TNO Turkey - TV Tropes

• Alcohol-Induced Idiocy: Menderes and Kurtbek get drunk while having dinner at a restaurant, causing them to leak sensitive information about how to tackle CHP loyalties and threats within the Armed Forces. They pay no attention to the waiter coming with a bottle of more alcohol, where he retreats around the corner and writes down everything he's heard, hoping to sell the information.
• The Assimilator: The various regional identities of Turkey are suppressed to discourage regionalism or separatism. Since 1927 numerous Inspectorate Generals were established which have limitless control to Turkify the region, crush opposition and revitalise the economy. The Turkish government considers everyone in the country to be Turkish and those who want to separate to be backwards. The various non-Turkish peoples within Turkey are encouraged to adopt Turkish names and shed use of their native languages. One event details how a young Kurdish girl in Elazığ was forced to adopt a Turkish name and hair cut who is a good student but gets the occasional rap across the knuckles for slipping into Kurdish.
• Believing Their Own Lies: Many Turks believe in, or at least pay lip service to, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's legacy and Turkey's rightful place in the current world order. By 1962, however, the facade has begun breaking down as the costs of maintaining regional hegemony pile up, along with atrocities against Kurds and Armenians. This eventually forces the country to come to grips with itself. Which includes whether to live up to Kemalism as it ought to be or to jettison it entirely.
• Blatant Lies:
  • Turkey joined the Axis and invaded British-occupied Syria in 1942, under the pretense of "anti-colonialism". Turkey proceeded to annex swathes of Northern Syria, including the regions around Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo, and everything up to the Euphrates River, turning the rest of the region into a puppet state after two years of occupation. The puppet state itself spent many of its first years of existence being ruled by Syrian Turkmen politician Tayfur Sökmen.
  • Turkey also joined the war against the Soviet Union, for which it was rewarded control over Armenia. They reorganized the territory under a "sister republic", which is more of a puppet state acting on Turkey's interests above anything else. The blatant power imbalance was further displayed when Turkey annexed parts of Ararat Province from Armenia, linking Nakhchivan to the rest of Turkey.
• Broken Pedestal: Time has gradually eroded Atatürk's vision even though many still pay lip service to it. While Atatürk himself remains respected, and even the opposition parties claim to uphold Kemalist principles, the Turkey of 1962 diverges greatly from what he envisioned. Whether it can be rekindled and reformed is up in the air.
• Civil War: The Radical Kemalists will seize power dubiously in the 22 April Incident. Believing that this is going a step too far in destroying Turkey's democracy, Kurtbek will lead a clique of generals to rebel against the government, starting a conflict widely dubbed as the Turkish Civil War.
• Crushing the Populace: While not nearly as severe an example as the Nazis or the Japanese, intimidation and terror is still the primary method by which the Republic maintains control over the non-Turkish ethnic groups within its borders.
• Divide and Conquer: To weaken the opposition, İnönü tried to drive a wedge between the UDP and DYP, which proved successful in 1958. However, the two parties have caught on to İnönü's game and united under the Democratic Alliance in 1961, mutually pushing for democratization together.
• Enemy Mine:
  • The DYP can be elected in 1963, albeit in a coalition with the Liberal UDP as the "Democratic Alliance".
  • If Turkey loses the Italo-Turkish War, they can join either the American or Japanese spheres of influence. There's no affection between either of these nations, but as far as they're concerned, Turkey needs foreign investors to save their collapsing economy, the competing superpowers need a foothold in the Middle East, and both want an alliance to dissuade a potential German invasion.
• Evil Colonialist: The six Inspectorate Generals are responsible for marginalizing the indigenous populations to make way for Turkification: the first, third and fourth ones were based in Eastern Anatolia, the second in Thrace, the fifth in Northern Syria, and the sixth in Mosul and Kirkuk.
• Fascist, but Inefficient: The Inspectorate-Generals are government commissions intended to speed up Turkification programs, but all they've done is spark powerful separatist movements among ethnic minorities who have been deported or otherwise oppressed. The Turkish government must be sure to keep the population consciousness and discontent down to hold on to its empire; high variables of either will lead to stronger riots or insurrections.
• Gameplay and Story Segregation: Turkey is a semi-presidential republic whose in-game head of state is always the President, even when the Prime Minister is the one actually holding primacy (for example, when Adnan Menderes or Falih Rıfkı Atay is Prime Minister).
• Graceful Loser: If the DYP wins the 1967 election, the CHP and UDP will concede defeat, though it's more downplayed with the former, as their tone is decidedly more begrudging.
• "Hell, Yes!" Moment: A UDP activist who had previously expressed despair over the CHP's political dominance and interference along with Turkey's loss in the Italo-Turkish War expresses such joy after the defeat leads to the UDP winning the 1963 election. After a tiring day of door-to-door campaigning, strained voice and all, the activist screams cheers of overwhelming joy with the rest of the crowd upon hearing Menendes giving his victory speech.
• Hypocrite: The CHP prides themselves as the inheritor of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's legacy, who advocated sweeping reforms to modernize Turkey. Despite this, the CHP ruthlessly crushes any opportunity for reform, suppressing any parties or opinions that dare criticize how they are running things. A newspaper article in reaction to a "CHP Landslide Victory" lampshades the hypocrisy.

  Wasn't reformism one of their core principles?

