Being Chinese, Becoming Chinese American

2	Defending Chinese Republicanism and Debating Chineseness in the United States, 1912-14

            In 1913, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) in San Francisco, the most important organization for Chinese in the United States, took down the portrait of Sun Yat-sen from the central wall of its meeting hall, leaving the portrait of Yuan Shikai, president of the Republic of China, standing alone.¹ This small but significant event showed that Chinese communities in the United States had retained the traditional Chinese habit of hanging portraits of revered national leaders in a community's most symbolically prominent place. This event also revealed that American Chinese support for Sun Yat-sen, leader of the 1911 Revolution and advocate of the three principles of the people, was limited. Sun and his party actually became targets of attacks in American Chinatowns when they waged another revolution against the increasingly despotic Yuan government in China.

      The debate over whether Yuan or Sun was a more appropriate leader for China can be analyzed as a reflection of diasporic nationalism,² by which different interest groups in diaspora competed for local control. The 1911 Revolution brought into question the legitimacy of the traditional power structure and social hierarchy. The impact was very much felt in American Chinatowns. The Tongmenghui, which became Guomindang (GMD) in 1912, tried to claim not only its legitimacy but also its leading position in Chinatown life and politics as its counterparts held the national power in China. The Chinatown elite, Confucian scholars and successful merchants holding important positions as gentry-directors and merchant-directors of umbrella community organizations, had to find legitimacy by supporting a party in China that shared ideology and interests with them.

      Besides concerns over power and control, there were also debates over whether "state power" (guoquan) was more important than "people power" (minquan). This debate brought into prominence the conflict between traditional Chinese belief in elite rule and the Western concept of democracy and rule by the people. Together with this debate were arguments about gender equality and equality between different ages and groups of different socioeconomic, religious, and educational backgrounds. The debates among Chinese in this period reflected not only the conflicts between Chinese traditional and Western values but also the special circumstances confronted by Chinese diaspora.

      Diasporic nationalism has another side: the nonelite people's interests. Whether they had families in China or were in the process of bringing families into the United States, most Chinese wanted to see a stable, prosperous, and strong China. They believed that the Yuan government, which was able to unite all of China without further bloodshed, was more conducive to unity and stability in China. The Second Revolution,³ they thought, was only prolonging suffering for Chinese people. Given their tradition of following the elite, it was natural that they favored the conservative Chinatown elite and the Yuan government. Despite the geographic distance, American Chinese were still tied to politics in China between 1912 and 1914.

      However, living in diaspora provided space for the development of a new cultural sensitivity. How important were Chinese traditional values and customs in constructing their new cultural identity? How much should they adopt Western values and adhere to norms of American mainstream society? Decisions over such fundamental issues represented their diasporic experience and environment. Accepting Christianity would give the Chinese access to the larger society and establish bridges for non-Chinese to better understand Chinese. Other decisions were made according to economic considerations such as business opportunities created by celebrating the Chinese New Year for Chinatown business owners. Thus, the emergent cultural identity was Chinese American in nature, for it retained Chinese traditional values and customs while encompassing Christian values and norms of American mainstream society.

      The impact of the 1911 Revolution on American Chinatowns was significant. Despite the restoration of conservative control, a spirit of independence and democracy gradually took hold of Chinatown life. Chinese American leaders resorted to the American way of lobbying against U.S. legislation and questioned the constitutionality of anti-Chinese administrative measures. The American-born Chinese used their citizenship rights to thwart a California legislative attempt at disenfranchising American citizens of Chinese ancestry and organized themselves politically. Chinese in the United States were positioning themselves as an ethnic minority group in the tapestry of American society.

A New Nationalist Discourse, 1912

      The Republic of China, declared on January 2, 1912, included only seventeen provinces that had achieved independence from the Qing government. The rest of China was still under the control of the Qing court. To unify China without further bloodshed, Sun Yat-sen gave up the presidency to Yuan Shikai, who was then premier in the Qing government and was in control of the Qing army. Although Yuan agreed to adopt the republican form of government and to demand the abdication of the Qing court, he believed that conservative forces still prevailed in China. Before taking the office of president, he said to a London Times reporter that "70 percent of the Chinese people are conservatives" and that after the Qing court was overthrown, "the conservatives must, before long, try to restore the monarchical system."⁴ Although Yuan did not attempt to restore the monarchical system in China between 1912 and 1914, his firm belief that this was the desire of the people combined with his desire to become emperor one day to pave the way for the rise of conservative forces in China.

      The unsettled nature of the new Republic of China provided ground for further contention among the three Chinese-language newspapers in the United States. Because it represented the voice of the revolutionaries whose actions had led to the republic, Young China believed that its vision of the republic should predominate. It deeply resented the appointment of Yuan Shikai. When Sun Yat-sen was negotiating a deal with Yuan for the unification of China, the paper carried cables sent by Tongmenghui members to China, asking Sun and his government in Nanjing not to give the presidential post to Yuan. The paper and the cables instead supported the idea of a northern expedition to unify all China under the republican government. "Dare-to-die" teams were organized, standing ready to join the northern expedition. The paper called on all Chinese in the United States to support the teams financially.⁵ Only Sun's personal cables stopped the dispatching of these teams.⁶

      Young China's resentment against Yuan was based on its fear that Yuan would ruin the fruit of the 1911 Revolution. During the revolution, the paper pointed out, Yuan had acted as an enemy to the Chinese people by leading the Qing army in killing Chinese. Right after Yuan assumed the presidential post, the paper informed its readers that Yuan had decided to keep the diplomatic envoys sent by the Qing court to foreign countries and had appointed figures with inclinations toward a monarchical system to important government posts. In Young China's opinion, this was evidence that Yuan harbored an ambition to restore the monarchical system in China and to become emperor himself.⁷

      According to Young China, Yuan's assumption of the presidency in China endangered the future of the new Chinese Republic. To defend the republic, the paper supported the idea of turning the Tongmenghui into a political party, named the Nationalist Party, or Guomindang (GMD). The paper assumed that, as in modern democracies such as the United States, the GMD would serve as a political force in politics and government in China in general and as a check against Yuan's monarchical ambitions in particular.⁸

      Having established a republic in China, Young China argued, the main task of the revolutionary party was to realize the principle of people's livelihood.⁹ This principle, the paper explained, meant that the power of the state should be used to develop China's economy and that state socialism should be practiced. Such state socialism included abolishing private land ownership and rights of inheritance, imposing progressive taxation, confiscating property from people who had gone overseas and from national traitors, and nationalizing banking and financing institutions and means of transportation. The paper emphasized the importance of this central task of the GMD and pointed out that the future of the new Chinese republic hinged on taking such steps toward equality.¹⁰

      Besides economic equality, Young China also advocated abolishing practices that showed social inequality in traditional Chinese society. At New York CCBA, a reporter from the paper observed a debate over the use of the term daren (your excellency). One side argued that as republican citizens, Chinese should stop using the term daren when addressing the Chinese consul in New York.¹¹ The argument continued that everyone was equal in a republic and that the consul was only a servant of the Chinese people. However, the other side regarded the term as a way to express courtesy and respect. Young China then commented that insistence on using the term showed that some Chinese still suffered from the profound servility that Chinese tradition had imprinted on them. Because such servile practice could only stain the quality of republican citizens, the paper advised all Chinese to keep their personal integrity to qualify as republican citizens.¹²

      Besides economic and social equality, Young China believed that civic participation in national and community politics was another quality that republican citizens should develop. The paper encouraged all Chinese people, in China and overseas, to be politically involved and to exercise their rights as citizens of the republic. The Tongmenghui, for which the paper was the voice, had already set an example of political participation by writing a public letter to China's president and the senate of the provisional government. The letter requested that the new Chinese government appoint a strong ambassador to negotiate with the U.S. government for an end to all anti-Chinese discriminatory laws and practices and for new treaties guaranteeing equal treatment of Chinese in the future.¹³

      Young China apparently was advocating fundamental changes in the traditional Chinese identity. The conservative result of the 1911 Revolution undercut the possibilities for change by helping to keep the American Chinatown elite in power. Therefore, in real life, there was no incentive to question authority and participate in politics. The fact that most Chinese in the United States had come there looking for economic betterment for themselves and their families, combined with their exposure to the laissez-faire capitalist system, made them suspicious of socialist equality, especially the ideas of abolishing private land ownership and confiscating personal property.¹⁴ Young China therefore was advocating ideas beyond the ideology and social milieu of many Chinese in the United States.

      In contrast to Young China, Chinese World, the paper that had advocated reforms as a way to modernize China and had defended Confucianism as the essence of Chinese civilization, welcomed Yuan as president. At the beginning of 1912, when the revolutionaries were negotiating with the Qing court for the unification of China, the paper carried on its editorial page a manifesto promulgated by a reform-oriented association in China. The manifesto called attention to the dangers of a divided China and advocated reconciliation between the North and the South. It argued that the fundamental difference between the North and the South was that between democratic constitutionalism and monarchical constitutionalism. Instead of prolonging the military conflict to determine which would prevail, the manifesto suggested that a decision should be made through a national assembly representing both the North and the South.¹⁵

      When the Qing emperor abdicated and Yuan was elected president by the senate of the provisional government, Chinese World accepted Yuan as the legitimate leader for all China and committed its full support to Yuan's government as the sole legitimate government of China. The paper praised Sun for his contributions to the establishment of the republic and his selfless decision to give up the presidential post in the interest of a peaceful unification of China. ¹⁶

      However, the unification of China did not bring peace, prosperity, and happiness to the Chinese people. Chinese World attributed continuing chaos in China to the destruction of order caused by the revolution. The paper reported and commented especially on the misery and chaos in Guangdong, the native province for most Chinese in the United States. Xinning, the native district for the largest section of Chinese in the United States, had become "a world of bandits and thieves," the paper said.¹⁷ It also carried detailed reports of military skirmishes in Guangdong and in other provinces. Such chaos made business and commerce impossible.¹⁸ Chinese in the United States sent weapons home to defend their businesses and homes from looting bandits, but the military government in Guangdong refused to allow the weapons to be imported. The government army even looted homes and searched travelers for weapons. These, the paper reported, were the results of the revolution.¹⁹

      Reports of such chaotic situations laid the foundation for Chinese World to propose its own recipe for restoring order, which was to reinstate the gentry class at all levels of government and to govern society with Confucianism.²⁰ It believed that in China, where the majority of people were uneducated, too much liberty and democracy would lead only to chaos. Confucianism, on the other hand, prescribed who should govern and who should be governed, who should be respected and who should respect, and who should be obeyed and who should obey. In essence, there were different categories of people, and when each category minded its own duty, there would be order in society.

