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Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans - PubMed

  • ️Mon Jan 01 2007

Comparative Study

Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans

Pat Barclay et al. Proc Biol Sci. 2007.

Abstract

Reciprocal altruism has been the backbone of research on the evolution of altruistic behaviour towards non-kin, but recent research has begun to apply costly signalling theory to this problem. In addition to signalling resources or abilities, public generosity could function as a costly signal of cooperative intent, benefiting altruists in terms of (i) better access to cooperative relationships and (ii) greater cooperation within those relationships. When future interaction partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, this could lead to competition to be more generous than others. Little empirical work has tested for the possible existence of this 'competitive altruism'. Using a cooperative monetary game with and without opportunities for partner choice and signalling cooperative intent, we show here that people actively compete to be more generous than others when they can benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships, and the most generous people are correspondingly chosen more often as cooperative partners. We also found evidence for increased scepticism of altruistic signals when the potential reputational benefits for dishonest signalling were high. Thus, this work supports the hypothesis that public generosity can be a signal of cooperative intent, which people sometimes 'fake' when conditions permit it.

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Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1

Number of lab dollars given to partners in each condition before partner choice/assignment. At this point, donations could affect future partners' decisions. Bars represent the interquartile range for donations in each condition and lines represent the 10th and 90th percentiles for donations, and much of this variation is between subjects rather than between experimental conditions. Participants gave significantly more when their donations were known than unknown (random/knowledge versus random/anonymous: Wilcoxon z=3.19, p=0.001) and gave still more when donations could affect partner choice than when they could not (choice/knowledge versus random/knowledge: Wilcoxon z=2.31, p=0.021).

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