• I Can Rule Alone: The Socialist and Liberal factions of the DYP, though united by the goal of democratisation, remain ideologically incompatible. After the DYP wins the 1963 election, the contradictions will escalate until the dominant faction purges the weaker one from the Party.
• In It for Life: Members of the Grand Council of Kemalism are proposed by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the President. Once installed they serve for life, have legal immunity, and can propose and veto legislation, which was used to pass many of Peker's land reform, industrialization, and secularization programs.
• In Medias Res: The starting screen describes the situation that the player is jumping into and it's not pretty. Turkey is still reeling from the failed Democratization Bill of 1961, which had been proposed by the DYP and the UDP, and supported by the reformist faction of the CHP. While the bill narrowly passed the National Assembly, the bill was immediately vetoed in the Grand Council of Kemalism. The controversy all happened weeks prior to 1962 and İnönü's silence on the matter has provoked protests from the outraged masses, intense enough to force Banguoğlu to resign as Prime Minister. The political conflict is still hot and it's up to the player to manage the crisis and power vacuum that's about to be left with Banguoğlu's departure.
• Know When to Fold 'Em: Recognizing that keeping their empire together is more trouble than its worth, a progressive Turkish administration can negotiate with the separatist movements in their occupied territories and give them their independence.
• Landslide Election:
  • The first multi-party election in Turkey's history was held in 1958 and the CHP secured a whopping 70.2% of the votes because of the continued suppression against opposition political parties and İnönü's Divide and Conquer strategy to weaken the UDP and DYP.
  • After winning the Italo-Turkish War, the CHP arrogantly believe that their reelection is a guarantee, relying on renewed popularity and a propaganda victory to ensure a historic and monumental victory. Confidence in their victory is high enough that they genuinely consider dropping their usual, dirty electoral practices and letting the election play out to reduce the anti-CHP sentiments. However, it is still possible, albeit difficult, for the DYP or UDP to win the election.
• Meet the New Boss: Tahsin Banguoğlu succeeded Saka as Prime Minister in 1958 and, as another member of the orthodox wing of the CHP, continued many of the same policies.
• Moral Myopia: Turkey dislikes Italy's imperialistic control over the Suez Canal, exploiting the Turkish trade there to enrich itself at the expense of their supposed ally. However, Turkey engages in its own hegemonic expansions into the Middle East, abusing and deporting the non-Turkic minorities living within their territory.
• My God, What Have I Done?: In an event, a Turkish soldier writes to his wife about the atrocities done to Kurds and Armenians, with an implicit hint that he might have killed himself afterwards. Another event shows a TRT late night interview with a combat pilot who absentmindedly mumbles about the screams she is haunted with.
• Point of Divergence: Turkey's point of divergence from OTL was Recep Peker not suggesting the idea of the Grand Council of Kemalism to Atatürk. In real life, Atatürk responded to this by purging Peker and subsequently appointed Bayar as Prime Minister after İnönü's resignation, but in TNO, Peker was appointed at İnönü's recommendation. Peker would go on to hold this position when İnönü became president, where he would push for increasingly autocratic and nationalistic policies, alongside radical societal reforms.
• Pragmatic Villainy:
  • Turkey can develop the infrastructure of its colonies, but only to make them more profitable and efficient for Turkey's purposes rather than out of genuine concern for the people living there.
  • Some CHP politicians supported the regime's media censorship so that the people wouldn't mock their armed forces. However, when they win the Italo-Turkish War, these politicians want to reverse these measures, not out of remorse, but because their latest victories would make it unthinkable to mock their military's might.
• Propaganda Machine: The CHP bask in the Italo-Turkish War victory and steel themselves for a landslide reelection by hiring a wave of propagandists to parade their latest success.
• The Purge:
  • When Peker became Prime Minister, he oversaw an immediate crackdown of all opposition, which destabilized the nation. Even when İnönü became President after Atatürk's death in 1938, he was forced to concede to Peker's demands and go along with Peker's dismantlement of Bayar's liberal wing of the CHP.
  • Using the death of Peker and the German economic crash, İnönü and the orthodox faction of the CHP ousted Prime Minister Atay and purged the influence of the Radical Kemalists.
• Pyrrhic Victory: Despite their territorial gains in World War II and becoming an empire in all but name, the domestic situation has since turned on Turkey, as the peoples they've conquered clamor for independence and the CHP's hold over the government is slipping.
• R-Rated Opening: One of Turkey's early events is a report of a government-backed Turkish nationalist organisation torturing local Kurds for hours before killing them and both agents then assigned to watch over potential uprisings in Diyarbakır.
• Red Is Violent: The Kemalist Youth Movement was founded by Prime Minister Recep Peker to radcalize the intellectual and working class youth, encouraging them to take street-level violence against "reactionaries." Not coincidentally, their organization is labeled red.
• Regime Change:
  • In the Turkes Kenes, Turkey may approve of Sarry Karryev's coup in Turkmenistan, ousting whoever was previously in charge and making the country a more suitable proxy for their interests.
  • Daoud Khan's coup against Zahir Shah in Afghanistan may also be backed by Turkey.
• Resigned in Disgrace: The fallout of the Democratization Bill of 1961 resulted in Tahsin Banguoğlu resigning in defeat. He's already packing his things in 1962 and ready to leave the premiership vacant for someone else to take over.
• La Résistance: The Northern Alliance for the Syrian Independence and Liberty (NASIL) is a resistance group operating in Northern Syria, which has been occupied directly by Turkey since the Second World War ended.
• Shocking Defeat Legacy: Defeat in the Italo-Turkish War comes as a major shock to Turkey, having not lost any war since the Republic's formation. The fallout of the defeat can also usher in the downfall of the CHP's political dominance in Turkey, making it more likely for the DYP or UDP to get elected. More ominously, it also makes it more likely for the Radical Kemalist wing of the CHP to conduct the 22 April Incident, arresting the Turkish legislature and taking over the country for themselves.
• Shown Their Work: Turkey's borders follow much of the plans outlined in the 1920 Misak-ı Millî, which detailed the country's territorial ambitions.
• Suspiciously Specific Denial: The DYP denies all rumors that they are receiving American funding. The slight leg-up they have in the polls is supposedly a mere coincidence.
• Sword of Damocles: Turkey has secretly been funding a nuclear program, in which they eventually conduct their first successful nuclear test and show the world that they have a nuclear weapon as a deterrent. Germany and Italy denounce this as an act of belligerence, while the rest of the world fears its implications for nuclear proliferation around the world.
• Teeth-Clenched Teamwork:
  • Turkey became a brief ally to Germany during World War II, but it was obvious that their truce was based entirely on German intimidation and the convenience of taking territory owned by the Allies. As a result, their short-lived, working relationship proved extremely tumultuous.
  • Even though they start in the same faction, Turkey's relationship with Italy is the tensest between the three main powers of the Triumvirate, mainly due to their border disputes in the Middle East and the Aegean Sea. These squabbles eventually escalate into the Second Italo-Turkish War.
  • The CHP is primarily divided between two major factions: the orthodox wing and the reformist wing. The orthodox wing wishes to reinforce the CHP's one-party, status quo dominance and assertive nationalism. Meanwhile, the reformist wing is a broad collection of figures still committed to Kemalism, but argue for a need to democratize. The reformist wing itself is divided between populists, Social Democratic-leaning Kemalists, and Conservative-leaning Kemalists. There is also the dormant Radical Kemalist faction, which seek a return to the autocratic regime of Peker. Depending on who gets in power, more divisions can reveal themselves.
    • The reformist clade of the CHP becomes the dominant force if they get elected twice, though they become divided between the left-wing reformers by Ecevit and the right-wing reformers by Feyzioğlu. A schism will inevitably develop when Inönü retires and Gülek needs to pick one of the aforementioned men to be his Prime Minister. If not chosen, Ecevit will splinter to form the DSP, while an alienated Feyzioğlu will form the CGP.
    • The Radical Kemalists can secure their power against Kurtbek and Inönü, but a power struggle still breaks out when Atay dies. The two competitors are the Yön faction, who believe Kemalism is an avenue to Socialism, and the Ülkü faction, who keep the quasi-Fascist, state corporatist and militarist according to Peker's model.
  • The DYP is united by the commitment to democratization and left-leaning to left-wing politics, along with a focus on human rights. However, it is sharply divided between Socialists and Liberals, with other ideologies occupying minor factions. At game start, the Socialist faction is dominant as the Party Congress chose Aybar to lead the party after deals with trade unions made many trade unionists join the party. These divisions become especially relevant after being elected in 1967, where the DİSK will conduct strikes and protests across the country, where the Socialists sympathize with their cause and create tension with the more pragmatic liberals who want order. Inevitably, the DYP splits, where quelling the protests causes the socialists to form the TİP and negotiating with them causes the Liberals to form the IDP.
  • The UDP is conflicted between the moderate Liberal Conservatives who follow Bayar's ideals and the populist Young Democrats led by Menderes who represent displaced landlords, the rural populace, and businessmen. When they get reelected in 1967, the party comes to blows in the Sunday Crisis, where Menderes tries to run for President against his mentor Köprülü. If Menderes is foiled and forced to resign, Köprülü will have to pick a new Prime Minister in either Demirel or Bilgiç, which will unavoidably alienate the man who isn't chosen. Ultimately, the party splinters, as the disgraced Menderes forms the MDP, while Demirel or Bilgiç found the AP or MMP, respectively.
• To Absent Friends: After winning the 1963 election and getting settled in the Çankaya Mansion, Menderes is notably absent minded at the feat of achieving power compared to Köprülü who is more celebratory. As Köprülü gives Menderes a moment to himself, he states that he believes that Bayar would be impressed, prompting Menderes to ponder over the assassination of Bayar and whether Inönü had any role or if he had given the order in the very room they are sitting in.
• Unperson: Ethnic minorities are regularly oppressed by the Turkish police to prevent rebellion, where they are kidnapped at night and never seen or heard from again.
• We Hardly Knew Ye: Banguoğlu is already resigned by game start and will inevitably need to be replaced.
• Won the War, Lost the Peace: Turkey economically flourished from victory in the Second World War and Peker's industrialization plans, but it also saw growing opposition to the dictatorial rule of the CHP. In the decades since, more people have organized political opposition from the DYP and UDP, who are spearheading an eventual, albeit gradual, democratization process.
• You Are What You Hate: For all their hatred towards Italy, the Turkish government has taken inspiration from several of its institutions to hold on to their power, such as the Grand National Assembly's derivation from the Grand Council of Fascism in its rabid rejection of anything deemed anti-Kemalist. In general, İnönü's regime upholds the ideals of "Nationalism, Statism, and Militarism", which check a couple of ideological tenets from Fascism.
• You Cannot Kill An Idea: Despite the best efforts of successive Turkish governments to enforce the Kemalist ideals, most remain passive if not outright hostile to Kemalism. Socialist, liberal and traditionalist elements within Turkish society consistently threaten the Kemalist political establishment in addition to continued agitation from the regional identities within Turkey. No matter what path Turkey goes down, none of these ideas, including Kemalism, can be destroyed.

