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The neural basis of conceptual-emotional integration and its role in major depressive disorder - PubMed

The neural basis of conceptual-emotional integration and its role in major depressive disorder

Sophie Green et al. Soc Neurosci. 2013.

Free PMC article

Abstract

The importance of differentiating between social concepts when appraising actions (e.g., understanding behavior as critical vs. fault-finding) and its contribution to vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD) is unknown. We predicted poor integration of differentiated conceptual knowledge when people with MDD appraise their social actions, contributing to their tendency to grossly overgeneralize self-blame (e.g., "I am unlikable rather than critical"). To test this hypothesis, we used a neuropsychological test measuring social conceptual differentiation and its relationship with emotional biases in a remitted MDD and a control group. During fMRI, guilt- and indignation-evoking sentences were presented. As predicted, conceptual overgeneralization was associated with increased emotional intensity when appraising social actions. Interdependence of conceptual overgeneralization and negative emotional biases was stronger in MDD (reproducible in the subgroup without medication) and was associated with overgeneralized self-blame. This high conceptual-emotional interdependence was associated with functional disconnection between the right superior anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) as well as a septal region across groups when experiencing guilt (SPM8). Strong coupling of conceptual information (ATL) with information about the context of actions and emotions (frontal-subcortical regions) is thus associated with appraisal being less dependent on conceptual overgeneralization, thereby protecting against excessive self-blame.

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Figures

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

An example screen from the CSKD task is depicted. Beneath the denoted social behavior, participants were presented with 19 negative social concepts in the negative condition (as displayed) and 19 positive social concept labels in the positive condition. Concepts were taken from our normative pre-study. Participants were provided with the instructions as displayed above. To clarify this instruction, participants were reminded by the experimenter that when choosing multiple concepts, “they should all be equally good labels of the described behavior.” Participants were asked to rate to what extent they would experience unpleasant or pleasant feelings (valence) as a result of the social behavior on a bipolar scale (−4 = extremely unpleasant to +4 = extremely pleasant).

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Displayed are individual values of VALENCE scores = difference of mean valence (NEG_SA – NEG_OA) and CONCEPT scores = difference of mean number of concepts (NEG_SA – NEG_OA) for N = 56 participants (29 control, 27 MDD). A univariate AN(C)OVA (corrected model: R2 = .26, F = 6.2, p = .001) showed a main effect of VALENCE on CONCEPT (F = 6.5, p = .01) and an interaction of group by VALENCE (F = 9.2, p = .004) with no main effect of group (F = .09, p = .76). The interaction was due to people with MDD showing a higher interdependence of CONCEPT and VALENCE scores in the expected direction (MDD: B = −.60, t = −4.2, p < .0001; Control: B = .05, t = .33, p = .75) such that self-agency-selective conceptual overgeneralization (i.e., high CONCEPT scores) was associated with self-agency-selective negative valence biases (i.e., low VALENCE scores).

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Displayed are connections between the 19 negative concepts and 30 social behaviors in the self-agency and other-agency condition made by one participant with remitted MDD (using PAJEK software for network analysis, (de Nooy, Mrvar, & Batgelj, 2005)). As can be seen, the participant used more concepts as descriptive of her own (92) relative to her best friend's behavior (56) indicating conceptual overgeneralization for negative self- relative to the other-agency condition.

Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Regions showing increased coupling with the right superior ATL during the experience of guilt relative to indignation in individuals with lower (a) or higher (b) CONCEPT [NEG_S-AG – NEG_O-AG] (blue scale) or VALENCE [NEG_S-AG – NEG_O-AG] × CONCEPT [NEG_S-AG – NEG_O-AG] interaction (hot scale) scores irrespective of VALENCE scores and group. NEG_S-AG-selective conceptual differentiation (negative CONCEPT scores) was associated with left middle ATL increases in coupling for guilt (a) while high interdependence of conceptual overgeneralization and negative valence (more negative interaction scores) were associated with left superior ATL coupling increases for guilt (a). Higher coupling in right dorsolateral PFC and the septal part of the nucleus accumbens were associated with relative noninterdependence of conceptual overgeneralization and negative valence (i.e., more positive CONCEPT × VALENCE scores). Higher coupling in the same right dorsolateral PFC area and in the hypothalamus were also associated with higher NEG_S-AG-selective conceptual overgeneralization (i.e., higher CONCEPT scores). Cropped whole brain images were displayed at an uncorrected threshold of p = .005 (extent threshold of 4 voxels). All depicted regions survived FWE-correction over a priori ROIs at p = .05 in separate analyses.

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

(a) Displays right superior ATL coupling coefficients from the subgenual cingulate peak voxel of the positive effect of CONCEPT × VALENCE interaction scores on guilt versus indignation within the control group. Within this voxel, the control group showed higher ATL coupling for guilt versus indignation compared with the MDD group (CONTROL mean = 3.5 ± 4.7, MDD mean = −1.9 ± 4.4, t[43] = 4.02, p < .0001). (b) Depicts the subgenual, hypothalamic, right anterior dorsolateral PFC, medial and lateral frontopolar, and left temporo-parietal regions showing increased coupling for guilt versus indignation in control individuals with relative noninterdependence of conceptual overgeneralization and negative valence when appraising social behaviors (i.e., more positive CONCEPT × VALENCE interaction scores).

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