      In accord with its firm belief that Confucianism could save China from disorder, Chinese World gave loud support to making Confucianism the official state religion in China. The paper noted that the 1911 Revolution had destroyed the traditional Chinese value system. Revolutionary advocacy of rebellion, liberty, and equality had made the Chinese society a world of robbers, thieves, and bandits. Revolutionary concepts had also destroyed the moral codes of Chinese society. Sons now could threaten fathers with knives, and students could walk out of school examinations. A society with neither order nor values appeared weak to the outside world. Therefore, the Russians dared to cut Mongolia away from China.²¹ According to Chinese World, all this resulted from the abandonment of Confucianism. Because it was Confucianism that had sustained the great Chinese civilization for thousands of years, the only way for China to restore its greatness in the world now, the paper stated, was to make Confucianism China's state religion.²²

      In addition to its attacks on the general idea of equality, Chinese World specifically opposed gender equality. It believed that women's participation in politics would only do harm to the political process.²³ According to Confucianism, a virtuous woman should not be talented. A person with no talent could only muddle the political process. The paper also used a story to show how troubling the idea of liberty and equality for women was. A Chinese woman in the United States wanted to enjoy liberty and equality. Against her parents' wishes, she got engaged to a man and eloped with him, only to find that the man already had a wife in China.²⁴ The paper explicitly pointed out that liberty and equality for women were in direct opposition to the criteria for "good women." Liberty and equality should not be taught to women.²⁵

      Echoing its equation of revolution with terror, Chinese World once again used the French Revolution as an example to warn the Chinese people against another revolution. Demonstrating its belief in elite rule, the paper pointed out that the destruction of social order and the abandonment of traditional values would lead to mob rule. When a society was ruled by ignorant masses, people with education, people who owned property, and people who believed in religion often were killed. That was the situation in France, and it would happen in China, too, if the so-called revolutionaries in the southern part of China launched another revolution against the Beijing government in the name of building a true republic with liberty and equality.²⁶

      Besides these descriptions of terrors and chaos associated with revolution and accompanying prescriptions for moral and social order, Chinese World also directly attacked the fundamental principle of the GMD. The paper argued that the principle of people's livelihood should be interpreted as the "principle of people's death" (minsi zhuyi). In Guangdong, where the government was still controlled by the revolutionaries, popular religious practices such as ancestor worship, the worship of various gods, and the practice of employing house servants were arbitrarily abolished, and there were inflationary policies and high taxes. There was no social or moral order, and life in general was dangerous and miserable. The paper claimed that such was the concrete result of the so-called principle of people's livelihood.²⁷

      Although the problems in Guangdong could not be attributed to the minsheng principle,²⁸ what Chinese World described touched many Chinese in the United States directly. Fong Chow, who came from Guangdong and was superintendent of a gold mine in northern California, lost a son to bandits in Guangdong during this period. The bandits kidnapped his son and demanded "25,000 in American gold dollars." Fong Chow failed to send that amount of money back, and his son was never returned to him. ²⁹

      What contributed to the "dangerous and miserable" life in Guangdong was chronic poverty and lack of established law and order. Poverty had been a characteristic of life in Guangdong and served as a main impetus for emigration to the United States since the Opium Wars and Taiping Rebellion. The 1911 Revolution destroyed the established social, political, and legal orders of society. Local bandits and other criminals took advantage of the disorderly situation and robbed poor as well as rich homes and disrupted businesses. Particularly vulnerable were homes whose men were in the United States. To make the situation even worse, the Guangdong government, with Hu Hanmin, a close associate of Sun Yat-sen, as governor, had to collect taxes to keep the government afloat because the Beijing government itself was having serious financial problems and could not be expected to provide support.

      After much discussion of the harmfulness of revolution and revolutionary ideas, Chinese World offered its remedy for China. In the wake of the failed Second Revolution, led by the GMD against the Yuan government, the paper editorialized that it was now "state's power" (guoquan), not "people's power" (minquan), that China needed to consolidate. The editorial compared a country to a business corporation in which the people were shareholders and the government was the executive. When shareholders supported the executive and worked for the profit of the corporation, the business flourished; when shareholders scrambled for selfish benefits, no matter how competent the executive was, the business declined and would eventually lose its ability to compete. The state of affairs in China was just like a poorly managed company in which militarists and rebels fought for their own power with slogans of liberty and equality and claims for individual rights overwhelmed moral duties for public benefits. This state of affairs led to a weak China in the international system. Only by shifting the emphasis from people's power to the building of state's power could Chinese in the United States expect to see a strong China. The editorial finally concluded that it was this weak China that led to exclusion, discrimination, deportations, killings, and other kinds of problems that Chinese in the United States suffered.³⁰

      This argument simplified the political situation in China and appealed to the mentality of many Chinese in the United States. Using the management of a business as an example made Chinese World's conservative theory against democracy reasonable, although the editorial neglected to mention that shareholders should have the right to participate in the decision-making process. Who would want to see selfish scrambles for individual power? It was against traditional Chinese values to emphasize individual needs, let alone fight for power at the expense of public safety and social stability, as leaders of the Second Revolution were portrayed as doing. Most American Chinese had longed for a strong China that could bring happiness and prosperity to their families and protect diasporic Chinese. Why would they support selfish rebels who could only bring chaos to China and make China weaker in the international system?

      Chinese World's argument for state's power reflected the Chinatown elite's desire to preserve their power. American Chinatown elite relied on the conservative regime in Beijing for their power and status. Between 1912 and 1914, there were still close connections between the Chinese diplomatic corps in the United States and main Chinatown organizations such as CCBAs and other district associations.³¹ Support for the Yuan government thus amounted to protection of their own powers and positions. Because the search for a modern China had provided a forum where ideas of democracy, equality, and representative government were discussed together with Confucian ideas of social order and the role of government, Chinese World was downplaying the idea of democracy and stressing the virtue of behaving as obedient followers. When Confucius was asked about government, he replied that there is good government "when the emperor is emperor, the minister is minister, the father is father, and the son is son."³² Although Confucius talked about duties for both the ruler and the ruled, Chinese World emphasized the duty for the ruled to be obedient to maintain social order and harmony. This was the essence of the argument for guoquan, or state's power.

      Thus, after its short-lived support for the establishment of a Chinese republic, Chinese World once again became the defender of Confucianism and the advocate of Chinese traditional values among Chinese in the United States. Representing the opinion of the Chinatown elite and riding on the resurgence of the conservative forces in China, this paper played an important role in shaping a new Chinese identity in the United States between 1912 and 1914.

      These two diametrically opposed visions for the building of a strong and modern China did not cover the entire spectrum of opinions among Chinese in the United States. Hopes among American Chinese for a prosperous homeland and desires to represent a great and modern China to the world were expressed by the nonpartisan, pro-reform Chung Sai Yat Po. Believing in nonviolence and opposing partisan politics, Chung Sai Yat Po welcomed Yuan as president of the Chinese republic and praised Sun's yielding the presidency to Yuan as "an unprecedented great act."³³ However, the paper spoke loudly against the proposal of making Confucianism China's state religion. It argued that making Confucianism China's state religion would lead to national disintegration, for there were non-Han nationalities with different belief systems in China. Also, Confucianism as China's state religion would not only threaten the development of liberty, freedom, and equality, which were essential principles of a republic, but would also lead inevitably to the restoration of the monarchy.³⁴

      Chung Sai Yat Po believed that the establishment of the Chinese republic provided an opportunity to develop Christianity in China. It believed that because Christianity advocated equality among all peoples as God's children and universal love, its popularization in China would cure social problems, end political scuffles and factional differences, and build China into a strong and modern republic.³⁵ The paper also argued that Christianity in China would reassure the world that there would be no more anti-Christian uprisings in China and that Chinese people were no longer godless, making China a respected equal in the international community.³⁶

      Chung Sai Yat Po opposed Sun's challenges to President Yuan's power. The paper accepted Yuan as China's president and Yuan's government as China's legitimate government and so considered Sun Yat-sen's anti-Yuan propaganda and actions rebellious, troublemaking activities.³⁷ The paper believed that a republic needed morals as well as laws that all citizens had to obey. Sun's effort to overthrow Yuan, who was elected president by the Chinese Parliament, was unlawful and immoral. The paper compared Sun's anti-Yuan campaign to students' disobeying school rules; both actions warranted reprimands.³⁸

      Chung Sai Yat Po promoted its own version of freedom and equality, and it argued against Sun Yat-sen's principle of people's livelihood. It pointed out that Sun's radical theories of equality caused social turmoil in China when lower-class masses staged strikes to demand equality.³⁹ The paper also argued that socialism would harm China. Socialism promoted class solidarity beyond national boundaries, but what China needed was to develop its nationalism or patriotism to save it from extinction. Instead of socialist principles, what China needed was family values and Christian morals to act as a check against political corruption and social evils.⁴⁰

      Chung Sai Yat Po argued that the Republic of China should develop laissez-faire capitalism. Right after the establishment of the Chinese republic, the paper called on all Chinese capitalists to pool their money to develop China's wool industry.⁴¹ It was assumed that republican citizens would discard the traditional long gowns made of silk and adopt Western-style clothes that had to be made from wool. Because most of the wool consumed in China at the time was imported, China should develop its own wool industry to be self-sufficient. Later on, the paper complained that China's market was still filled with foreign goods because Chinese capitalists were too conservative to invest in the development of their own national industry. It called on all Chinese with money to help build China's modern economy.⁴² Helping to develop China's national industry was one of the important ways to show patriotism. The paper explicitly pointed out that patriotism started with efforts to develop national industry and consume national products.⁴³

      Besides encouraging China's development by appealing to its readers' patriotism, the paper saw a direct relationship between the lack of economic development and the image American mainstream society had of Chinese in the United States. Because China did not have a developed manufacturing industry to produce high-quality products, Chinese in the United States could display and sell only unrefined products in their stores. Such goods made Chinese appear backward and uncivilized.⁴⁴

      Chung Sai Yat Po also believed that as part of the process of developing laissez-faire capitalism, China needed to develop a modern educational system. In traditional China, schools put emphasis on reading and memorizing classics and on bringing up an educated elite while keeping the majority ignorant and obedient. A modern educational system should not only teach children to be responsible citizens but also teach general knowledge to all citizens. The system should include schools that would train people to be professionals and businessmen fit for the modern world.⁴⁵

      Representing a growing consciousness as modern Chinese or American Chinese, Chung Sai Yat Po advocated reforming certain Chinese cultural practices and encouraged a degree of accommodation to American mainstream society. It criticized traditional Chinese wedding ceremonies, which involved wasteful banquets that often put sponsoring families deeply in debt. Instead, the paper encouraged wedding ceremonies performed in churches, where newlyweds received blessings from church ministers.⁴⁶ It also argued against early and arranged marriages on the grounds that those outdated practices allowed Chinese women to be treated as chattels. Such practices should be discarded in the modern republic.⁴⁷ The paper even insisted on getting rid of the Chinese lunar calendar and Chinese New Year celebrations.⁴⁸

      Advocating Chinese "assimilation" ⁴⁹ in the United States, Chung Sai Yat Po encouraged American Chinese to try to get closer to the American mainstream society. It argued that the fact that many Chinese did not speak English and still wore traditional Chinese clothing created a gap between the mainstream society and Chinese communities. To the American mainstream society, tong wars, opium dens, and gambling houses were distinctive features of American Chinese communities. Lack of family life and lack of religious faith made the Chinese appear unwilling to be assimilated.⁵⁰ All these problems should be remedied to turn the Chinese into republican citizens and to present the Chinese to the mainstream society as people of a great civilization. The paper argued that the assimilation of different nationalities in a country would bring peace to that country, and the assimilation of different races would bring peace to the world.⁵¹

      Unlike the other two papers, which represented opposite visions of a new China and a new Chinese identity, Chung Sai Yat Po reflected a vision shaped by diasporic experience and environment as well as by Chinese cultural heritage. Chung Sai Yat Po's vision pointed out the way in which a distinctive Chinese American identity was taking shape. Yet in the short run this diasporic vision ran against the prevailing value placed on preserving Chinese cultural practices among Chinese in the United States.⁵² However, Chung Sai Yat Po's opposition to radical theories and to continuing revolution coincided with the opinions of Chinese World and the desire for peace and order prevalent among Chinese in the United States.