^{Second Atay cabinet portrait}

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note 

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Kemalism^note 

President of Turkey since 1938.

• Became Their Own Antithesis: His critics have accused him of betraying the nation's founding principles by engaging in anti-democratic practices and turning Turkey into a one-party state led by the CHP.
• Boomerang Bigot: Inönü, who is of Kurdish descent himself, represses the Kurdish population in Southeast Turkey to prevent them from rebelling.
• The Chains of Commanding: While Inönü still tries to live up to Atatürk's legacy, it's implied that he feels the heavy burden on his shoulders, and regrets if not resents the policies he's encouraged to ensure Turkey's survival as a regional power.
• Emergency Authority: In response to the Spring Protests, Inönü can declare martial law and disperse the demonstrators through force.
• Evil Old Folks: He's 78 years old by 1962, and has reigned as an illiberal President for over 30 years since the death of Atatürk. His age becomes an important point if the CHP was elected in 1967, where İnönü retires so that Gülek succeeds him and has to find a new Prime Minister.
• Founder of the Kingdom: Downplayed. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is acknowledged as the father of modern Turkey, but Inönü was his right-hand man and played such a major role in the nation's early history that he's likened to a Godfather.
• History Repeats: İnönü's victory against Atay effectively returns Turkey to its 1950s political scene, with the orthodox CHP members reigning in a one-party state.
• Hypocrite: Despite potentially crushing the pro-democratic Spring Protests, Inönü will have the gall to speak to the press and claim that the CHP is the "Party of Democracy" who will defend the country from anyone who threatens that order.
• I Did What I Had to Do: Inönü's flavor text implies that he views all the compromises he made to make Turkey survive as regrettable acts.
• Ironic Echo: As his actions and disparaging moniker suggest, Inönü' has increasingly become more like the Grand Viziers from the waning years of the Ottoman Empire than anything else, clashing with his pretensions of being Atatürk's greatest champion.
• Let No Crisis Go to Waste: When it became clear that the Axis were going to win the Second World War, Inönü joined them in the final stages of the conflict and swept to occupy all of their claimed territory that they had lost to Russia, Britain, and France in past treaties. He later used the German economic crash to give tactical support to the orthodox wing of the CHP and oust Prime Minister Atay in 1954, securing his dominance over the Party.
• Old Retainer: He has been a longtime ally of Atatürk and strongly believes that he is the greatest champion of his ideals.
• Patriotic Fervor: İnönü turns to unbridled nationalism to ensure stability and combat the combined threat of separatists and opponents to his regime.
• Pet the Dog: Inönü can heed the Spring Protests' calls for democracy and economic revitalization, agreeing to a bill that will liberalize public meetings and press laws, and promise multi-party elections, even though this will alienate the more radical elements of the CHP.
• Pragmatic Villainy: İnönü, despite wishing to maintain total CHP dominance over Turkish society, initiated a gradual democratization policy because he believed that democracy was inevitable by that point. Whether it came by reform or revolution was in his hands and he chose the former. That being said, the democratization efforts have been slow and often stalled by İnönü's deliberate attempts to divide the opposition between the UDP and DYP.
• The Purge: İnönü can win his power struggle with Atay, replacing him with Erim as Prime Minister and either demoting or reassigning the CHP's radical members in an internal purge.
• Realpolitik: He made détente and allied with the Fascist powers of Europe, simply because it was the most practical option at the time.
• Rousing Speech: If Turkey wins the Italo-Turkish War and the CHP secures reelection, İnönü will give an optimistic victory speech in Istanbul's Taksim Square, thanking his supporters and promising a continued commitment to fighting injustice within Turkey and ensuring military prowess.
• Strong Empire, Shriveled Emperor: Inönü is shown to not be in the best health, with his body aching and his coughing getting worse by the day.
• Team Switzerland: With bitter memories of the Turkish War for Independence, Inönü tried to remain neutral in World War II. Unfortunately, pressure from the Axis and his own government forced him to join with the Axis, sweeping into Allied territory in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
• Ungrateful Bastard: Inönü did not appreciate Bayar's advocacy of corporatist economic policies, even though they benefited Turkey in its early years.
• Villain with Good Publicity: If Turkey wins the Italo-Turkish War, Inönü's popularity will skyrocket to unprecedented levels and ensure the continued dominance of Orthodox Kemalism. Meanwhile, any opposition party to Inönü is rendered toothless and there is only the slimmest chance that things can reform within the reformist wing of the CHP.
• Villainous Friendship: His alliance with Italy was based partially on his personal friendship with Mussolini. With him gone, Inönü has fewer reasons to stick with the Triumvirate.
• War Hero: İnönü became famed for his stellar military record in the Greco-Turkish War, allowing to become the right hand man to Atatürk.
• Well-Intentioned Extremist: İnönü will do anything to keep the Turkish state alive, even if it means working with Fascist states and oppressing the people he rules over.
• What You Are in the Dark: For all of İnönü's pretensions of being Atatürk's rightful successor, behind closed doors he's less than certain given what he's done to keep Kemalism, and Turkey's standing as a regional power, alive.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (İnönü cabinet - Italo-Turkish War victory), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (İnönü retirement)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Kemalism^note 

• Allohistorical Allusion: Gülek's reformist policies and populist approach to Kemalism allude to his real life policies as General Secretary of the CHP, which helped lay the groundwork for Turkey's democratization.
• Dragon Ascendant: As İnönü's legal successor, Gülek is automatically made President when the former retires in 1969.
• Internal Reformist: Gülek leads the CHP's reformist wing, pushing for multi-party democratization and guaranteed civil rights, while still venerating nationalism and secularism.
• Omniglot: Adding to his already eccentric character, Gülek is also a polyglot who knows seven languages.
• Reconcile the Bitter Foes: Gülek has the charisma and presence to keep the left and right wings of the reformist clade together, despite their increasingly bitter conflict. However, Gülek will eventually have to pick a side in 1969, when İnön retires and Gülek needs to pick a Prime Minister from one of them.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Inönü cabinet)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Kemalism^note 

• Reconcile the Bitter Foes: Korutürk has focused on restrengthening Turkey's ties with its Triumvirate allies, despite their tensions. Unfortunately for him, this goes out the window when the Italo-Turkish War breaks out.
• War Hero: Korutürk is a seasoned veteran of the Turkish Navy who has now turned to politics.

