Strategy : an introduction to game theory | WorldCat.org

Preface

Introduction

Representations and basic assumptions

The extensive form

Strategies and the normal form

Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs

General assumptions and methodology

Analyzing behavior in static settings

Dominance and best response

Rationalizability and iterated dominance

Location, partnership, and social unrest

Nash equilibrium

Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting

Mixed-strategy nash equilibrium

Strictly competitive games and security strategies

Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings

Analyzing behavior in dynamic settings

Details of the extensive form

Sequential rationality and subgame perfection

Topics in industrial organization

Parlor games

Bargaining problems

Analysis of simple bargaining games

Games with joint decisions negotiation equilibrium

Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership

Repeated games and reputation

Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill

Information

Random events and incomplete information

Risk and incentives in contracting

Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability

Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation

Perfect bayesian equilibrium

Job-market signaling and reputation

Appendices

Index