Political Identifications

      In mid-1913, Young China issued an editorial analyzing why most Chinese in the United States supported Yuan Shikai while the GMD waged the anti-Yuan Second Revolution. According to this editorial, some Chinese supported Yuan because they lionized him as an omnipotent person for China, some mistook all GMD members as selfish seekers of benefits and power, many suffered from lack of education and were thus followers and worshipers of Confucian scholars and of people of age and fame, and still others thought that Yuan's violation of the laws should be punished through legal channels and that there was no need to resort to military means.⁵³

      Young China obviously was disappointed, yet it made an accurate assessment of the majority of the Chinese in the United States. Most of the Chinese in the United States came from China as adults, carrying with them a complete set of Chinese traditions and cultural values. The American Chinatowns they had been living in, which were isolated from American mainstream society and run by Confucian scholars and conservative Chinese business leaders, reinforced these traditions and values. Their support of the 1911 Revolution was, as one scholar argued, the result of "a taught nationalism"⁵⁴ rather than a fundamental change in outlook or a break with their traditional identity. They were told by nationalist leaders from China that only a strong China could protect them and that only by overthrowing the Manchus could the Chinese nation be saved and become strong. After the successful Wuchang Uprising in China, which led to the death of the Qing dynasty, most Chinese celebrated the establishment of the Republic of China, hoping it would restore China's greatness, bring peace and happiness to their families in China, and extend protection to Chinese in the United States.

      What American Chinese hoped for did not materialize. The new Republic of China was quickly plunged into domestic turmoil, and it failed to extend protection to the Chinese in the United States. Furthermore, the conservative result of the 1911 Revolution enabled American Chinatown elite to maintain their social control. In traditional Chinese society, members of the elite class were cultural models whose behaviors were to be emulated and whose opinions were to be followed. The fact that the elite of the American Chinatowns identified with the Yuan government therefore influenced the opinion of the majority of the Chinese in the United States in the period between 1912 and 1914.

      Although Young China's analysis of the lack of support for the Second Revolution from Chinese in the United States was generally accurate, it lacked perception. The principle of people's livelihood, or socialism, advocated by the revolutionary GMD and expounded by Young China, did not speak to the needs and desires of most Chinese in the United States. Whether or not they were successful businessmen, most of them aimed for a better life for themselves and for their families. The concept of private ownership of property was essential to securing their goals. They longed for peace and stability in China, where many of their families lived, and refused to support the violence and destruction another antigovernment revolution would bring.

      Most Chinese in the United States quickly shifted their support from Sun Yat-sen to Yuan Shikai. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco, which had been among the last to express support for Sun and the 1911 Revolution, was the first organization to cable to Yuan, after Sun yielded the presidential position to him in order to unify China without further military conflict, recognizing him as China's president.⁵⁵ At the same time, the CCBA issued an official notice to all Chinese communities in the United States to celebrate the unification of China.⁵⁶ Responding to the CCBA's notice, Chinese throughout the United States ignored Young China's rejection of Yuan as president and celebrated the unified Republic of China. Even the Tongyuanhui, the Native Sons of the Golden State, the organization for American-born Chinese who at that time generally were young and had received or were receiving an American education, celebrated the unification of China with a banquet.⁵⁷

      The Zhigongtang, which had turned against the Tongmenghui, changed the name of their organization to the Chinese Republic Association. By mid-1912, the new organization had openly committed its support to the Chinese community leadership in the United States for the common interest of all Chinese. It had also declared its support to the Yuan government in China.⁵⁸

      The shift of support from Sun to Yuan was accelerated by the Tongmenghui's own actions and problems. According to Chinese traditional values, competing for power and position was shameful. When the revolutionary government was established in Nanjing, many Tongmenghui members in the United States went back to China, and some of them were appointed to positions in the new government.⁵⁹ By the end of January 1912, so many leaders had gone to China that the Tongmenghui in the United States was struggling to fill its vacant positions with new people.⁶⁰ When the Chinatown elite and Zhigongtang leaders pointed out that the new government was not being fair by appointing only Tongmenghui members to government positions, Young China carried an editorial reasoning that because Tongmenghui members had rendered their services to the establishment of the new government, they deserved the rewards offered to them.⁶¹ Such an argument went against the grain of Chinese traditional ethics that emphasized living and working for the good of society, not for individual gratification.⁶²

      The Tongmenghui lost support not only among ordinary Chinese in the United States but also among its former enthusiastic supporters. Wu Yiping, a Tongmenghui leader and an important editor of Young China in 1911, disappeared from the paper as an editorial writer. He later explained in the newspaper that he was engaged in organizing a business enterprise and did not have time to work for the Tongmenghui.⁶³ Li Shinan, one of the founders of Young China and of the Tongmenghui, resigned from his editorial position at the paper.⁶⁴ Wang Chaowu, another founder and the managing editor of the paper, died of gas poison inhalation at home at age 36 in August 1912.⁶⁵ Young China was so weakened that the Tongmenghui had to send Ma Lixiang from China to act as editor-in-chief.⁶⁶ Earlier in 1912, Young China had had to require all Tongmenghui members to pay a $4 "newspaper fee" to help tide the paper over.⁶⁷ Apparently the paper as a business enterprise was not getting enough support from Chinese businesses.

      Then the exposure of a Tongmenghui leader's embezzlement further accelerated the decline of credibility of the Tongmenghui among Chinese in the United States. Tan Yuelou was the former Tongmenghui secretary and cashier. Tongmenghui members had to pay "a two-dollar basic membership fee," "a four-dollar newspaper fee," "a ten-dollar military fee," and "a certain amount of monthly dues."⁶⁸ There were also donations and contributions from members, supporters, and sympathizers. In September 1912, it was revealed that Tan, who was secretary and cashier from June 15 to August 17, had embezzled an estimated $5,000 from the money collected by the Tongmenghui. When he refused to return the money, the police were called, a warrant was issued, and he was arrested.⁶⁹ An announcement was made in Young China, calling all those who had given money to Tan to report to the Tongmenghui with their receipts to determine the exact amount Tan had embezzled.⁷⁰

      While the Tongmenghui was losing supporters, a new political party was introduced to the Chinese in the United States. Named the People's Society, this new party was initiated by some former Tongmenghui members who disagreed with Sun over the party's political platforms. Headed by Li Yuanhong, vice president of the Republic of China, with the stated purpose of consolidating and building the republic, the People's Society attracted immediate attention from Chinese in the United States. Both Chinese World and Chung Sai Yat Po praised the society as "the political party for the new China" and a party organized by "men of noble characters" and "for the common good of all Chinese people."⁷¹ An American branch of the People's Society was organized immediately, with the Chinese Consul General in San Francisco as president and Wu Panzhao, owner of Chung Sai Yat Po, as vice president.

      It must be pointed out that the selection of the president and vice president of the People's Society was very important. The Consul General was considered the official representative of all Chinese in the United States and the liaison between the Chinese government and the American Chinese. His selection meant that the society was a legitimate organization endorsed by the Chinese government. Wu Panzhao, a representative of all Chinese Christians, was more importantly one of the few people widely respected among all Chinese in the United States. His selection meant that the People's Society was an association that respectable and knowledgeable Chinese with good morals and patriotic feelings could join. The People's Society, established and supported by many Chinese while the revolutionary Tongmenghui/GMD was losing its support as a political party, signified that most Chinese in the United States at the time identified with Yuan as China's leader and considered Sun and his party troublemakers.

      The close identification of American Chinese communities with the new Chinese republic was highlighted by the fact that these communities sent representatives to the parliament in China. In 1909 the Qing court approved a nationality law that declared that Chinese residing overseas would be considered Chinese nationals.⁷² The new Chinese government not only kept this law but also allowed Chinese on the American continent and Hawaii to send six representatives to Beijing, where three would be elected parliamentary senators. The process of selecting six representatives attracted much attention among Chinese in the United States. Chinese World editorialized that such a representative should have political and legal knowledge, should be familiar with the conditions in which overseas Chinese lived and with the situation in China, and should be a learned man who spoke the official language in China.⁷³ By listing such qualities, Chinese World was campaigning for Liang Chaojie, a Confucian scholar who was one of the best students of Kang Youwei⁷⁴ and also the writer of the editorial that gave rise to the Ningyang-Chung Sai Yat Po dispute of early 1911.

      Chinese World's list of qualities obviously reflected its emphasis on Confucianism and its role as a defender of a more traditional Chinese identity. Chung Sai Yat Po did not agree. According to Chung Sai Yat Po, a representative should have a good knowledge of American laws, be familiar with conditions of Chinese in the United States, speak good English, be a good diplomat and a humanitarian, live in the United States, and be of extraordinary character.⁷⁵ This paper apparently was recommending somebody like Wu Panzhao. Yet there was no evidence that Wu ran as a candidate. The qualities listed by the paper signified the changed criteria for being Chinese among some American Chinese.

      Young China did not come up with any criteria for such a representative, nor did the Tongmenghui recommend any of its members for candidacy. American Chinese businessmen in San Francisco, through the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, elected Kuang Yaojie, president of the CCBA in San Francisco; in New York, Zhu Zhaoxin, a student from China, was elected.⁷⁶ The Zhigongtang, under the new name Chinese Republic Association, sent its own representative, Tang Qiongchang, to Beijing. Tang was the managing editor of Ta Tung Yat Po, the newspaper of the Chinese Republic Association. Chinese in Canada, Cuba, and Hawaii also elected representatives. In Beijing, Tang, the Zhigongtang representative, Zhu, the student from New York, and Lu Xin, the representative from Hawaii, were finally selected as senators representing all Chinese in the Americas and Hawaii.⁷⁷

      Thus, by the end of 1912, the identification of most Chinese in the United States with the new China under Yuan Shikai was complete. This identification showed the strength of Chinese traditional identity and the political commitment of Chinese in the United States to the republic as the best hope for building a modern China. The combination promised something to everyone. For the gentry elite, Yuan represented a less dramatic break from Chinese traditional culture than Sun. For the business elite, Yuan promised to develop China's economy as the nation's first priority.⁷⁸ For people such as Wu Panzhao, who had accepted laissez-faire capitalism and American middle-class ideology, Yuan represented a unified China. Peace and unity were of utmost importance for the new China to develop capitalism and a modern society with a middle-class backbone. And for most ordinary Chinese, although their Chinese traditional values determined that they would follow the elite, their desire for peace in China and their belief in the evils of socialism distanced them from the radical Tongmenghui/GMD.