Role: Minister of State^note  (Inönü cabinet - Italo-Turkish War victory), Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Gülek cabinet - CHP Party Congress victory)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note , Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi^note  (Ecevit chosen as Prime Minister)

Ideology: Right Kemalism^note 

• The Ace: Feyzioğlu is a respected academic with a passion for teaching students and famous in Turkey's legal world for his groundbreaking law work. His success has earned him respect amongst the old guard of the CHP, despite being a newer reformist figure.
• I Can't Believe I'm Saying This: While Feyzioğlu distrusts Gülek and thinks he has his head in the clouds, he does think Gülek managed to capture a certain public hunger for change and sees it as proof that reforms are needed. This comes off the back of him entertaining the notion of granting the free exercise of religion.
• Internal Reformist: Feyzioğlu wishes to return to Atatürk's old democratic ambitions and roll back the tyranny practiced by the CHP, guiding the party to the centre-right with a focus on nationalism, democracy, and the rule of law.
• Start My Own: Disappointed when Ecevit is made Gülek's Prime Minister, Feyzioğlu and the right-leaning reformers leave the CHP to found a different political party, CGP.

Role: Minister of Labor^note  (Inönü cabinet - Italo-Turkish War victory), Head of State (1971 election), Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Gülek cabinet - CHP Party Congress victory)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note , Demokratik Sol Parti^note  (Feyzioğlu chosen as Prime Minister)

Ideology: Left Kemalism^note 

• Allohistorical Allusion: Many of Ecevit's views and policies are based on his real life tenure as Prime Minister, which not only introduced Social Democratic ideas to Turkey, but also served as the foundation for modern Kemalism.
• Gentleman and a Scholar: Ecevit is a poet, academic, writer and major reformist CHP politician.
• Hypocrisy Nod: Ecevit is accused of hypocrisy by a student while he is giving a campus about the need for workers rights, safety, and welfare, yet partakes in the same regime that threw famous Communist poet Nâzım Hikmet in prison. However, Ecevit deflects the criticism by calling Nâzım Hikmet one of Turkey's greatest poets and a victim of Peker's anti-Communist purges, concluding that he too was a political prisoner and is now here to enact change.
• Internal Reformist: Ecevit wants to reform the CHP into a Social Democratic party, wishing to implement stronger social welfare programs under the Kemalist principles of populism and statism.
• Patriotic Fervor: He's committed to serving his country, while his desire to reform the CHP is borne from seeking to fulfill Atatürk's legacy, as it ought to be, rather than what it's turned into.
• Rebuilt Pedestal: Ecevit seeks to rekindle the memory of Atatürk through his reforms.
• Start My Own: Gülek will alienate Ecevit by picking Feyzioğlu as his Prime Minister, spurring Ecevit and the other left-leaning party members to leave the CHP and found the DSP.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (22 April Incident), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (power struggle victory)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Radical Kemalism^note 

• The Coup: In the power struggle with İnönü, Atay can win and coup the government, which forces İnönü to resign and sidelines the Orthodox wing of the CHP so that the Radicals can fully take over.
• Demoted to Dragon: Atay was Prime Minister of Turkey from 1950 to 1954 before being ousted by the Orthodox faction of CHP. However, he's still an active presence on the political scene, serving as Speaker of the Grand Council of Kemalism, where he played a major role in defeating the Democratization Bill of 1961.
• Dragon with an Agenda: Atay can officially serve as İnönü's Prime Minister, but he goes even further in his devotion to Kemalism. This is a point of tension between the two figures, as İnönü is frustrated with Atay's actions and eventually starts a power struggle between the two.
• Hero-Worshipper: Atay has a deep admiration for Atatürk, whom he sees as his mentor.
• Life Will Kill You: Coming into power through ruthless means, Atay will naturally pass away in 1971 from a heart attack.
• Meet the New Boss: Falih Rıfkı Atay succeeded Peker as Prime Minister in 1950, representing a continuation of Peker's radical devotion to Kemalism and autocratic nature. Even after being ousted by the Orthodox faction of the CHP in 1954, Atay continues to trumpet Peker's ideology in the Grand Council of Kemalism.
• President for Life: In the aftermath of Turkey's defeat in the Second Italo-Turkish War (in which case there's no way for the CHP to win the following election), İnönü can concede to the Pekerists, cancelling elections and naming Atay as Prime Minister, beginning a second era of Radical Kemalism.
• Succession Crisis: During his presidency, Atay will die from a heart attack and create a power struggle within the Grand Council of Kemalism, as the Yön and Ülkü factions compete to succeed him.
• Tyrant Takes the Helm: Korutürk was seedy, but he had some semblance of respect for Turkey's democratic processes, enough that he may agree to the Spring Protests' demands. By contrast, Atay takes over the country by arresting the Turkish legislature—including his sympathizers—and establishing Independence Tribunals to punish accused traitors. His takeover kills Turkish democracy, in the name of conducting a Second Turkish Revolution.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Atay cabinet - Atay appointed President), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Atay succession)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Radical Kemalism^note 

• Patriotic Fervor: Aydemir has the unorthodox belief that Socialism can be achieved through Kemalism, simultaneously liberating the working class and glorifying the Turkish identity.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Atay succession)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Radical Kemalism^note 

• Undying Loyalty: Sökmensüer is an old ally of Peker, and remains loyal to his vision in the Ülkü faction. If he succeeds Atay, Sökmensüer will look to revive the Corporatist state from the 1940s and early 50s, per Peker's ideal.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Aydemir cabinet)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Radical Kemalism^note 

• Wide-Eyed Idealist: Subverted. Avcıoğlu is an idealist, but he's no fool. He acknowledges that the road to Socialism will be a long one, so he'll rely on heavy propaganda to convince the people that this transition is best for them.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Sökmensüer cabinet)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Radical Kemalism^note 

• Richard Nixon, the Used Car Salesman: Talat Aydemir is a man who is quite changed by the circumstances of alternate history. While the real one was a Turkish Army colonel renowned for his coup attempts, this Aydemir has never been in the military, instead having joined the Kemalist Youth Movement under Peker, eventually becoming its Chairman.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1963 or 1967 election)

Party: Demokratik Yenileme Partisi^note 

Ideology: Left-Wing Nationalism^note 

• Resign in Protest: Aras was always uneasy about the rise of Fascism in Europe, which threatened the alliances he built up and his policy of Soviet rapprochement. But the final straw came when İnönü became President, which convinced Aras that the CHP was turning too rightwards for his taste, so he resigned from the CHP and Foreign Ministry, at around the same time Turkey joined the Axis Powers.
• The Rival: As another personal friend of Atatürk, Aras was rivals with İnönü, up until the former resigned from the CHP.
• Start My Own: He left the CHP for working too closely with European Fascists, in which his rivalry with İnönü and Communist sympathies made him an immediate target for them. As a strong advocate for democracy and a brief ally to Celal Bayar, Aras sought to create an opposition force against the CHP, which is why he worked with Alican to form the DYP.
• Taking Up the Mantle: Aras vows to carry on the legacy of Atatürk, before the CHP's vision was corrupted under İnönü's direction.
• Universally Beloved Leader: Aras is the founder of the DYP, beloved by Liberal Conservatives and Socialists, and supported by a coalition of workers, students, and farmers who are attracted to his promises of democratization and welfare.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1963 election), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1971 election)

Party: Demokratik Yenileme Partisi^note , Türkiye İşçi Partisi^note  (DİSK protests quelled)

