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Document Zbl 1518.94043 - zbMATH Open

(Public) verifiability for composable protocols without adaptivity or zero-knowledge. (English) Zbl 1518.94043

Ge, Chunpeng (ed.) et al., Provable and practical security. 16th international conference, ProvSec 2022, Nanjing, China, November 11–12, 2022. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 13600, 249-272 (2022).

Summary: The Universal Composability (UC) framework [R. Canetti, in: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on foundations of computer science, FOCS 2001, Las Vegas, NV, USA, October 14–17, 2001. Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society 136–145 (2001; doi:10.1109/SFCS.2001.959888)] is the current standard for proving security of cryptographic protocols under composition. It allows to reason about complex protocol structures in a bottom-up fashion: any building block that is UC-secure can be composed arbitrarily with any other UC-secure construction while retaining their security guarantees. Unfortunately, some protocol properties such as the verifiability of outputs require excessively strong tools to achieve in UC. In particular, “obviously secure” constructions cannot directly be shown to be UC-secure, and verifiability of building blocks does not easily carry over to verifiability of the composed construction. In this work, we study Non-Interactive (Public) Verifiability of UC protocols, i.e. under which conditions a verifier can ascertain that a party obtained a specific output from the protocol. The verifier may have been part of the protocol execution or not, as in the case of public verifiability. We consider a setting used in a number of applications where it is ok to reveal the input of the party whose output gets verified and analyze under which conditions such verifiability can generically be achieved using “cheap” cryptographic primitives. That is, we avoid having to rely on adaptively secure primitives or heavy computational tools such as NIZKs. As Non-Interactive Public Verifiability is crucial when composing protocols with a public ledger, our approach can be beneficial when designing these with provably composable security and efficiency in mind.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1515.68035].


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