      For all these reasons, most Chinese in the United States opposed the Second Revolution Sun Yat-sen led against the Yuan government. Chinese World and Chung Sai Yat Po, serving as opinion leaders and sources of information for Chinese in the United States, spoke loudly against the Second Revolution, advised readers to stand behind the Yuan government, and reported opposition to the Revolution in China and among Chinese in diaspora. Both papers believed that a second revolution would only divide China.⁷⁹ Chinese World even claimed that Huang Xing, who took command of the anti-Yuan armies in the South, was fanning rebellion to achieve his selfish ambition of becoming China's president. The paper thus urged the Yuan government to take actions to suppress such a rebellion in its embryonic stage and called on all patriotic Chinese in the United States to stand up against revolutionaries who had become "common enemies of the four hundred million Chinese."⁸⁰ On the other hand, Chung Sai Yat Po pointed out that Sun was an idealist and Yuan was a practical leader for China.⁸¹ Because most of Sun's ideas, such as his radical notion of absolute equality embodied in the principle of people's livelihood, could not be implemented in China, Yuan was a more suitable person for China at the time. It advised all Chinese to support Yuan and his government.⁸²

      The two papers also defended Yuan's actions as being in the interests of the Chinese republic. According to Chinese World, Yuan's loan of approximately $100 million from a consortium of foreign banks was the only way to help tide China over its financial difficulties.⁸³ Chinese businessmen throughout the world, from Canton to Honolulu, from Tokyo to Hanoi, from North America to South America, had all cabled support to the Yuan government, Chung Sai Yat Po reported. Yet, the paper added, businessmen were not the only Chinese supporting the government. Overseas Chinese workers, through organizations such as the Zhigongtang, also expressed support to the Yuan government. Many nonradical Chinese people in the media and many young Chinese students also stood firmly behind the government.⁸⁴

      Whereas Yuan got overwhelming support, Sun was portrayed by Chinese World as a "corrupt traitor" to the Chinese nation. This conservative newspaper accused Sun of having printed military bonds through which he made 400,000 Chinese yuan, roughly U.S.$252,000, for himself.⁸⁵ He then used the money to buy Western-style mansions in Macao and luxurious houses with gardens in Kowloon, Hong Kong for himself and his new wife; the bonds in the hands of many ordinary Chinese people were only scraps of paper.⁸⁶ Even more damaging was this paper's story of Sun's "traitorous action." When Sun was provisional president of the Nanjing government, the story said, he gave the Japanese the privilege of running a national bank in China.⁸⁷ Whereas the first accusation aroused anger among Chinese who still held the bonds they bought to support the 1911 Revolution, the second accusation tapped into the American Chinese fear of China being controlled by foreigners.

      Despite Young China's argument that there was enough evidence to prove that Yuan was the instigator of Song Jiaoren's murder and that Yuan had become a dictator by ignoring the parliament in obtaining the loan,⁸⁸ the majority of Chinese in the United States did not support the Second Revolution.⁸⁹ The few Chinese in the United States who supported the Second Revolution apparently realized that ordinary fundraising for the military action in China would not be fruitful. They came up with the idea of collecting money through a game sponsored by the National Salvation Society, an organization not explicitly aimed at supporting the revolution but at saving China. Organizers and enthusiasts would donate articles, and the society would sell 10,000 tickets for a dollar each. When all 10,000 tickets were sold, a drawing of lots would be held. Two hundred fifty lucky people would be rewarded with the donated articles, which included rings, pins, watches, pens, books, and ties. The $10,000 then would be sent to China to support the anti-Yuan military effort.⁹⁰ The society had a hard time selling tickets, for the drawing of lots was not held until September, and Yuan had suppressed the rebellion in China in August.

      The lack of support for the Second Revolution was also revealed by the fact that even former Tongmenghui members both in the United States and in China spoke out against it. Ma Xiaojin, a former Tongmenghui member and editorial writer for Young China in 1911, and other former revolutionaries believed that the GMD committed political suicide by waging the Second Revolution.⁹¹ When a new political party, the Progressive Party, was organized in China with China's vice president Li Yuanhong and Constitutionalist leader Liang Qichao as leaders for the purpose of defending republicanism from conservative bureaucratic forces and rebellious radicals,⁹² many GMD branches throughout the United States cabled Beijing to join the Progressive Party or simply to change their present organizational name to the new party name.⁹³ Young China was dismayed that within two weeks of its organization, the new party established offices in San Francisco.⁹⁴

      The response to the Second Revolution revealed that most Chinese in the United States preferred to see a unified and peaceful China. Many Chinatown organizations in the United States cabled the Beijing government, asking it to suppress the secessionists in Guangdong and preserve the republic in China,⁹⁵ to restore order to China after the military defeat of the rebellious forces,⁹⁶ and to execute, on behalf of all people under heaven, the leaders of the Second Revolution, who "were currying favor with Japan and dividing up China."⁹⁷

      Supporting China's unification was one way Chinese in the United States showed their continuing close identification with their home country. Another way was through their commitment to defending China's independence and sovereignty. When President Yuan approached foreign banks for a loan to tide the new republic over its financial difficulties, the foreign banks demanded in return the right to oversee China's financial matters. Because this would encroach on the new republic's independence, Chinese in the United States immediately supported a proposal to collect money directly from Chinese citizens. All three papers carried supportive editorials advising their readers to donate or lend money to the Chinese government.⁹⁸ The Tongmenghui, the Zhigongtang, all Chinese churches, and Chinese World immediately started to collect donations from Chinese in the United States.⁹⁹ When the Citizen Donation Bureau, organized by the CCBA, opened its office, all the money collected by different organizations was given to the bureau. Two CCBA directors, Li Baozhan and Kuang Renrui, were awarded "medals of patriotism" for supporting the citizen donation by the Chinese government in Beijing.¹⁰⁰

      When, in the latter part of 1912, Russia formally committed itself to the defense of Mongolian autonomy, Chinese in the United States were again united in demanding government action against foreign encroachment. A proposal was made among American Chinese to raise funds for military preparedness against the Russians. This proposal was supported by the three Chinese-language newspapers.¹⁰¹ The CCBA again set up an office to collect money. This time the CCBA required all adult Chinese to donate at least U.S.$10. Those returning to China had to give the $10 donation before they could leave.¹⁰² However, the Yuan government made compromises with Russia for a peaceful settlement of the Mongolia question.¹⁰³ In July 1913, the CCBA announced that the money collected for military preparedness against Russia in Mongolia would be kept in a bank for later emergencies in Mongolia.¹⁰⁴

      Identification with different political forces in China and with China as a nation revealed the political ideology, the strength of traditional Chinese values, and the commitment to an independent and peaceful China among Chinese in the United States. After the establishment of the Republic of China, Chinese in the United States strongly desired peace and development in China. With no fundamental break from the framework of traditional Chinese identity, most Chinese, after a brief period of supporting the Revolution of 1911, continued to accept social and political control exercised by the gentry-business elite. This combination of prevailing mentality and continued elite control shaped the political orientation of American Chinatown politics, which opposed radical ideas such as socialism and antiestablishment actions such as the Second Revolution. Although debates over politics in China revealed overwhelming opposition among most Chinese in the United States to radical ideas and rebellious actions, financial support for the defense of China's independence and sovereignty went beyond factional politics, demonstrating the breadth of American Chinese identification with China as a nation in the period between 1912 and 1914.

Cultural Identifications

      James Clifford has argued that "diasporic cultural forms can never, in practice, be exclusively nationalist"; instead, they practice accommodation with and resistance to norms of their host countries.¹⁰⁵ This applies to Chinese in the United States between 1912 and 1914. Although Chinese in the United States kept close identification with the government in China and supported efforts to defend China's sovereignty and independence, they made accommodations to the norms of American mainstream society. However, accommodation did not mean abandoning traditional Chinese cultural values and practices. Instead, accommodation to norms of American mainstream society was combined with the continuation of traditional Chinese cultural practices to form a transnational cultural identity among Chinese in the United States.

      It was the Chinese Christians, represented by Chung Sai Yat Po, who served as a bridge between the mainstream culture and American Chinatown culture. Before the 1911 Revolution, Chinese Christians were unable to play such a role. In China's history, Christianity had been regarded as part of Western imperialism, and there had been many antiforeign uprisings that involved attacks on missionaries, churches, and Christian converts. However, the establishment of the Republic of China made Chinese Christians both bold and proud in their identity as Christians.¹⁰⁶ They believed that the adoption of Christian beliefs not only would make Western powers accept and respect China as an equal¹⁰⁷ but would also help end prejudice and discrimination against Chinese in the United States, for prejudice and discrimination were believed to be derived mainly from unfamiliar Chinese beliefs and customs.¹⁰⁸

      Although Chung Sai Yat Po argued that China should popularize Christianity, it obviously realized the limitations of its impact on China as a nation. However, the paper believed that Chinese in the United States were windows through which the American mainstream society viewed China. Out of patriotism and a sense of mission to improve the Chinese image, in the period between 1912 and 1914, Chung Sai Yat Po and Chinese Christians took several actions; some were welcomed by all Chinese in the United States, and others were rejected. These events inform us of the process underlying the formation of a transnational Chinese culture in the United States.

      Motivated by the new republic's constitutional guarantee of religious freedom in China, Chinese Christian leaders in the United States proposed to organize a Chinese Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in San Francisco, the city with the largest concentration of American Chinese at the time and the port of entry and departure for all Chinese in the United States. According to the proposal, the association would help young Chinese learn the morals and skills they needed to contribute to their mother country and would provide recreational facilities to Chinese, who did not have access to such facilities because of racial prejudice and segregation. The proposal also mentioned that the association would teach American-born Chinese the Chinese language and Chinese culture to bring up a generation with both Chinese and English language skills.¹⁰⁹

      This proposal received support from all groups of Chinese in the United States. Within half a year, the first Chinese YMCA was officially opened in San Francisco. Chinese World, representing the Confucian-traditionalists and the Chinatown elite, congratulated the association on its official opening, hoping that it would provide facilities for all Chinese to receive some education, but more importantly, the paper encouraged the association to educate the younger generation so that they might grow up willing and able to contribute to the development of a modern and strong China. ¹¹⁰ The Tongmenghui also sent congratulations to the association on its official opening.¹¹¹

      Encouraged by the enthusiastic support expressed by various groups, Chinese churches immediately sent representatives to other Chinese communities in the United States to raise funds to construct a YMCA building. The Chinese consul general in San Francisco issued an announcement asking all Chinese in the United States to donate money for the building. In the announcement, the consul general said that the YMCA was organized to promote general interests and that the completed building would bring "unlimited benefits" to young Chinese.¹¹²

      Chung Sai Yat Po saw even more significance in the establishment of the YMCA. The paper argued that Chinese suffered discrimination in the United States partly because they lacked education, looked sick, and lived immoral and filthy lives. It then concluded that the Chinese YMCA would help remedy these problems and improve the Chinese image and status.¹¹³ Such a negative portrayal revealed that stereotypes prevailing among the mainstream society had affected the paper.¹¹⁴ At the same time, the actions advocated by the paper demonstrated a willingness to accommodate to the norms of the mainstream society.