Ideology: Social Democracy^note , Interim Government^note  (1971 election), Revolutionary Front^note  (Second Turkish Revolution)

• Category Traitor: When elected in 1971, Aybar can continue to work within the system by compromising on his more Radical Socialist promises. The radical left responds negatively to this news, accusing him of betraying the TİP's Socialist vision to work with bourgeois parties.
• The Gloves Come Off: After winning both the 1963 and 1971 elections, Aybar will no longer tone down his socialist rhetoric. Instead, he'll call upon his supporters to begin a Second Turkish Revolution, clashing with the opposition and creating civil unrest, even if this means destabilizing his administration.
• Internal Reformist: Aybar dreams of a Socialist Turkey, one of land for the farmer and work for the worker, which he seeks to implement through electoral politics until the time is ready for a revolution.
• Pyrrhic Victory: His victory in the 1971 election is immediately hit with an electoral deadlock, as the bourgeois parties are unwilling to approve of his Socialist politics. If he fails to carry out the Second Turkish Revolution, Aybar will be forced to compromise on his agenda.
• Red Baron: He's nicknamed the "Smiling Face of Socialism".
• Start My Own: Disappointed when the DYP refuses to negotiate with the DİSK demonstrators, Aybar splinters the party's Socialist faction to form the TİP.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Aras cabinet - DİSK protests quelled)

Party: Demokratik Yenileme Partisi^note , Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi^note  (DİSK protests negotiated)

Ideology: National Liberalism^note 

• Start My Own: Alican accuses the DYP of being too "coddling" when they negotiate with the DİSK protestors. Thus, he and his Liberal allies resign from the party to found the IDP.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1963 or 1967 election)

Party: Ulusal Demokrat Parti^note 

Ideology: Liberal Conservatism

• Defector from Decadence: Köprülü's intellectualism impressed Atatürk enough that he was invited to join the Assembly. Unfortunately, the increasingly autocratic nature of the CHP regime dissatisfied him and a coalition of other center-right politicians, notably Menderes and Bayar, who formed the UDP in response.
• Gentleman and a Scholar: Köprülü was a teacher of Ottoman Turkish and is a respected academic whose works managed to land him a position in the Ministry of Education under Atatürk before being asked to enter the Assembly.
• Non-Idle Rich: Mehmet Fuat Köprülü is a member of the Köprülü political dynasty which had prominence in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. He has since become involved in academia and politics as the leader of the UDP and potential President of Turkey.
• Start My Own: Köprülü was a founding member of the UDP after becoming dissatisfied with the increasingly autocratic CHP. He has since become the leader of the UDP as a respected figure who can unite the various wings of the party and potential President of Turkey if the UDP wins the 1963 election.
• Universally Beloved Leader: The UDP is fractured, but the one man who can unite them all is Köprülü. With his unwavering determinism, Köprülü commands the respect of everyone within the faction. If they win the 1963 general election, Köprülü serves as their President because of the wide respect he commands, more so than his controversial Prime Minister, Menderes.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Köprülü cabinet), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Sunday Crisis victory)

Party: Ulusal Demokrat Parti^note , Milletin Demokrasi Partisi^note  (purged from UDP)

Ideology: Populist Conservatism^note  (as prime minister), Anocracy^note  (1st presidential term), Personalistic Dictatorship^note  (2nd presidential term)

• Ambiguous Situation: After being purged from the UDP and forming the MDP, Menderes tries to do a campaign for the 1971 election, only to get caught in an altercation between his supporters and some rival demonstrators. In the clash, Menderes is fatally stabbed by an unknown assailant, kicking off a firestorm of speculation of who could have committed the deed. Given how controversial Menderes is, there are a lot of names on the suspect list.
• Bastard Understudy: In Menderes' early political career, his mentor was Köprülü, who taught him the ropes of politics, something that doesn't stop him from betraying Köprülü by challenging him for the presidency after the first UDP term and stealing his job in the Sunday Crisis.
• Beneath the Mask: Even if the UDP wins the 1963 and Menderes gives a thanking his supporters and promising to continue the fight against CHP opposition, he feels doubt about his own words that they are unstoppable with popular will.
• Cult of Personality: By the time Menderes secures his second presidential term, his supporters consider him second only to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who will save Turkey from degeneration and demagoguery from the far-right and far-left.
• The Face: Like Demirel, Menderes is the face of the UDP's populist faction, overshadowing the popularity of Köprülü.
• He Who Fights Monsters: Menderes once demonstrated against the CHP dictatorship, but once he becomes President himself, his paranoia and lust for power drives him to roll back the previously liberalized press laws and abolish the premiership to centralize all executive power to himself.
• It's Personal: Menderes was initially invited by Atatürk into the CHP after gaining his law degree in 1931, but had his career repeatedly stifled by Inönü who saw him as an obstacle to his economic ambitions. In 1945, Menderes was expelled from the CHP due to his advocacy of economic liberalism which only fueled his opposition with feelings of revenge towards those in the CHP.
• Playing Both Sides: Menderes carefully manipulates the rivalry between Bilgiç and Demirel. He praises the work of the one he is speaking to and, when the other comes up, he admits a shortcoming, in spite of their potential, before promptly trying to end the conversation.
• President for Life: Menderes' ambitions and paranoia push him to challenge Köprülü's presidency, rewrite the Constitution, turn Turkey into a Presidential Republic, and then centralize power around himself until he becomes dictator for life.
• Start My Own: When his attempt to seize the presidency from Köprülü fails, Menderes is forced to resign and form his own political party, MDP. He tries to run in the 1971 election, but unfortunately for him, his ambitions are cut short when he gets stabbed with a knife at a political demonstration.
• War Hero: Menderes fought in the Turkish War of Independence, winning him a medal of honor for combatting the Greek Army.

Role: Minister of the Interior^note  (Köprülü cabinet), Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Köprülü cabinet - Menderes succession)

Party: Ulusal Demokrat Parti^note , Millîyetçi Muhafazakâr Parti^note  (Demirel chosen as Prime Minister)

Ideology: Paternalistic Conservatism^note 

• Appeal to Tradition: Bilgiç is one of the more traditional politicians in the faction, having grown up in a nationalist and Islamic household, and thus representing an interest in more paternalistic economic policies, compared to the UDP's more explicitly free-market wings.
• Start My Own: If he isn't chosen as Köprülü's replacement Prime Minister, Bilgiç parts from the UDP to found the MMP, which makes up the more traditionally conservative elements of the former.
• Taking Up the Mantle: He borrowed much of his political beliefs from his father and brother, which he's motivated to uphold.
• Teeth-Clenched Teamwork: Bilgiç has a rivalry with the populist faction led by Demirel.

Role: Minister of Economy^note  (Köprülü cabinet), Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Köprülü cabinet - Menderes succession)

Party: Ulusal Demokrat Parti^note , Adalet Partisi^note  (Bilgiç chosen as Prime Minister)

Ideology: Populist Conservatism^note 

• The Apprentice: Demirel became an apprentice to Menderes, who taught him public-speaking skills and the rhetoric needed to win the farmers' vote.
• The Face: Demirel is a people person and is frequently used to represent the UDP to the general public. He attends the opening of an apartment complex in Ankara with Menderes, where he talks to the locals as a fellow common man and lets them spill their woes.
• Red Baron: Unlike most Turkish politicians, Demirel did not come from the military or landowner aristocracy; he worked as an engineer for the State Hydraulic Works and became its chief. His renowned work earned him the nickname "King of Dams".
• Start My Own: If Köprülü doesn't pick him as his replacement Prime Minister, Demirel resigns from the UDP to found his own party, AP, which attracts other liberal conservative politicians.

