data volume and behavior characteristics |
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Application publication date: 20150701 |