      It is difficult to say whether most Chinese in the United States accepted Chung Sai Yat Po's opinion, but no Chinese rejected the idea of creating educational and recreational opportunities. The idea of improving moral education through Christian beliefs evidently was not as acceptable, for there was no sudden increase of Chinese Christians in the United States around this time.

      The Chinese YMCA, which drew financial support from churches and from Chinese businessmen who had converted to Christianity, sponsored all kinds of activities aimed at bringing Chinese closer to American mainstream society. Such activities included lectures introducing American ways of life, such as cooking and housekeeping, and plays advocating valor, martial spirit, civil rights, and patriotism. Together with the Customs Reform Society (Gailiang fengsu hui), a church-sponsored organization, the association put on plays encouraging Chinese to get rid of "bad habits," such as opium smoking and gambling, and to learn "good habits," such as keeping a clean and tidy appearance.¹¹⁵

      The establishment of the Chinese YMCA, whose activities were supported as well as attended by various groups of Chinese, signified some Chinese accommodation to the norms of the mainstream society. However, such accommodation was highly selective. Most Chinese seemed willing to accept new norms and practices in addition to but not instead of their own fundamental Chinese values.

      One of the most important identifiers of being true Chinese around 1910 was the knowledge of Chinese rituals and traditional festivals. Myron Cohen, a scholar of Chinese anthropology, observed that Chinese tend to put emphasis on "proper behavior rather than on proper ideas" when they judge whether someone is truly Chinese.¹¹⁶ Many Chinese rituals, such as remembering the dead and making offerings to the Kitchen God, and all Chinese traditional festivals were based on the Chinese lunar calendar. Although the Republic of China declared the observance of the Western calendar for official businesses and political activities, the lunar calendar continued to be the record of time for Chinese to carry on Chinese cultural traditions.

      Thus, the debate between Chung Sai Yat Po and the Recreational Society for Reading Couplets,¹¹⁷ an association of China-educated people who wanted to preserve traditional Chinese culture, over the observation of the lunar calendar tested the extent to which the majority of American Chinese were willing to abandon Chinese traditions. Continuing its advocacy for reforming Chinese traditional practices and customs, Chung Sai Yat Po argued that the lunar calendar was no longer fit for modern life in the United States. The paper pointed out that the lunar calendar was designed with superstitious ideas about so-called predetermined fate, thus providing grounds for superstitious practices such as fortune telling and witchcraft. Such superstitions caused a nation of people to depend on various gods and goddesses and to suffer from lack of motivation for a better life. The paper also noted that the lunar calendar marked many holidays that kept people from work. The celebration of the Spring Festival, known more commonly as the Chinese New Year, was attacked as the worst example. For twelve days, everything ground to a halt, Chung Sai Yat Po asserted. Such celebrations bred laziness and contributed to the slow pace of life among Chinese, the paper concluded. The paper argued that the lunar calendar, which was at the root of China's backwardness, should be abandoned and Chinese in the United States, who had been "living in a civilized country and breathing in civilized air," should be the first to stop observing it.¹¹⁸

      This was quite an attack on Chinese traditional culture. The language used in this editorial resembled that used by iconoclastic nationalists in movements such as the May Fourth Movement, the Superstition Destruction Movement (1928-29), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) in China. What Chung Sai Yat Po attacked as superstition—popular religious activities such as fortune telling, worshipping various gods and goddesses, and ancestral cults—was an essential component of the traditional cultural framework with which all Chinese identified. What Chung Sai Yat Po described as laziness-breeding traditional festivals was a significant element of Chinese cultural heritage.

      In response to Chung Sai Yat Po's attacks, Chinese World carried a series of articles written by the Recreational Society for Reading Couplets. The Recreational Society argued that the lunar calendar reflected the wisdom of Chinese culture and civilization and so could not be dismissed as outdated. The society pointed out that the way the Chinese lunar calendar marked the movements of the universe and seasonal changes on the earth remained an unsurpassed miracle. It favored the observation of both the Western calendar and the Chinese lunar calendar.¹¹⁹ The society dismissed the accusation that the lunar calendar reflected superstitious ideas. It pointed out that such accusers were "slaves of western countries and dogs of westerners."¹²⁰

      Chung Sai Yat Po apparently did not want to be accused of attacking Chinese culture and civilization. It made a rather weak counterargument by pointing out that the so-called Chinese culture and civilization the Recreational Society tried to defend included Manchu rule over China. By favoring the observation of the lunar calendar, the society was in essence advocating the restoration of Manchu rule in China, the paper said.¹²¹

      In this debate, the Recreational Society spoke for more Chinese than Chung Sai Yat Po. Chinese throughout the United States expressed support for the society by making donations. The names of the donors and the amounts were published in Chinese World. The society in turn gave all the donations to the Chinese government via the CCBA as financial contributions to the building and consolidation of the Chinese republic.¹²² The society came out of the debate not only as a defender of Chinese culture and civilization but also as patriotic to the Chinese republic. Chung Sai Yat Po lost this debate but also made enemies among Chinese businessmen.¹²³ In the end, Wu Panzhao, the owner of Chung Sai Yat Po, went to a representative of the Recreational Society seeking a peaceful end to the debate.¹²⁴

      Chung Sai Yat Po's failure to abolish the lunar calendar not only demonstrated American Chinese willingness to preserve Chinese cultural heritage but also reflected the business orientation of American Chinese communities. Most Chinese business owners in the United States insisted on preserving the Chinese lunar calendar and observing Chinese traditional festivals. Not only was it part of their cultural heritage, but Chinese traditional festivals also brought them business. For instance, for the Qing Ming Festival, or the day to remember the dead, Chinese families bought food, incense, paper money, and other related items as offerings. The Mid-Autumn Festival was an occasion for family reunions with abundant good food and a seasonal gift exchange of moon cakes. Standing above all other festivals was the Chinese New Year, which was celebrated with many gift exchanges, visits between relatives and friends, entertainment, and banquets. It had been the American Chinatown tradition to ask local police and authorities for permission to hold street fairs and set off firecrackers and fireworks to celebrate the Chinese New Year.

      The willingness to preserve the Chinese cultural heritage and the interests of businessmen led to continued observance of the lunar calendar and celebration of Chinese traditional festivals. Despite an ambivalent decision made by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the general organization for Chinese businesses in the United States, about whether the Chinese New Year should be observed,¹²⁵ the Chinese New Year of 1913 was celebrated in American Chinatowns. The CCBA publicly announced that the Chinese New Year would be observed and celebrated in all American Chinatowns, whereas the Chinese Christian churches announced a decision not to observe or celebrate it.¹²⁶ Yet as Ta Tung Yat Po, the newspaper of the Chinese Republic Association, reported, both consumers and business owners in Chinatowns demanded the observation of the festival, and the CCBA was only promoting the common interest.¹²⁷

      Chung Sai Yat Po's failure to stop the observation of the Chinese lunar calendar and traditional Chinese festivals indicated that most Chinese in the United States did not see Chinese traditional culture as a barrier to progress or modernization. Yet as a people living in diaspora, they were willing to learn to accommodate to some norms of the mainstream society. However, they would not make such accommodation at the expense of their own cultural heritage. Their refusal to abandon the lunar calendar and the Chinese traditional festivals showed the strength of Chinese cultural identity among most Chinese in the United States. As will be seen later, this strong Chinese cultural identity was maintained even when China itself waged anti-Confucius and antitradition political movements.¹²⁸

Emergence of an Ethnic Minority Consciousness

      Accommodation to the norms of American mainstream society and continued observation of the lunar calendar and traditional Chinese festivals demonstrated both "routes and roots" in the construction of a transnational cultural identity.¹²⁹ This cultural identity formed in an environment of racial discrimination. American Chinese in 1912-14 fought against legislative and administrative attempts to further limit Chinese immigration into the United States. By evoking the democratic institutions of a republican system and the American Constitution to protect their rights and by organizing for the protection of American citizenship privileges, Chinese demonstrated their consciousness as an integral part of the American nation. The appearance of this ethnic minority consciousness also lay in the development of family-oriented communities and in the scale of involvement in activities for Chinese American rights.

      Recent studies show that Chinese in the United States struggled against discriminatory immigration laws and practices in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and contributed to the formation of American immigration policy.¹³⁰ Most such studies detailed Chinese efforts in the American court system against racist practices within the framework of laws already enacted by the federal and state legislatures. Between 1912 and 1914, Chinese fought to prevent anti-Chinese bills from becoming laws. This change marked the beginning of an endeavor aimed at forming families in the United States and acting as viable participants in the American political system under the Chinese exclusion laws.

      The Chinese American population after 1910 began to take on a new look. Being mostly urban-based and with many engaged in businesses, American Chinese communities witnessed the growth of two other significant characteristics: an increasing number of Chinese women and the appearance of a second generation. According to U.S. Census data, while the total American Chinese population dropped from 71,531 in 1910 to 61,639 in 1920, the female number grew from 4,675 to 7,748 within the decade. Those under age 24 made up 24.4 percent of the total Chinese population in the United States in 1920. By 1930, the American Chinese female population had reached 15,152, having almost doubled the figure in 1920 and more than tripled that of 1910. The number of American Chinese under age 24 was 34.6 percent of the total Chinese American population in 1930.¹³¹

      The growth of the Chinese American population resulted in part from an opportunity created by the San Francisco earthquake and the ensuing fire. The exclusion law of 1882 not only prevented Chinese laborers from entering but also denied the right of entry to wives and children of Chinese laborers remaining in the United States. The earthquake and the fire destroyed almost all records of the San Francisco population, giving Chinese residents the opportunity to claim American birth. As American citizens, they were entitled to bring their wives over, and their children born in China were derivative American citizens according to American laws and were therefore entitled to enter the United States.

      In addition, because children and wives of Chinese merchants, who belonged to the exempt classes, were allowed to enter, some Chinese also resorted to deceptive ways of forging business connections. Some bribed merchants to list them as partners or bought shares in order to be listed as partners; others presented authorities with false papers, thus becoming "paper merchants." According to one immigration commissioner, "A number of the stores in the cities are organized ... just to give the Chinese a chance to be a merchant."¹³²

      The unstable situation in the wake of the 1911 Revolution and the changed view of woman's position in China also helped create a new push factor for immigration to the United States. Political, social, and economic disorders in China threatened everyday life of family members who were still in China and dimmed the future for their children. The search for a modern China in general and the 1911 Revolution in particular undermined the traditional framework for Chinese society, which restricted women to their homes. "New women" were expected to be "educated mothers and productive citizens" in the development of a modern China.¹³³ More and more Chinese American men tried to bring their wives to the United States, where they helped raise children and assisted in family businesses.