^{Civilian Outfit}

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (coup)

Party: Milli Birlik Komitesi^note 

Ideology: Military Junta^note 

• Cincinnatus: He believes that the military should eventually step down from power and restore elections. His job is ensuring that the National Unity Committee falls in line with this plan. Whether he actually gets to do this or not depends on whether Madanoğlu or Türkeş prevails in the power struggle within the military.
• Military Coup: Sunay will stage a military coup against the DYP or UDP and name himself President if they fail to handle their 1967 controversies.
• My Country, Right or Wrong: He's sick of politics by the time Erim forms his government, but he sticks to his duties as President out of love for his country, hoping that Erim can revive the Kemalist republic.
• Red Scare: Upon overthrowing the DYP, Sunay has Türkeş read a radio broadcast stressing that the coup was done to defend the Constitution and rescue Turkey from 'Bolshevism'.
• Reluctant Ruler:
  • Downplayed at first. He's generally apathetic to politics, and more-or-less serves as a figurehead for the younger officers who drove the military coup. However, Sunay believes that the military has a duty to protect the nation from "radicalism", which justifies the junta's existence in his mind. Thus, he'll continue to represent it and facilitate the eventual restoration of civilian governance.
  • During Erim's technocratic premiership, Sunay serves as his President, despite wishing that he could retreat to Çankaya Mansion and leave the politics to his Prime Minister.
• Universally Beloved Leader: He has a long military history, serving in the Ottoman Army in World War I, fighting for Turkey's independence, and climbing the hierarchy to become Chief of General Staff. All of this has made him a widely respected figure in the military, making him perfect to head their junta.
• Well-Intentioned Extremist: He believes that the military coup was a necessary measure to protect Turkey from chaos and demagoguery, in which he intends to reinstate elections when the situation has stabilized enough.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Sunay cabinet - constitutionalist victory), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Turkish Miracle)

Party: Milli Birlik Komitesi^note 

Ideology: Kemalism^note 

• Cincinnatus: Following the military coup, Madanoğlu leads the faction which pushes for a return to democracy as soon as possible, believing the junta as a temporary measure.
• A Lighter Shade of Black: The elections he wants to set up will be heavily flawed, as the military still interferes in the government's affairs to preserve their overreaching authority. However, Madanoğlu at least wants to end the junta at some point, whereas his rival Türkeş wants to keep it indefinitely.
• Reassigned to Antarctica: Madanoğlu is reassigned to a diplomatic post out of the country if his faction loses out to Türkeş in the power struggle within the military junta.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Sunay cabinet - radical victory), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Sunay succession)

Party: Milli Birlik Komitesi^note 

Ideology: Revolutionary Nationalism^note 

• Not-So-Well-Intentioned Extremist: Unlike other officers like Madanoğlu, Türkeş has no intention of restoring power back to the civilian government. Any time he delays an election due to "political instability", it's always a flimsy excuse for Türkeş to keep governing the country.
• Politically Incorrect Villain: Türkeş wants to purge Turkey of all foreign influences and repudiates the minority ethnic identities in the country, believing that every citizen is Turkish.
• Red Baron: He's called Başbuğ by his followers, which means "great leader".
• Viler New Villain: After Türkeş wins the power struggle with Madanoğlu, it's inevitable that Sunay will retire and let Türkeş assume both the presidency and leadership of the National Unity Committee. From there, Türkeş corrupts the already dubious junta into a Fascistic dictatorship, which promotes Islamic moralism, hyper-industrialization, Turkish supremacism, and total loyalty to the regime.

Role: Minister of Foreign Affairs^note  (Inönü cabinet - Italo-Turkish War victory), Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (İnönü cabinet - Atay dismissed, Sunay cabinet - technocratic government formed, and Madanoğlu cabinet - Turkish Miracle)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Kemalism^note 

• Appeal to Tradition: Erim's ideal vision of the CHP is the status quo, with some minor changes if needed. He openly opposes the various reformist factions within the CHP, arguing that Atatürk's vision is already being upheld and that the country should stick to their traditional political structures. He openly complains to İnönü about Gülek's ambitions to create a new CHP and discusses the possibility of sidelining him.
• Emperor Scientist: If put into power by the military, Erim forms a technocratic government ruled by the educated.
• History Repeats: More than a few observers comment on Erim's advocacy of Orthodox Kemalism and the potential consequence of condemning Turkey to another 40 years of absolute CHP dominance.
• Know When to Fold 'Em: Erim will recognize when his technocratic government has failed and been paralyzed by infighting, in which he will publicly admit defeat in time for the Armed Forces to announce a new election.
• Passed-Over Promotion: Nihat Erim lead the orthodox opposition to Atay in 1954. However, this made him a controversial figure, so when Atay was ousted, İnönü appointed Hasan Saka as the new Prime Minister instead, even though Erim eyed the position.
• Puppet King: If the junta restores democratic elections, Erim will be pushed by the military to become Prime Minister and form a technocratic government, where they will use him as a puppet to further entrench their control.
• Repressive, but Efficient: It's possible for his technocratic government to be a success as the Turkish Miracle, restoring economic prosperity and political stability after the chaotic military coup. The government backslides into one-party rule by CHP bureaucrats, but most people are just grateful to live under a stable regime.
• Resign in Protest: Erim is among the many CHP establishment figures who leave the party when Gülek liberalizes the constitution to guarantee rights like free speech and public gatherings. This creates a resignation crisis for Gülek, who will have to fill in the vacancies to keep the government running.
• The Rival: Erim is a long-time rival of Gülek, as he is opposed to the latter's reformation of the CHP authoritarian policies.
• We ARE Struggling Together: If his technocratic government fails to meet expectations, Erim's motley coalition of the CHP, IDP, and AP will descend into infighting and paralyze the regime, while the military promises a future election to find a better administration.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1971 election or post-Erim junta election)

Party: Vatansever Parti^note  (post-Erim junta election), Adalet Partisi^note  (1971 election)

Ideology: Liberal Corporatism^note , Populist Conservatism^note  (1971 election)

• The Fettered: Unlike some other military officers, Arıburun is loyal to Kemalism and wants to restore civilian rule to the country. When he's made President, Arıburun is content to act as a stabilizing force, while Özal can do the heavy economic reforms.
• Like Father, Like Son: His father was a veteran from Gallipoli, which Tekin followed up on it by joining the Air Force as the first air attaché.
• War Hero: He's been recognized for his accomplishments in the Air Force. In particular, his success in the Italo-Turkish War allowed him to move into politics.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Arıburun cabinet)

Party: Vatansever Parti^note 

Ideology: Liberal Corporatism^note 

• Redeeming Replacement: Criticizing previous governments for sullying the ideology, Özal promises to bring the country back to "true Kemalist values" through a program of mass privatization and structural reform.

Role: Minister of National Defense^note  (Köprülü cabinet), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Radical Kemalists ousted)

Party: Ulusal Demokrat Parti^note 

Ideology: Paternalistic Conservatism^note 

• Anti-Mutiny: Following the 22 April Incident, Kurtbek and a few other generals rebel against the CHP's radical wing and try to stop Atay in the Turkish Civil War. Kurtbek's insurrection can either be put down violently or succeed in ousting the radicals, in which Kurtbek is unanimously elected President.
• Dark Horse Victory: By all measures, the Turkish Civil War is slanted against his favor, but his rebellion has a chance at overthrowing Atay and the Radical Kemalists.
• Internal Reformist: Having fought in the military for over twenty years, Kurtbek realized that the only way to save Turkey was to reform its political structure, so he joins the UDP to dismantle the one-party CHP regime and dismantle its loyalists within the Armed Forces.
• Landslide Election: If he wins the Turkish Civil War, Kurtbek will unanimously win the subsequent election and be named President.
• Long Game: As he explains to Menderes, Kurtbek's plans to weaken the CHP loyalists in the armed forces by initially softening them up, expanding the army and funding academies in a bid to gain influence within the Turkish Army. It will take some time for them to get ready, but when they do, the integration can be triggered.
• Old Soldier: Kurtbek has been involved with the Turkish military ever since he was eighteen and fought to protect Turkey for more than twenty years before joining politics to rid the army of CHP loyalties.
• Rebel Leader: When Atay returns to power as prime minister, Kurtbek is among the leading generals who refuse to acknowledge his regime and establish a rival government in Istanbul, opposed to Atay in Ankara.
• Zero-Approval Gambit: Many will regard his political career with suspicion, but Kurtbek thinks it will be worth it to reform the Turkish political structure. The closest call comes when his military reform package includes a restructuring of the Army, ending their independence to subordinate them under the Ministry of National Security. The gambit can either work or force Kurtbek to resign when he's implicated in a past coup plot against İnönü.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Kurtbek cabinet - post-insurrection election)

Party: Sosyal Demokratik Parti^note  (post-insurrection election)

Ideology: Reformist Socialism^note 

• The Future Will Be Better: His election promises to build a welfare state with a particular focus on workers rights and a strong Constitution, healing the country from the CHP's damage.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (Kurtbek cabinet - post-insurrection election)

Party: Demokratik Cumhuriyet Partisi^note 

Ideology: Paternalistic Conservatism^note 

• Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Her election makes her the first female Prime Minister in Turkish history.
• Like Father, Like Son: She is the daughter of Celâl Bayar and vows to continue his brand of conservatism, namely solving Turkey's economic problems with private investments and non-Kemalist agricultural reforms.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1963 election), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1971 election)

Party: Demokratik Yenileme Partisi^note , Türkiye İşçi Partisi^note  (DİSK protests quelled)

Ideology: Social Democracy^note , Interim Government^note  (1971 election), Revolutionary Front^note  (Second Turkish Revolution)

For his tropes, see the DYP Prime Ministers section.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (compromise with Aybar)

Party: Türkiye İşçi Partisi^note 

Ideology: Social Democracy^note 

• Consolation Prize: Given Aybar's controversial left-wing beliefs, he can compromise with the other parties by forming a coalition government with the IDP, in which Talu will be named President, while Aybar himself becomes Prime Minister.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1971 election)

Party: Demokratik Sol Parti^note 

Ideology: Left Kemalism^note 

• Defector from Decadence: In the 1971 election, Aksoy represents the former left-wing CHP members who were alienated by Gülek's favoritism to the right-wing.

Role: Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey^note  (İnönü cabinet - 1963 election), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (İnönü retirement)

Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi^note 

Ideology: Kemalism^note 

For his tropes, see the Orthodox and Reformist CHP Presidents (1962-1971).

Role: Foreign Minister (İnönü cabinet), President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1971 election)

Party: Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi^note 

Ideology: Right Kemalism^note 

• Defector from Decadence: Feridun is among the right-wing Kemalists who leave the CHP when Gülek favors the left-wing, in which he'll run as their President in the 1971 election.
• Ignored Expert: He's an experienced and reliable diplomat within the Foreign Ministry, yet his calls for caution and peace are often ignored in İnönü's cabinet of nationalists.
• Minor Major Character: He's not mentioned much, but he was instrumental in shifting Turkey's diplomacy away from Germany and to Italy and the Iberian Union, which led to the Triumvirate's foundation and all of its subsequent drama.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1971 election)

Party: Demokratik Yenileme Partisi^note , Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi^note  (DİSK protests negotiated)

Ideology: National Liberalism^note 

• Defector from Decadence: Çelikbaş can be among the Liberals who defect from the DYP and join the IDP.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1971 election)

Party: Ulusal Demokrat Parti^note , Millîyetçi Muhafazakâr Parti^note  (Demirel chosen as Prime Minister)

Ideology: Paternalistic Conservatism^note 

• The Apprentice: Turan was the mentee to Köprülü, joining his opposition against Peker and standing by his side in the UDP.
• Gentleman and a Scholar: He's a medievalist, a Seljuk historian, a prolific writer, and a chairman of the cultural society Türk Ocakları. This, combined with his marriage to a former Ottoman princess, has made him widely respected among conservatives and nationalists, in which they hope his wisdom will help him lead Turkey.

Role: President of the Republic of Turkey^note  (1971 election)

Party: Adalet Partisi^note 

Ideology: Populist Conservatism^note 

For his tropes, see the Junta Transition Presidents and Prime Ministers section.

^{Flag of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus}

^{Flag of the State of Cyprus}

Official Name: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı^note , Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cyprus divided)

Ruling Party: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı^note 

Ideology: Paternalism

A Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organisation in Northern Cyprus, aiming to retake the isle from Greece during the Italo-Turkish War.

• La Résistance: Cyprus' status as part of Greece has always been a tension point between Italy and Turkey, due to the large Turkish population in the northern half of the island. When the Italo-Turkish War begins, the ethnic Turkish partisans are given weapons and training by Turkey and rise up against Greece.

Osman Fazıl Polat

Role: Head of State

Party: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı^note 

Ideology: Paternalism

• Badass Boast: When Polat hears of a potential Greek counterattack after invading Cyprus, Polat will be unfazed from the threat:

  Then we must prepare. Either Cyprus will be Turkish, or the mujahidden will not live.

• Know When to Fold 'Em:
  • Should Polat fail to conquer Cyprus, he's absolutely livid at this development, but gives the order to retreat anyway, dreading the fact that he'll be scapegoated for this military failure.
  • Alternatively, if the conflict in Cyprus halts to a stalemate, Polat will accept the fact that any further offenses would lead to pointless losses and accepts a ceasefire, though he remains fearful that future conflicts will persist over ownership of Cyprus.
• War Hero: He's an esteemed military commander from Turkey and he can potentially lead Northern Cyprus after leading a military campaign to occupy the island from Italian control.

Official Name: VI. Inspectorate-General of Mosul and Kerkuk

Ruling Party: Musul ve Kerkük Umumi Müfettişliği^note 

Ideology: Military Junta^note 

Economic Type: Military Directed^note 

Faction: Triumvirate^note 

• Evil Colonialist: The region of Mosul and Kirkuk is ruled by the 6th Inspectorate-General, which has limitless control over the regional, only accountable to the President. The government in Ankara is actively pursuing a goal of Turkifying the region through assimilation and Turkish economic dominance with the hope of fully annexing the region in the future. The Mosul and Kirkuk Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Petrol Ofisi, has full reign over the oil within the region and the Inspectorate-General has leveraged the profits to turn the region into an industrial complex which supplies the Turkish Army, as seen in a national spirit.
• Operation: [Blank]: Operation Alp Arslan, named after the Seljuk sultan who captured the Emperor Romanos Diogenes after his victory at the Battle of Manzikert, aims to destroy any opposition to Turkish rule and completely Turkify the region.
• Would Hurt a Child: A group of Turkish soldiers go to a small Kurdish village in the Zagros mountains, looking for the people who attacked a military convoy and killed three soldiers. The village itself has nothing but a few women, children, elderly and a goat, but some of the soldiers don't care and grab a boy around thirteen years old, beating him with the butt of a rifle as his mother cries on the ground and stealing a goat.
• Your Terrorists Are Our Freedom Fighters: A national spirit calls any anti-Turkish resistance "terrorism" and deploys Operation Alp Arslan to eliminate these elements.