      As a result of the rising number of women and the opportunity for China-born children to enter the United States as American citizens, the makeup of the Chinese American population changed greatly in the first three decades of the twentieth century. In the years between 1908 and 1924, the year in which the passage of another immigration act stopped wives of American citizens of Chinese ancestry from entering the United States, 6,623 Chinese women and girls entered the United States.¹³⁴ While the total Chinese population in the United States dropped from 89,863 in 1900 to 74,954 in 1930, the number of American citizens of Chinese ancestry more than tripled, from 9,010 to 30,868.¹³⁵ The quick increase of the number of American citizens of Chinese ancestry stemmed from two sources: the presence of Chinese wives and the entrance of children born in China.

      The number of Chinese children and wives entering the United States concerned American immigration officers and lawmakers. Immigration authorities noted in 1909 that "the second generation ... is coming forward in such numbers the matter becomes more grave than ever."¹³⁶ They suspected that some Chinese who claimed to be children of American citizens of Chinese ancestry and of merchants in the United States for immigration purposes forged the connection. Their suspicion was well founded, for some Chinese claimed having fathered more children than they actually had and then sold the empty slots for a profit, and others entered the United States by forging merchant status or claiming to be sons of merchants. ¹³⁷ As an effort to stop "paper sons," a term referring to Chinese who used the name on the document they purchased to enter the United States, from coming in, detailed interrogations were conducted before a Chinese was permitted to land in hopes of finding discrepancies between narratives given by the father and the incoming child, in most cases a son. Although interrogations prevented some from entering, most Chinese were well prepared and survived the long and detailed interrogations.

      The administrative measure was then aided by an attempt to further legislate against Chinese immigration. In August 1911, William P. Dillingham, a senator from Vermont, introduced a bill "to regulate the immigration of aliens and the residence of aliens in the United States" in the Senate Committee on Immigration. Better known as "the literacy bill" aimed at preventing unwanted immigrants, it specified that for Chinese, only the exempt categories, which included merchants and their legal wives and children, were admissible. The bill then inserted the following phrase: "But such persons or their legal wives and foreign-born children who fail to maintain in the United States a status or occupation placing them within the excepted classes, shall be deemed to be in the United States contrary to law, and shall be subject to deportation."¹³⁸ The bill was passed in the Senate on April 19, 1912.

      The particular provision of the Dillingham Bill apparently was designed to keep American Chinese under surveillance after entrance and to give immigration authorities the right to search and check Chinese residents in the United States. The specific language of the provision targeted the merchant class, which had been the main pillar in sustaining Chinese presence and had started to form families in the United States. If the bill became law, the effect would be devastating to American Chinese communities. Some would fail to prove or to sustain merchant status in real life. In case of a divorce or the death of a merchant, the entire family would be deported.

      Reaction to the bill from Chinese in the United States was strong. Both Chinese World and Chung Sai Yat Po reported that the Senate had passed a bill aimed at "preventing Chinese from changing status after their arrival in the United States and deporting all dependents of a Chinese merchant in the United States once the merchant dies."¹³⁹ All Chinese rose above their subidentities, such as Christian, GMD, or Confucianist, and demonstrated ethnic solidarity in their efforts to stop the bill. Chinese businessmen sent representatives to Washington, D.C. to see China's diplomatic envoy (there was not yet an ambassador from the newly established republic) and decided to hire a special lawyer to prevent the bill from becoming law. They cabled President Yuan, the Beijing Parliament, and even the governor of Guangdong, asking them to negotiate with the U.S. government to stop the bill. The CCBA, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the Native Sons of the Golden State (NSGS) cabled the American president and the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. All Chinese in the United States helped to prevent the bill from passing by donating money to cover the expenses of the effort. The NSGS, whose members had the right to vote in the United States, contacted congressional representatives of their respective districts, persuading them to vote against the bill.¹⁴⁰

      To the relief of Chinese in the United States, the Dillingham Bill failed to pass the House of Representatives. The House proposed its own literacy test bill. The House bill struck out all forty sections of the Senate bill, which was written as a comprehensive bill restating American immigration policy, and replaced it with a brief four-section bill concentrating only on the issue of a literacy test. During the deliberations on the House bill, Congressman John E. Raker from California proposed an amendment to further limit immigrants from Asia. The amendment read, "All aliens, natives of any part of Asia or the islands adjacent to Asia or in Asiatic seas and the descendants of such natives, who can not read in some European language (should be excluded)."¹⁴¹ The Raker amendment, which caused worries among Chinese,¹⁴² was not accepted. The House passed the brief bill on December 18, 1912. Because the Senate would not accept the House bill, the issue was finally resolved in conference. The literacy test bill, without the particular language against Chinese, was vetoed by President Taft on February 14, 1913. The bill ultimately died when the House failed to get enough votes to override the veto, although the Senate did.

      This concerted effort to stop the bill from becoming law reflected the growing Chinese consciousness as a minority group in the United States. They resorted to various means within the American political system to stop a bill. In addition to lobbying Congress, they also cabled the U.S. president, asking him to exercise his veto power in the interest of healthy Sino-American relations.¹⁴³ American-born Chinese used their citizenship rights and fought against discriminatory legislation on behalf of their ethnic group.

      This consciousness was also expressed in a publication of the Chinese American Association.¹⁴⁴ The publication pointed out that the Chinese were enterprising and intelligent people, that they were not barbarians refusing to accommodate to the norms of the mainstream society, and that they were in the United States not to compete for jobs but to develop and promote business and commercial relations between China and the United States.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, they were liaisons between China, a modern republic with a huge market and rich natural resources, and the United States, a modern industrialized republic looking for overseas markets and resources. As liaisons, Chinese in the United States had been contributing to the development of the United States.

      Despite these clear indications of a willingness to be an integral part of American society, anti-Chinese practices persisted. In early 1914, the immigration authorities approached San Francisco CCBA's attorney, John McNab, for an agreement to register all Chinese residents in the United States. When McNab refused to cooperate, the immigration authorities then turned to the attorney for the San Francisco Chinese Chamber of Commerce, O. P. Stidger, on the matter. Stidger agreed and tried to persuade Chinese merchants to support the registration measure by arguing that the registration proposal actually protected the Chinese merchants' rights in the United States. According to the details worked out by Stidger, all Chinese residents, legal or illegal at the time, would be registered and obtain certificates of residence. After the registration was completed, immigration authorities would conduct random searches among Chinese for illegal immigrants.¹⁴⁶

      The CCBA and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce responded to Stidger's proposal quickly and negatively. They had the following worries. First, although the proposal said that all Chinese already in the United States would be considered legal residents, they believed that Chinese who did not belong to the exempt categories and Chinese who did not already have legal documents to present would be deported in the process of registration. Second, after the registration was over, Chinese would have to carry their certificates all the time; homes and businesses could be searched any time of the day or night. Third, those who somehow missed the opportunity to register would be deported. More importantly, the two Chinese organizations very perceptively argued that the measure was discriminatory because of all the immigrant groups in the United States, only the Chinese were required to register. Moreover, because the proposed registration required all Chinese, including American citizens of Chinese ancestry, to register, it was a violation of the U.S. Constitution.¹⁴⁷

      The analysis of consequences and argument about the inherent discrimination and the questionable constitutionality of the registration measure further reinforced the theme that American Chinese as a whole were consciously defending themselves as an ethnic minority group. Studies have shown that some Chinese did enter the United States in ways defined by the immigration laws as illegal.¹⁴⁸ Yet the registration measure had singled out the Chinese as a collective body, creating a confrontation that easily aroused ethnic solidarity. This need to defend themselves as a collective body fueled the emerging ethnic minority consciousness. As an integral part of the American nation, the Chinese now believed that they were under protection of American laws and the Constitution. Just as they knew how to lobby Congress against potential legislation in 1912, they were demonstrating now that they knew how to argue against government measures by using ideas and principles of equality and justice in a democratic polity.

      Reinforcing their consciousness as an ethnic minority group, the Chinese in the United States followed their initial analysis of the consequences of registration with a public letter to the immigration authorities, reasoning against the proposed registration measure. The letter said that the registration proposal made all Chinese merchants, both in China and in the United States, unhappy, which could only hinder further development of commercial relations between the two countries; that it was not the Chinese choice to be cooks, gardeners, or laundrymen (they were eager to learn professional skills); and that immigration officers had been violating American laws as well as basic principles of humanitarianism by bullying and humiliating Chinese.¹⁴⁹

      The analysis and reasoning against the registration proposal, together with the actions taken in 1912 to block the anti-Chinese provision in a Congressional bill, marked a fundamental difference from the defense Chinese presented in the nineteenth century. In 1877, in the midst of anti-Chinese violence and cries for Chinese exclusion legislation, the CCBA presented a "Memorial" to Congress. In the Memorial, the CCBA depicted the Chinese as guests, appealed to the concepts of reciprocity and international justice under bilateral treaties, and used various kinds of evidence to show that Chinese were not immoral, filthy, and dishonest people.¹⁵⁰ In 1912 and 1914, American Chinese were no longer guests; they were American citizens or legal residents in the United States. They did not present a memorial; instead, they directly sent representatives and hired lawyers to Capitol Hill. Chinese with American citizenship rights directly contacted their own district representatives. It was no longer bilateral treaties under which they claimed protection; instead, they evoked the concept of equal protection under the law and challenged the constitutionality of the registration measure. Being aware of America's commercial and trade interests in China, they argued that their presence promoted American relations with China. Instead of citing evidence to prove the good character of the Chinese people, they pointed out that Chinese had been driven into the laundry, the restaurant, and other low and humble businesses.

      The Chinese refusal to accept the registration proposal prevented federal authorities from implementing a nationwide registration in 1914. Yet harassment of American Chinese did not stop. Random searches of Chinese businesses and residences for illegal immigrants continued. In fact, in the same month that the registration proposal was made, immigration officers in the greater Los Angeles area arrested about twenty Chinese and accused them of being illegal immigrants.¹⁵¹ Chinese in the United States continued to shoulder the burden of having to constantly prove their legal status in the United States.

      The emergence of this consciousness was accompanied by the nationwide organization of American-born Chinese. As early as 1895, a small group of American-born Chinese met in San Francisco Chinatown and created an organization for themselves. Named the Native Sons of Golden State (NSGS), its expressed purpose was "to fully enjoy and defend our American citizenship; to cultivate the mind through the exchange of knowledge; to effect a higher character among the members; and to fully observe and practice the principles of Brotherly Love and mutual help."¹⁵² This organization marked a conscious effort by the American-born Chinese to claim their American rights. Yet not until after 1910 did the organization develop and expand. In 1910, 20.9 percent of the total 71,531 American Chinese population was American-born, whereas in 1900 the proportion stood at 10 percent. With the ability to speak English and with American education, American-born Chinese served as bridges between American Chinese and the larger society.¹⁵³

      The search for a modern China energized American Chinatown politics and opened the way for the American-born and educated Chinese to express themselves. We have seen their participation in Chinatown activities in 1911. Their ability to invoke citizenship privileges to defend Chinese rights to immigrate and reside in the United States put them in the forefront of the Chinese struggle against discrimination. To more effectively resist anti-Chinese laws and practices and to participate more meaningfully in American politics, American-born Chinese in cities other than San Francisco also started to organize themselves. Branches of the NSGS were established in Los Angeles and Oakland in 1912 and Fresno and San Diego in 1914, making it a statewide organization.¹⁵⁴

      The significance of the organization was further highlighted when the NSGS won a victory in blocking an anti-Chinese bill in the California state legislature in 1913. The bill, introduced by state senator Anthony Caminetti, was to deprive American citizens of Chinese ancestry of the right to vote.¹⁵⁵

      As a collective effort to fight against discrimination in the United States, the NSGS, a statewide organization, became a national organization in 1915 as the Chinese American Citizens Alliance (CACA). Although it took a few more years for CACA branches to appear in Chinese communities outside California, the organization of the CACA was the natural result of a growing consciousness as an ethnic minority among Chinese in the United States. Whether American-born citizens or immigrants from China, they were claiming the United States as their home and fighting for the rights accorded them by American laws and the Constitution.

      This emerging consciousness as a minority group in the United States was accompanied by a change of attitude toward the Chinese government as a potential protector. In 1912, the Chinese in the United States appealed to China's diplomatic envoy in Washington, D.C., to President Yuan, to the Beijing Parliament, and to the governor of Guangdong for help in blocking the anti-Chinese legislation. In 1914, a newly established CCBA in Fresno, California drafted a letter to President Yuan, asking him to issue a protest against the search for certificates among Chinese in the United States. The letter circulated to all Chinese communities for signatures before it would be sent to Beijing.¹⁵⁶ No response to it was reported.

      This change of attitude marked the beginning of a rapid decline of trust in the Chinese government among Chinese in the United States. The republicanism in China that Chinese in the United States tried to defend started to disappear in 1914. After he suppressed the Second Revolution, President Yuan outlawed the GMD as the major opposition party and, soon after that, dissolved the parliament altogether. He then had a constitution passed, which concentrated all important powers in the hands of the president, whose term of office was ten years and who could serve as many terms as he wished. Chung Sai Yat Po deplored the fact that the president was in total control and that autocratic dictatorship was already a reality in China.¹⁵⁷

      Decline of trust in the Chinese government, a growing consciousness as an ethnic minority in the United States, and a new transnational cultural sensitivity paved the way for the development of a distinctive Chinese American identity. Events in 1915 in China and in America served as catalysts for the emergence and maturation of such an identity.

---

Notes

      1. Chinese World, October 13, 1913.

      2. McKeown, "Reconceptualizing Chinese Diasporas," 325.

      3. The Second Revolution was waged by the GMD under Sun Yat-sen's leadership to overthrow the Yuan government and to defend democracy and republicanism in China. The GMD accused Yuan of having murdered Song Jiaoren, the most prominent GMD leader in the Beijing Parliament, to suppress political opposition. The GMD also accused Yuan of violating parliamentary procedure in obtaining a multi-million-dollar loan without submitting it to the parliament for approval.

      4. Li, The Political History of China, 304-5.

      5. Young China, December 23 and 25, 1911, January 21 and February 16, 1912.

      6. Young China, January 25, 1912.

      7. Young China, March 14 and April 15, 1912.

      8. Young China, March 19, 1912.

      9. Young China, June 14, 1912.

      10. Young China, October 6, 1912. The paper's explanation of the minsheng principle is a bit stretched. When Sun Yat-sen explained the minsheng principle after the establishment of the Republic of China, he emphasized generally the importance of avoiding the social inequities existing in the capitalist world and specifically state control of the land, natural resources, public utilities, transportation, and other large-scale industries. The vague phrase "equal distribution of land" was now explained as a program by which land owners would report to the government the value of their land and the government would put a tax on the land according to its value. Any increase of land value from then on would benefit the country as a whole, not the individual land owner. Sun believed that such taxation of the "unearned increment—the increase in land values resulting from social progress and not from the improvements made by the owner" (Schiffrin's words)—would discourage land speculation and encourage rich people to invest in the development of industry and commerce. It was the lack of industrial and commercial development that had made China a weak nation, Sun believed. Government ownership of national resources and state control over public utilities would prevent exploitation and bring about economic and social justice to all citizens of the republic, Sun pointed out. However, Sun did not speak specifically about confiscation of private property, abolition of rights of inheritance, or confiscation of land. "Response to Reporters from Shanghai's Wenhui ribao (Wenhui Daily)," in Sun Zhongshan quanji, 2: 332. For Sun's explanation of the minsheng principle, see Schiffrin, "Sun Yat-sen's Early Land Policy," 550-57.

      11. Immediately after the founding of the Republic of China, the provisional government legislated to abolish physical torture, forbid the sale of human beings, advise not to bind feet, have all queues cut off, wipe out opium smoking, forbid the sale of laborers overseas, protect overseas Chinese, prevent the corruption of government officials, and abolish titles of daren and laoye among government workers. Quoted in Li, Sun Zhongshan quanzhuan, 207.

      12. Young China, April 7 and 20, 19

      13. Young China, July 3, 1912.

      14. The two most important things Chinese in the United States strove for were to build houses and to buy land for their families in China, and by 1910, some of them had already achieved those goals. For more details, see Lai, Cong huaqiao dao huaren, 236-48.

      15. Chinese World, January 3, 1912.

      16. Chinese World, March 11, 1912.

      17. Chinese World, April 3, 1912.

      18. Chinese World, April 13 and May 8, 1912.

      19. Chinese World, May 18, 1912.

      20. Chinese World, May 27, 1912.

      21. With help from Russia, the "Empire of Mongolia" was declared on December 28, 1911. On November 3, 1912, Russia and Mongolia signed an agreement by which Russia committed itself to help Mongolia "maintain autonomous regime." On November 5, 1913, Russia and China signed a declaration by which Russia recognized China's suzerainty over Outer Mongolia and China recognized Outer Mongolia's autonomous status. Clubb, China and Russia, 153-55.

      22. Chinese World, October 14 and December 27, 1913. Kang Youwei first proposed to the Qing ruling court that Confucianism be made China's state religion in 1898. In 1913, Kang repeated the proposal to the Chinese parliament. Neither time was he successful. Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World, 44, 120.

      23. Chinese World, June 6, 1912.

      24. Chinese World, June 8, 1912.

      25. Chinese World, June 17, 1912.

      26. Chinese World, September 12, 1912.

      27. Chinese World, July 7-10, 1912.

      28. The minsheng principle was precisely aimed at ridding the Chinese nation of poverty. Paul M. A. Linebarger pointed out that minsheng aimed at "national enrichment" and strove for "economic justice." The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, 1

      29. Sparks, China Gold, 152-55.

      30. Chinese World, November 3 and 4, 1913.

      31. Presidents of district associations and CCBA presidents were titled scholars who were sent to the United States by Chinese government as part of its diplomatic corps. This practice continued until 1925, when the United States "objected to giving" such persons "diplomatic status." Lai, "Historical Development of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association," 22.

      32. Confucian Analects, Book XII.

      33. Chung Sai Yat Po, February 20 and 21, 1912.

      34. Chung Sai Yat Po, October 21, 1912 and September 12 and 29, October 23, and November 24 and 25, 1913. It was precisely the opposition offered by leaders representing the Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist, and Taoist faiths in China in the form of a Society for Religious Freedom that blocked Kang's campaign for state religion. Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World, 121.

      35. Chung Sai Yat Po, December 27, 1913.

      36. Chung Sai Yat Po, April 23, 1913.

      37. Chung Sai Yat Po, July 24, 1913.

      38. Chung Sai Yat Po, July 2 and 5, 1912.

      39. Chung Sai Yat Po, May 13, 1913.

      40. Chung Sai Yat Po, May 6, 1913.

      41. Chung Sai Yat Po, March 23, 1912.

      42. Chung Sai Yat Po, August 2, 1913

      43. Chung Sai Yat Po, June 15, 1912.

      44. Chung Sai Yat Po, June 3, 1912.

      45. Chung Sai Yat Po, February 27, 1912.

      46. Chung Sai Yat Po, May 9, 1913 and September 12, 1912.

      47. Chung Sai Yat Po, May 5 and 9, 1913.

      48. The lunar calendar and the Chinese New Year are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

      49. Assimilation is a complicated process, and there are several types of changes that can be called assimilation. If changes are only in the realm of cultural practices, then it is more precisely called acculturation. Through large-scale intermarriage, it can reach amalgamation. The "assimilation" that Chung Sai Yat Po is advocating here is more accurately called acculturation, through which process Chinese modify their cultural practices to fit those of the American mainstream society. My definition of assimilation is from Gordon, Assimilation in American Life, 71.

      50. Chung Sai Yat Po, April 12 and 27 and November 4, 1912 and March 19 and 20, 1914.

      51. Chung Sai Yat Po, April 27, 1912.

      52. The section on cultural identifications in this chapter discusses the conflict between Chung Sai Yat Po's vision and the prevailing American Chinese mentality.

      53. Young China, July 21, 22, and 24, 1913.

      54. Wang, Community and Nation, 145.

      55. Young China, February 18, 1912.

      56. Young China, February 15, 1912. The Native Sons of the Golden State (NSGS) was established in San Francisco in 1895. The organization became a national one in 1915, and the English name was then changed to Chinese American Citizens Alliance (CACA). The Chinese name, Tongyuanhui, remained the same. For more information about the NSGS and CACA, see Chung, "Fighting for Their American Rights," 95-126.

      57. Young China, February 20, 1912.

      58. Chung Sai Yat Po, June 28, 1912.

      59. From December 27, 1911 to February 24, 1912, Young China reported on eleven occasions that Tongmenghui leaders and members went back to China and were taking up government positions: December 27 and 31, 1911 and January 2, 3 (there were two separate reports on the same day), 8, and 9, and February 1, 4, 7, and 24, 1912.

      60. Young China, February 1, 1912.

      61. Young China, January 13, 1912.

      62. According to Confucius, a gentleman should be a man of humanity (ren). When asked what humanity was, Confucius replied, "To subdue one's self and return to propriety is humanity" (Keji fuli wei ren). Confucian Analects, Book XII.

      63. Young China, June 17, 1912.

      64. Young China, September 18, 1912.

      65. Young China, August 3, 1912. According to the paper, Wang died from inhaling poison gas at home, a tragic accident. San Francisco Chronicle also reported Wang's death. According to the Chronicle, Wang's "body was lying on the floor near a small gas stove on which was a pan of water and it is thought that he was preparing a meal and was overcome by the fumes before he could turn off the gas jet." The police said that they found no indications that Wang tried to commit suicide, the Chronicle reported. "Chinese Editor Meets Death by Suffocation," August 3, 1912.

      66. Young China, October 29, 1912.

      67. Young China, April 10, 1912.

      68. Young China, April 10, 1912.

      69. Chinese World, September 27, 1912 and "Chinese Catches an Alleged Thief," San Francisco Chronicle, September 28, 1912.