Sabiha Gökçen

Role: Inspector-General^note 

Party: Musul ve Kerkük Umumi Müfettişliği^note 

Ideology: Military Junta^note 

• Beneath Notice: Inönü, after purging most of the Radical Kemalists, spared Gökçen because he interpreted her silence as conformity to the status quo, not to mention her useful skills in combatting anti-Turkish terrorism.
• Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Decades prior, Gökçen built planes and was one of the first women pilots in Turkish history.
• Evil Colonialist: Gökçen is adamant about colonizing and annexing Mosul and Kirkuk into Turkey, no matter how many "subversives" need to be killed in the process.
• The Remnant: Sabiha Gökçen represents a remnant of the once dominant Radical Kemalists, following the footsteps of Peker and Atay.
• Richard Nixon, the Used Car Salesman: On top of Gökçen's track record as an accomplished aviator and adopted daughter of Atatürk, Prime Minister Peker's reforms to empowering women have allowed her to pursue an actual military and political career that she never had the opportunity to in real life, as well as develop more radical political leanings.
• War Hero: Gökçen was already respected as the adopted daughter of Atatürk. However, her political standing was accelerated due to her military service, where she fought in Syria, Armenia, and West Russia.

Official Name: Republic of Armenia

Ruling Party: Haykakan Hanrapetakan Kusakts'ut'yun^note 

Ideology: Oligarchy^note 

Economic Type: Dirigisme^note 

Faction: Triumvirate^note 

• Les Collaborateurs: The Armenian Republican Party and administration is made up of opportunists and collaborators, who are kept in power by Turkish assistance in a sham democracy.
• Corrupt Politician: The ruling collaborator HHK party suffers from widespread corruption. In a stunning and frequent example of this, the Turkish government sends a lot of money to the Armenian Development Initiative, intended to rebuild the country after World War II, yet most of the funds get pilfered by corrupt politicians.
• Puppet State: After World War II, Armenia was reformed into a 'Sister Republic' of Turkey, ruled by a politician from Turkey and governed by the Armenian Republican Party, a purported peer to the CHP. The state is frequently used by Turkey to extract valuable metals found in Armenia, ensuring Turkish economic dominance over the country.
• La Résistance: Turkey's efforts to subjugate Armenia have been stifled by a hostile population, with some rebels using the mountainous terrain to conduct a guerrilla war.

Mkrtich Shelefyan

Role: Head of State

Party: Haykakan Hanrapetakan Kusakts'ut'yun^note 

Ideology: Oligarchy^note , Civilian Dictatorship^note  (martial law)

• 0% Approval Rating: Shelefyan's corruption and collaboration has made him widely despised among the Armenian population, coinciding with increased demands for Armenia to have greater self-governance. Not even the Turkish public likes him, due to widespread knowledge of his corruption.
• Corrupt Politician: Shelefyan's name is synonymous with corruption. His history is tarnished with so many scandals that the only reason why he's still in power is because he bootlicks to his benefactors in Ankara. However, this corruption leads to his downfall, due to the mismanagement of the construction of Yerevan's airport.
• Failure Is the Only Option: There is no way for him to remain in power and withstand the firestorm of riots against his reign. At the first round of trouble, Turkey can take a deal with Zakaryan and the rest of the party to oust Shelefyan, putting the reformist wing in charge. Otherwise, if Turkey refuses, Shelefyan will declare martial law and try to survive through naked suppression, but this fails to contain the unrest. In that case, either Turkey forces him to resign or the Turkish Armed Forces deposes Shelefyan, where both scenarios set up an interim government with Zakaryan.
• Fascist, but Inefficient: His only solution to the riots is to declare martial law and use violence against his opponents, which only creates further instability and threatens to escalate the situation into a full-blown revolution. It's so much of a liability that either Turkey will force Shelefyan to resign or the Turkish Armed Forces will move against the President.
• Hoist by His Own Petard: Shelefyan's downfall is triggered by the scale of protests that emerge, once it is revealed how many kickbacks he has received from the already-mismanaged construction of Yerevan Airport. This all comes after the project got off to a bad start due to a lack of replacement parts, where a worker dies because a rescue team cannot reach him and the other workers had gone on strike due to payment issues.
• Led by the Outsider: Shelefyan is a Turkish politician of Armenian descent and rules the Republic of Armenia, answering to Ankara and keeping the country under their sphere, so long as they keep rigging elections in his favor. He and Ankara justify his appointment on the basis of his Armenian ethnicity.
• Puppet King: Shelefyan rules Armenia, but his regime is only kept afloat with campaign donations and political actions from Ankara. The Turkish government considers him an ideal link between the two nations who can help pacify Armenia.
• You Have Outlived Your Usefulness: Shelefyan is already unpopular with the Armenians and protests against his corruption are commonplace. When over ten thousand people protest against Shelefyan's role in the Yerevan Airport scandals, the Turkish government deems him to be more troublesome than he's worth, so they oust him and discourage any further radicalization among the Armenians.

Ruben-Zakar Zakaryan

Role: President^note  (party coup or Shelefyan deposed by military)

Party: Haykakan Hanrapetakan Kusakts'ut'yun^note , Hayastani Hanrapetut'yan Azgayin Zhoghov (Shelefyan deposed by military)

Ideology: Social Liberalism^note , Interim Government^note  (Shelefyan deposed by military)

• The Coup: With the support of Turkey, Zakaryan can lead an internal party coup against Shelefyan and remove him from power, while he becomes the new President of Armenia.
• The Idealist: Zakaryan promises to convert Armenia into a genuine and prosperous democracy that works alongside Turkey as an equal, putting to rest the widespread anti-Turkish sentiment within the nation and ending corruption and "radicalism". Zakaryan knows that his ambitions cannot be completed overnight, but he resolves to try.
• Internal Reformist: Zakaryan is a member of the Armenian Republican Party and dismayed by the corruption and authoritarianism practiced by Shelefyan. As protests mount against the corrupt President, Zakaryan forms a united front and ousts him, aided by Turkey losing their patience with Shelefyan. His willingness to avoid Shelefyan's mistakes and still work with Turkey is why he is Ankara's preferred candidate to win in the 1966 election, enough they they may meddle in the vote to guarantee his victory (and a Radical Kemalist government will always intervene).
• Led by the Outsider: Much like Shelefyan, Zakaryan is a Turkish politician of Armenian descent. However, unlike Shelefyan, he is committed to reforming Armenia to be a democratic and equal partner to Turkey.
• Redeeming Replacement: Zakaryan isn't necessarily opposed to the idea of Armenia cooperating with Turkey. However, he bemoans the corruption of Shelefyan's regime and leads a united front to overthrow him, promising a more fair and equal relationship to Armenia's larger neighbor.

Haykaz Khachatryan

Role: President^note  (1966 election)

Party: Azgayin Miats'yal Kusakts'ut'yun

Ideology: Christian Democracy^note 

• The Puppet Cuts His Strings: His election marks a turning point for Armenia, as they emphasize their own national identity and become less dependent on Turkey.

Karen Demirchyan

Role: President^note  (1966 election)

Party: Hayastani Zhoghovrdakan Kusakts'ut'yun - Sots'ialistner

Ideology: Social Democracy^note 

• Internal Reformist: By working within the electoral system, Demirchyan hopes to create a strong welfare state that is partially inspired from the Soviet Union.