      70. Young China, October 2, 1912.

      71. Chinese World, May 25, 1912 and Chung Sai Yat Po, June 4, 1912.

      72. Wu, Huaqiao shi gaiyao, 348.

      73. Chinese World, October 12, 1912.

      74. Both Liang Chaojie and Liang Qichao studied in Kang Youwei's private school, Wanmu Caotang, in Canton in the late 1890s. Kang once commented to a friend that "Liang Chaojie was ten times smarter than Liang Qichao." Guan, Huaqi zhanggu, 84.

      75. Chung Sai Yat Po, October 12, 1912.

      76. Young China, October 28 and 29, 1912.

      77. Feng, Huaqiao geming kaiguo shi, 122.

      78. According to some China specialists, during the first few years of the new Republic, China's economy developed and expanded steadily. For an example, see Chesneaux, Le Barbier, and Bergere, China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberation, 22-26.

      79. Chung Sai Yat Po, May 11 and 12, 1913 and Chinese World, June 3, 1913.

      80. Chinese World, June 3, 1913.

      81. Chung Sai Yat Po, May 13, 1913.

      82. Chung Sai Yat Po, June 30, 1913.

      83. Chinese World, June 14 and 17, 1913.

      84. Chung Sai Yat Po, July 9, 1913.

      85. In 1911, Guangdong guomin junzhengfu (the Guangdong People's Military Government) sold bonds worth more than 600,000 Chinese yuan, about U.S.$378,000, to Chinese in the United States. Quoted in Lai, "The Kuomintang in Chinese American Communities," 204. Chinese World apparently is referring to these bonds. The information on the exchange rate between the Chinese yuan and United States dollar is from Schneider et al., Wahrungen der Welt V, 213.

      86. Chinese World, June 19, 1913. It would be very hard to support this accusation. Sun was well known for his devotion to public service. His famous motto was Tianxia weigong ("All for the public under the heavens"). James Cantlie, Sun's teacher at the medical school in Hong Kong, said that Sun's "revolutionary ambition and the tenacious efforts driven by the ambition can be compared to Christ's spirit in saving mankind. Mr. Sun's principles in establishing himself in society and in handling his relations with others were undoubtedly selfless and with no intention of benefiting himself." Quoted in Li, Sun Zhongshan quanzhuan, 196. Sun was known for living a very frugal life. While acting as provisional president of the Republic of China in Nanjing, he ate mostly vegetables, and each of his meals cost 40 cents, whereas most government officials and employees spent $3 on each meal. Deng, "Sun Zhongshan xiansheng yiwen," 22.

      87. Chinese World, June 28, 1913. Sun did not give the Japanese any privileges for running a national bank in China while serving as provisional president. However, he did propose to give Japanese interests joint control of the Hanyehping Company to use Japanese investments to make China "as strong as Japan." However, stockholders of Hanyehping Company rejected the proposal, and Yuan Shikai, who succeeded Sun as provisional president, decided not to implement the proposal. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, 147.

      88. Young China, May 9, 14, and 16, 1913.

      89. The Second Revolution was a short-lived military conflict that did not involve mobilization of the Chinese civilian population. The newly emerged Chinese bourgeoisie, consisting of businessmen, financiers, and industrialists, who gave full support to the establishment of the Chinese Republic, did not support the Second Revolution, either. Just like many Chinese in the United States, China's bourgeoisie did not welcome rebellion or military conflict, for they disrupted the business environment and hindered economic development. China's bourgeoisie opted for the strong man, Yuan Shikai, who had been recognized by foreign powers and supported by China's conservative elite and who represented law and order in China. For a detailed study of China's bourgeoisie and the Second Revolution, see Bergere, "The Role of the Bourgeoisie," 229-95.

      90. Young China, July 25 and 26, August 12, and September 9, 1913.

      91. Chinese World, June 26, 1913 and Chung Sai Yat Po, September 6, 1913.

      92. "The Manifesto of the Progressive Party," Chinese World, June 12, 1913.

      93. Chinese World, June 21, 23, and 25, July 1, 3, and 11, and August 5, 1913.

      94. Young China, June 29, 1913.

      95. Chinese World, July 30, 1913.

      96. Chinese World, August 12, 1913.

      97. Chinese World, September 2, 1913. This accusation stemmed from the fact that Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing fled to Japan in early August as the government forces succeeded in putting down the Second Revolution. Another factor that could have contributed to such an accusation was Sun's visit to Japan in the spring of 1913. During the visit, Sun, who had been appointed by President Yuan to head the national program for developing a modern railroad system in China, talked extensively with Japanese businessmen and politicians about possible economic cooperation between China and Japan. For details of Sun's spring visit to Japan, see Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen, 157-62.

      98. Chinese World, July 6, 1912; Young China, May 29 and June 6, 1912; and Chung Sai Yat Po, May 20, 1912.

      99. Young China, July 14 and 15, 1912; Chinese World, July 16, 1912.

      100. "Letter to CCBA from (Chinese) Ministry of Finance," Chung Sai Yat Po, April 1, 1915.

      101. Young China, November 22 and December 4, 18, and 23; Chinese World, November 19 and December 2 and 30; and Chung Sai Yat Po, December 7, 1912.

      102. Young China, December 28, 1912.

      103. Young China attacked the Yuan government's compromise "not to send officials, not to station troops, and not to migrate people" to Mongolia on January 12, 1913.

      104. Chinese World, July 5, 1913.

      105. Clifford, "Diasporas," 307.

      106. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, proclaimed on March 11, 1912, stated that "All the peoples of China were to be equal, without racial, caste, or religious discrimination.... They were to enjoy freedom of business enterprise, of the press, of assembly, of private correspondence, movement, and worship." Quoted in Li, The Political History of China, 272.

      107. Chung Sai Yat Po, April 23, 1913.

      108. Chung Sai Yat Po, July 10, 1912.

      109. Chung Sai Yat Po, January 17, 1912.

      110. Chinese World, June 22, 1912.

      111. Chung Sai Yat Po, June 24, 1912.

      112. Chinese World, November 27, 1912.

      113. Chung Sai Yat Po, July 10, 1912.

      114. Betty Lee Sung, who grew up in New York Chinatown in the first half of the twentieth century, observed that "Chinese-Americans sometimes swallow the stereotyped image of themselves conjured up by the public. They look upon themselves as insignificant, as handicapped and discriminated against." Sung, The Story of the Chinese in America, 3.

      115. Chung Sai Yat Po, November 2 and December 25, 1912 and August 5, 1913.

      116. Cohen, "Being Chinese," 92.

      117. There were many such recreational societies in American Chinese communities. According to Liu Boji, there were twenty-four such societies in the Americas in 1911. Liu, Meiguo huaqiao shi, 453-60. These societies collected couplets from Chinese all over the Americas, read them, and then rewarded the best ones with a prize. These were purely recreational societies for educated Chinese, and they served as channels for preserving Chinese culture and tradition.

      118. Chung Sai Yat Po, September 18, 1912.

      119. Chinese World, September 27 and October 3, 1912.

      120. Chinese World, September 27, 1912.

      121. Chung Sai Yat Po, October 2, 1912.

      122. Chinese World, October 14, 19, 23, 26, and 28 and November 9, 1912.

      123. Chung Sai Yat Po, October 5, 1912.

      124. Chinese World, October 21, 1912.

      125. Some Chinese business leaders in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce were Christians, and they apparently objected to the proposal of making the Chinese New Year an official holiday in Chinatowns. Therefore, the chamber's decision was the result of a compromise. The decision said that the Western New Year's Day would be observed, but it would be up to individual businesses to decide whether to observe the Chinese New Year's Day. Chinese World, October 2, 1912.

      126. Chung Sai Yat Po, January 30, 1913.

      127. Ta Tung Yat Po is not available for research in this period. This information came from Young China, which quoted and criticized Ta Tung Yat Po. February 2, 1913.

      128. See chapter 4.

      129. The term "roots and routes" is James Clifford's. He argued that diaspora discourse articulates "both roots and routes" to construct "forms of community consciousness and solidarity that maintain identifications outside the national time/space in order to live inside, with a difference." "Diasporas," 308.

      130. See McClain, In Search of Equality and Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers.

      131. Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the 15th Census, 1930, 82, Table 26; Abstract of 14th Census, 1920, 143, Table 48; and Abstract of the 15th Census, 1930, 186, Table 102.

      132. Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore, 234.

      133. Yung, Unbound Feet, 53.

      134. Yung, Unbound Feet, 294-96, Table 2.

      135. Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the 14th Census, 1920, 96, Table 21; and Abstract of the 15th Census, 1930, 81, Table 25.

      136. Annual Report, 1909, United States Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Immigration, quoted in Hsu, "Gold Mountain Dreams and Paper Son Schemes," 53.

      137. According to one estimate, 90 percent of the Chinese who immigrated to the United States under exclusion entered via false documents. Hsu, "Gold Mountain Dreams and Paper Son Schemes," 52.

      138. Senate Committee on Immigration, "An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens and the Residence of Aliens in the United States."

      139. Chinese World, May 24, 1912 and Chung Sai Yat Po, May 27, 1912.

      140. Chinese World, May 16, 20, and 24; Chung Sai Yat Po, May 6, 8, 11, 13, and 16, 1912.

      141. Congressional Record, 49: 804.

      142. Chinese World, May 23, 1912.

      143. Chung Sai Yat Po, June 4, 1912; Chinese World, June 4, 1912.

      144. The Chinese-American Association was organized by Chinese and their Caucasian sympathizers in Los Angeles after the founding of the Republic of China. The organizers believed that discrimination against Chinese resulted mainly from ignorance. Therefore, the organizers resolved to educate the public with facts about Chinese in the United States. Chung Sai Yat Po, March 26, 1912.

      145. Chung Sai Yat Po, May 28, 1912; Chinese World, May 31, 1912.

      146. Chung Sai Yat Po, March 19, 1914. According to Stanford Lyman's estimate, between 1910 and 1920, 7,167 Chinese succeeded in entering the United States illegally from Mexico and Canada. Lyman, Chinese Americans, 106.

      147. Chung Sai Yat Po, March 20, 24, and 25, 1914.

      148. See Yung, "The Fake and the True," 25-56; McCunn, Chinese American Portraits, 107-17; and Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore, 236-37.

      149. Young China, April 4, 5, 6, 9, and 11, 1914.

      150. Memorial: Six Chinese Companies, An Address to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.

      151. Chung Sai Yat Po, March 30, 1914. In 1925, searches for illegal Chinese immigrants were carried out in cities such as New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia. In New York alone, about 600 Chinese were arrested, 134 of whom were finally deported. Lai, Cong huaqiao dao huaren, 77.

      152. Chung, "Fighting for Their American Rights," 98-99.

      153. For more information on the role played by American-born Chinese as bridges between Chinese and the larger society, see Chan, "Race, Ethnic Culture, and Gender," 127-64.

      154. Chung, "Fighting for Their American Rights," 101-2.

      155. Ibid, 108.

      156. Chinese World, May 13, 14, and 15, 1914.

      157. Chung Sai Yat Po, February 7, 1914.